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Exile within Borders: A study of compliance with the international 
regime to protect internally displaced persons 
 
Gabriel Cardona-Fox, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Catherine Elizabeth Weaver 
 
The UN Guiding Principles for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons 
(GP), introduced before the UN General Assembly in 1998, are the cornerstone of the 
international regime for the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Much has 
been written about their unusual and unlikely development, yet very little is known about 
their effectiveness in altering state behavior towards their displaced populations.  This 
dissertation takes a systematic and global look at patterns of commitment and compliance 
with the IDP regime and identifies forces that have driven states to comply with them.  
 
This dissertation addresses: (1) when and why countries voluntarily bind their 
sovereignty by instituting the GP into domestic law, and (2) if countries that have 
instituted the GP into law in fact comply with them.   
 
I tackle these questions using mixed methods.  First, I present a large-n statistical 
analysis of all documented cases of displacement in the past twenty years to test the 
merits of competing theories of norm diffusion.   Then I trace the evolution of 
Colombia’s response to internal displacement from denial of the crisis to deep 
compliance with the IDP regime. 
 
Both the first and second stages of the dissertation find that, above all, regional 
factors are key to the diffusion of IDP norms.  This is evidenced by the clear pattern of 
 ix 
regional clustering of commitment found in the statistical analysis and by the significant 
influence exerted by Latin American regional politics found in Colombia’s evolving 
response to its displacement crisis.   
 
This study should be of particular interest to policy practitioners and activists 
involved in addressing the problem of internal displacement and protecting the rights of 
IDPs.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Internal forced displacement presents one of the most pressing humanitarian 
challenges in the world today.1  Forced to abandon their homes and livelihoods, and often 
persecuted by their own governments, internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) constitute 
some of the most helpless and neglected people on earth.  Former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan referred to them as “the most vulnerable of the human family” (Forward to 
GP, 2004).  Whether fleeing combat in Ukraine, Syria, North Africa, or the Central 
African Republic, rarely does a week pass when IDPs are not the subject of front-page 
news.  
As I completed this study, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) 
in Geneva estimated that over 9,500 Syrians were fleeing their homes every day.  The 
majority of these forced migrants will be joining the ranks of close to 6.5 million Syrians, 
or a staggering 30 percent of the country’s population that has been effectively exiled 
within its own borders since the conflict erupted in 2011.2  Once displaced, these IDPs 
rarely find adequate food or shelter. The majority of them are left out in the cold, living 
in makeshift settlements in camps under dire conditions.  They have been the targets of 
bombings by both rebel and government forces. The Syrian government refuses to 
formally recognize these people as IDPs, and continues to deny them access to any sort of 
cross-border humanitarian assistance.3  
                                                
1 The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define internal displacement as a situation in which 
“persons or groups of persons […] have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized state border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United 
Nations, 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). 
2 See: IDMC: http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/summary/ 
3 See: http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/05/5427/syria-worlds-biggest-idp-crisis/ 
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Syrians, of course, are not alone.  It is estimated that as of January 2014 over 33.3 
million people in over fifty countries have been forced to migrate within their own 
borders because of conflict and gross human rights violations.4  This represents almost 
twice the size of the world’s cross-border refugee population, which is estimated to be 
16.7 million.5 
Although they flee their homes for largely the same reasons as international 
refugees, IDPs are not protected by the same international treaties and institutions as 
refugees because they do not cross any internationally recognized borders.  In fact, until 
the late 1990s, IDPs were not protected by any sort of international institutional or legal 
framework.  Historically, responsibility for addressing internal displacement fell 
exclusively upon domestic authorities.  
Beginning in the 1980s, as IDPs began to significantly outnumber cross-border 
refugees, the international community began to address this gap for the first time.  During 
this period the idea of national sovereignty also began to be challenged to imply a 
minimum of state responsibility for the wellbeing of countries’ civilian population.  The 
1990s and 2000s saw the emergence of what was to become the international regime to 
protect IDPs.  The centerpiece of this regime was an innovative set of non-biding 
guidelines, or “soft law,” known as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(“GP”).  In a fascinating turn of events, these principles were drafted by a group of legal 
experts and human rights activists, with very little international support, largely outside 
of the traditional inter-governmental treaty-making frameworks.  According to the 
principal authors of the GP, this may have been the first time ever that international 
                                                
4 See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures (last visited 9/3/14). 
5 See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures 
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experts outside the traditional intergovernmental process drafted, reviewed and 
completed a major international legal document (Cohen & Deng, 2008). 
Although much has been written about the fascinating genesis of the GP, very 
little is known about its effectiveness in altering state behavior towards their IDPs or, 
more generally, in improving the lives of these people (Bagshaw, 2005; Phuong, 2004; 
Weiss & Korn, 2006). Aside from some scattered anecdotal evidence there is little 
empirical proof that “soft laws,” such as the GP, really matter.  Nevertheless, a number of 
norm entrepreneurs have sought to adopt the international “soft law” approach to address 
a myriad of other international problems, both within and outside of the world of forced 
migration (Betts, 2010b). 
Why do states choose to commit to and comply with international rules that are 
essentially non-binding and may prove politically costly?  The fact is that very little is 
known about why and when countries choose to comply with the GP or, more generally, 
with other “non-binding” international humanitarian norms. This study seeks to begin 
addressing this gap by taking the first systematic look at international patterns of 
compliance with the IDP in order to identify the forces that drive countries to commit to 
the regime and also by tracing the process through which Colombia – a country plagued 
with one of the largest displacement crises in the world – also came to be a showcase of 
compliance with the IDP regime. 
 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL IDP REGIME 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement constitute a list of thirty 
generally worded rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of the internally 
displaced persons in all phases of displacement (See Appendix A). These principles are 
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intended to guide countries’ efforts to provide protection against arbitrary displacement, 
to protect and assist IDPs during displacement, and set in place guarantees for safe return, 
resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations. Although in and of themselves 
these principles are non-binding, they both reflect and are consistent with international 
law. 
The international regime to protect IDPs had its beginning in the 1990s.  During 
the 1980s, as the number of internally displaced persons surpassed by far the number of 
cross-border refugees the international community began to take note of a serious 
normative humanitarian gap – specifically the fact that there were no international norms 
or institutions in place to protect and assist IDPs.6  In 1992, after the UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Gali submitted the first analytical report on IDPs to the UN’s 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva the Commission authorized him (through 
resolution 1992/73) to appoint a special representative to explore “views and information 
from all Governments on the human rights issues related to internally displaced persons, 
including an examination of existing international human rights, humanitarian laws and 
standards and their application to the protection of the relief and assistance of internally 
displaced persons” (Weiss & Korn, 2006).  Butros-Ghali appointed Francis M. Deng, a 
former Sudanese diplomat and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution to serve as the 
first Representative to the Secretary General for Internal Displacement (“RSG”).  During 
his time as RSG, and with the help of an extensive team of experts from academia and 
Brookings, Deng drafted the GP.  The Guiding Principles were finalized by a team of 
fifty legal experts at a conference in Vienna hosted by the Austrian government, one of 
                                                
6 As pointed out by Weiss & Korn (2006), at the end of the Cold War both the nature of wars and the 
politics of asylum changed radically.  Fewer political points could be scored by accepting refugees, 
especially when so many of them came from poorest countries in the world instead of Eastern Europe.  
Refugee numbers diminished while IDPs shot up still further; particularly in Africa where stability 
crumbled as superpowers stopped jockeying in an ideological war and virtually abandoned the continent. 
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the GP’s leading sponsors, and were then officially presented by the RSG to the UN in 
1998. 
As the RSG pointed out from the outset, even though the Guiding Principles were 
based on existing international laws, they did not constitute “binding instruments” 
(Schmidt, 2004).  The Representative and his team chose to employ a “soft law” 
approach rather than to call for the drafting of a formal treaty on which to build a 
protection regime for IDPs.  This decision was made because, among other things, they 
believed that treaty negotiations could have taken a very long time.  A formal treaty 
would have required ratification by every country (which was not guaranteed), and could 
possibly have watered down some important norms during a negotiating process in which 
countries could seize the opportunity to object to existing international human rights and 
humanitarian law (Kalin, 2001).  Many legal scholars have agreed with the RSG’s 
approach and have argued that a “soft law” approach could in fact prove to be more 
effective in the long run than “hard law” (Bagshaw, 2005; Raustiala, 2005; Weiss & 
Korn, 2006).    
Although a number of countries (led by Egypt, Sudan, and India) initially 
objected to the manner in which the Guiding Principles were developed by non-
governmental actors, the principles were generally well received.7  At the behest of 
Sérgio Vieira de Mello, who at the time was serving as Under-Secretary General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) – the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance – endorsed and 
                                                
7 To allow their concerns to be addressed, the Swiss government hosted a series of meetings, beginning in 
2001, by the end of which the dissenting states abandoned their reservations and expressed support for the 
GP.  In particular, they were reassured that the experts involved had not created new law but had mostly 
compiled and restated what had already been negotiated and agreed to by governments.  According to 
Cohen and Deng (2008), they were also influenced by the many governments of the Group of 77 
developing nations who quickly found the principles to be a valuable tool in dealing with internal 
displacement in their own countries. 
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disseminated the Guiding Principles among the major UN humanitarian and development 
agencies and international NGOs and began applying them in the field (Cohen & Deng, 
2008).  At the world summit in 2005, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan referred to 
the principles as setting the “basic international norm” for the protection of IDPs.  A 
summit outcome resolution referred to them as “an important international framework” 
(UN, 2005).  Since then, the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the 
Commission on Human Rights have all acknowledged or recognized these principles.  
Since the GP came into being in 1998 a number of countries have signaled their 
commitment to the regime. As of 2010, 21 countries – approximately a third of all 
countries with internal displacement crises since 1990 – had developed laws and policies 
aimed at translating some of the abstract provisions of the Guiding Principles into 
directives at the national level.  This includes among others: Colombia, Sri Lanka, 
Uganda and Turkey (IDMC, 2011). 
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Figure 1: IDP Crises 1990-2010 
 
 
 
  Missing Laws on IDPs   Adopted Laws on IDPs 
 
Russia  1993  Azerbaijan 1999 
	  
India 2003 
Guatemala 1994  Burundi 2000 
	  
Nepal 2004 
Tajikistan 1994  Angola 2001 
	  
Peru 2004 
Bosnia & H 1995  Sierra Leone 2001 
	  
Uganda 2004 
Georgia 1996  Liberia 2002 
	  
Turkey  2004 
Colombia 1997  Serbia 2002 
	  
Iraq 2008 
Armenia 1998  Sri Lanka 2002 
	  
Sudan 2009 
 
 
 
The proliferation of domestic laws and polices is a critical step for the 
development of the regime.  Because the regime depends primarily on domestic 
governments to assume responsibility over the protection of IDPs, in order for the 
Guiding Principles to become translated into concrete action on the ground they had to be 
internalized into countries’ domestic legislation (Kalin, 2005).  Moreover, the framers of 
the regime hoped that these norms would eventually harden and become binding for all 
  8 
countries through the development of customary international laws as a critical number of 
countries adopted laws on internal displacement. To this end, Deng and the two 
succeeding RSGs launched an ambitious series of country visits, workshops and 
consultations. Despite their efforts, many countries with internal displacement have yet to 
adopt any sort of domestic framework to protect IDPs even though they do not openly 
object to the principles per se.   
Another strategy adopted by the promoters of the GP has been to harden these 
norms at the regional level.  In the presence of an often unwilling, and ineffective UN 
system, the promoters of the GP realized that regional institutions could become the first 
line of defense in preventing situations of internal displacement and protecting IDPs 
(Cohen & Deng, 1998b).  To this end, the Organization of American States and the 
Council of Europe have recommended their member states to adopt the Guiding 
Principles through national legislation.8  Moreover, Africa has seen two important 
regional initiatives.  In 2006 the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance 
to Internally Displaced Persons obliged its eleven signatories, including Kenya, Uganda, 
Central African Republic, Sudan the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) to incorporate the Guiding Principles into Domestic Law.9  In 2009 the 
African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (better known as the “Kampala Convention”), which binds 
all union members to provide legal protections for the rights and well being of IDPs 
according to the GP.  This convention entered into force in December 2012, and was the 
                                                
8 In 2006, at the instigation of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Population, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe agreed to 13 recommendations on IDPs 
which underlined the obligation to establish legal protections for IDPs (Jonker, 2008). 
9 See: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, “Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to 
Internally Displaced Persons” (2006). (http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52384fe44.pdf). 
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first regional binding instrument ever developed for the protection and assistance of 
IDPs. This was also particularly significant because Africa is home to more than a third 
of the world’s IDPs and includes three countries that have consistently figured among the 
five largest displacement crises in the world – Sudan, DRC and Somalia. 10   
A number of international development and humanitarian agencies began using 
the GP extensively, raising awareness and training practitioners on the application of the 
Principles and employing them as an advocacy tool and a checklist to monitor and assess 
the needs of IDPs.  Most significantly, UNHCR directly incorporated the GP into its 
protection and human rights activities for IDPs. The IASC, an agglomeration of the major 
international humanitarian, development and human rights agencies, welcomed the 
principles and disseminated them by developing a number of tools based on the GP to 
provide operational guidance to their staff.  These included a Manual on Field Practice in 
Internal Displacement, a Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced 
Persons, and the IASC Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (R. 
Cohen, 2013). 
Sixteen years after their publication, the successful institutionalization of the 
Guiding Principles at the international level has indeed been impressive and encouraging, 
particularly given their unconventional genesis.  Their acceptance and institutionalization 
at the international level, however, has not automatically translated into meaningful 
change in the countries with displacement.  For countries to signal meaningful 
commitment to the regime they must, at a minimum, institute domestic legislation 
reflective of these principles.  The fact that an important number of countries with 
                                                
10 (see: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2013/201312-af-kampala-convention-
progress-report-thematic-en.pdf) 
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displacement have yet to institute such laws represents an important problem that raises 
concern over the long-term viability of this innovative “soft law” approach.  
In practice, the international regime for the protection of IDPs is arguably quite 
weak.  The GP in and of themselves are not binding. Their wording is purposely very 
general and vague.  And, because the regime is based on “soft law,” it lacks any sort of 
robust international enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.  Despite the fact that the 
norm has been diffusing internationally, as predicted by constructivist theories of IR 
(Orchard, 2010b), which are explained latter, and that an increasing number of countries 
have take the GP seriously, compliance with the IDP regime has been patchy at best 
(IDMC, 2010).   
Even among countries that have instituted domestic legislation in line with the 
GP, commitment has not necessarily translated into implementation or even compliance. 
As continuous reporting by the IDMC (2010) and the Brookings Project on Internal 
Displacement (Ferris, 2008) makes clear, there has been a notable gap between 
commitment and implementation of the of IDP norm-based laws and policies.   
This suggests that commitment to and compliance with the GP may be driven by 
slightly different mechanisms.  While it is very probable that commitment to these norms 
has been driven principally by many of the international processes of human rights norm 
diffusion suggested by international relations theory, implementation at the national level 
may be a different matter altogether which could be determined primarily by domestic, or 
even regional, factors.   
This study represents a first attempt to address several important questions:  (1) 
How effective have these Guiding Principles really been in the past fifteen years?  (2) To 
what extent are countries really complying with them?   (3) Why do some countries 
commit to the GP while others have not?   
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WHY IS STUDYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE GP IMPORTANT? 
The research questions pursued in this study are driven simultaneously by 
theoretical, empirical and policy concerns.  Theoretically, the regime presents a puzzle 
for international relations theory.  The GP constitute an example of what has been 
referred to as “privately generated soft law” (Abbott, 2007).  It is privately generated, in 
the sense that it was drafted and promoted primarily by non-state actors with the 
surprisingly limited participation of states.  It is considered “soft” because the GP are 
legally non-binding and thus difficult to enforce. Unlike other regimes based on hard law, 
the IDP regime does not have an established international monitoring body to which 
countries are obliged to report.  There is no system of sanctions or channels through 
which to investigate or settle grievances. The emerging regime also stands in opposition 
to some of the most established norms in international relations – the norms of national 
sovereignty and non-interference.11 As such, the dominant paradigms in international 
relations such as neorealism (Gilpin, 1983; Mearsheimer, 1994; Morgenthau, 1948; 
Waltz, 1979) and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984) have difficulty explaining 
why states would voluntarily bind their sovereignty by complying with such norms in the 
absence of coercion from stronger states or when transactional costs are high (Krasner, 
1993).  
The existing scholarship in international relations in general, and the field of 
human rights studies in particular, has focused primarily on studying patterns of 
compliance and the effectiveness of “hard law” instruments (binding international treaties 
and conventions) to the detriment of “soft law” instruments such as the GP (Landman, 
                                                
11 According to a statist perspective of international relations these represent the fundamental principles of 
international legitimacy.  Since the peace of Westphalia (1648), the modern international system has been structured 
around the principles of sovereignty of the nation-state, which grants a state exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory 
and resources, including its population.  In turn, sovereignty has implied the principle non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states (Donnelly, 2003).    
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2005; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Simmons, 2009).12  Part of the reason may 
be that, because of their binding nature, hard laws are perceived as being more important 
or relevant to international politics.  In contrast, disagreement exists as to what soft norms 
are and what compliance pull they exert (Shelton, 2007).  
Soft laws such as the GP also present a significant empirical challenge.  In many 
ways soft laws are “messier” and thus more difficult to study than hard law instruments.  
They create both conceptualization and measurement difficulties.  Because their 
provisions are sometimes vague and lofty, indicators of compliance are tricky to 
operationalize.  Because soft laws in general and the GP in particular lack well-
established monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the data on compliance is often 
scarce and selective.  After more than a decade since the inception of the regime, and 
thanks to the efforts of the IDMC and the Brookings Project on internal displacement, 
enough data exist today to begin to analyze patterns of compliance with the GP.13 
Very little empirical work has been done to study compliance with international 
norms on internal displacement.  Most of the research to date has focused on studying the 
regime’s surprising emergence (Bagshaw, 2005; Phuong, 2004; Weiss & Korn, 2006).  
Although there have been a number of brief qualitative case studies on individual 
countries (Cohen & Deng, 1998a; Ferris, Mooney, & Stark, 2011; Korn, 1999), to date no 
                                                
12 There has been a significant body of scholarship on compliance with “soft law” instruments in the environmental 
regime.  See for example: (Mitchell, 1994)  And (Victor, Raustiala, & Skolnikoff, 1998) I maintain, however, that the 
environmental regime is dominated by problems of collective action which are virtually absent in the area of human 
rights regime so that environmental soft law is qualitatively different than soft law pertaining to human rights and 
humanitarian matters.  
13 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC), is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.  At the request 
of the United Nations, the Geneva-based IDMC runs an online database providing comprehensive information and 
analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.  Another important monitoring body is the Project on Internal 
Displacement at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 
was created to support the work of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons in carrying out the responsibilities of the mandate and promoting the dissemination and application 
of the GP.  Together, these two bodies have made publicly available the most up to date information on the state of 
internal displacement crises and government responses.    
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one has performed an independent, systematic and global evaluation of patterns of 
compliance with the IDP regime. As Orchard (2010) notes, internal displacement remains 
an area where scant comparative research of government implementation policies has 
been done, making it a fruitful area for research (Orchard, 2010).  Moreover, most efforts 
to study and monitor state behavior towards IDPs are being conducted by the same 
institutions and individuals who are charged with promoting the regime and in some 
cases were involved in drafting the GP in the first place. This poses a problem of 
objectivity and independence, in part because most of the empirical data generated is 
geared primarily towards promoting state reform rather than understanding state 
behavior.  An independent, systematic and comprehensive evaluation of patterns of 
compliance with the IDP regime will be of interest to scholars interested in understanding 
the dynamics of forced migration, the power of privately generated soft law, as well as 
the evolving interpretation of the concept of national sovereignty and its voluntary 
relinquishment.14 
Global policy concerns also drive this research project.  The phenomenon of 
internal forced displacement represents an urgent and growing challenge to the 
international community not only because of obvious human rights and humanitarian 
concerns, but also because internal displacement has spillover effects into areas of 
international security, economic development, and international migration.  As pointed 
out by Jan Egeland, former Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordination: “Forced to abandon their homes and livelihoods, the 
internally displaced are often the most forgotten and neglected people in the many 
forgotten and neglected emergencies around the world” (Egeland, 2004).  Although they 
                                                
14 The GP were written very much in the spirit of the normative reformulation of national sovereignty known as the 
responsibility to protect (“R2P”).  As such, patterns of compliance with this legal instrument may empirically help shed 
some light as to the fate of this new norm. 
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are displaced for many of the same reasons, IDPs are seldom given the same international 
attention, assistance and protection as refugees who crossed international borders.  Even 
in war settings, displaced persons suffer significantly higher rates of mortality than the 
general population. In Somalia in 1992, for example, the IDP rate of mortality was 50 
times higher.15  
Since the end of the Cold War the number of IDPs has grown dramatically, 
quickly surpassing the number of cross-border refugees by a factor of two to one (Weiss 
& Korn, 2006). Since 1997, the global number of IDPs has steadily increased from 
around 17.4 million to over 33.3 million in 2014. In comparison, the number of refugees 
has remained fairly stable, fluctuating between 13 million and 17 million during in the 
same period.16 The number of IDPs seems certain to increase as a result of continuing 
political instability and the effects of climate change in many regions of the world.  
  
                                                
15 World Health Organization, “Internally Displaced Persons, Health and WHO.”  Paper presented at the humanitarian 
affairs segment of the substantive session of the Economic and Social Council for 2000, p. 5.  Quoted in (Deng, 2007) 
16 See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Refugees and IDPs Fleeing Conflict and Violence 1989-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IDMC (2014). Internal Displacement: Global Overview People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence 
 
Internal displacement affects almost every region of the world.  Over 50 countries 
have documented internally displaced populations.  As of December 2013, the countries 
with the largest displacement related to conflict and violence were Syria (6.5 million), 
Colombia (5.7 million), Nigeria (3.3 million), DRC (2.9 million), Sudan (2.4 million), 
Iraq (2.1 million) and Somalia (1.1 million). The region with most IDPs was Sub-Saharan 
Africa (with 12.5 million) in 21 countries but there have also been significant and 
increasing numbers of IDPs in the Middle East and North Africa (9.1 million), the 
Americas (6.3 million) and South and South-East Asia (at least 3.2 million) (IDMC, 
2014a). 
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Figure 3: Internal Displacement Crises as of December 2014 
Source: IDMC (2014). Internal Displacement: Global Overview People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence 
 
This study should also has direct relevance for policy practitioners and activists 
involved in addressing directly or indirectly the problem of internal displacement and 
protecting the rights of IDPs.  Its findings should help a number of inter-governmental 
organizations (i.e. UN, the ICRC and regional bodies) as well as international non-
governmental human rights and humanitarian organizations (“INGOs”) to make the most 
effective use of their limited time and resources to influence state behavior. But, most 
importantly, this study’s findings bring to light some of the weaknesses in compliance 
with the existing regime and suggest some needed changes, reforms, and/or tools – 
particularly in what involves the gap between norm acceptance and implementation. 
There are several reasons why, in my view, the question of compliance with the 
IDP regime has not been adequately resolved in either the international relations or 
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forced migration literature. As noted by Betts (2009), despite the political and 
international nature of forced migration, issues relating to refugees and internal 
displacement are rarely addressed by scholars of international relations. This is puzzling 
because forced migration is enormously relevant to international relations.17  Forced 
migration touches upon, among other things, matters relating to international cooperation, 
globalization, global public goods, ethnicity and nationalism, sovereignty, international 
organizations, regime complexity, security, the role of non-state actors, interdependence, 
regionalism, and North-South relations. 
The area of forced migration studies has also failed to examine the issue of 
compliance within the IDP regime.  Forced migration, in fact, has rarely taken a top-
down look at issues of migration, that places the state at the center of analysis, or drawn 
upon the tools offered by IR to inform its analysis.  As noted by Betts, “Forced Migration 
Studies have primarily drawn upon disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, 
geography and law to analyze the causes and consequences of human displacement.  It 
has generally offered a ‘bottom-up’ perspective which places displaced people at the 
center of the analysis” (Betts, 2009) and thus fails to analyze issues of international norm 
compliance or implementation.  In order to understand the macro-level structures and 
processes that determine state compliance with the new regime our research program 
adopts a “top-down” approach to analysis drawing from the analytical tools of IR. 
                                                
17 The International Organization for Migration defines forced migration as:  “A migratory movement in 
which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural 
or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people 
displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development 
projects).” (see: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-
1.html#Forced-migration) 
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HYPOTHESES AND MAIN ARGUMENT  
What motivates countries to commit to and comply with intrusive international 
norms that are potentially costly and are essentially unenforceable?  A significant body of 
literature in international relations and international law suggests two broad explanations.  
First, the rational-instrumentalist interpretation argues that states generally comply with 
international norms when they perceive them to be in their national or strategic interest 
(Gilpin, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Mearsheimer, 1994; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979).  
Under this view, states principally follow a “logic of consequence.”  A second, more 
constructivist view, emphasizes that international rules sometimes have a special 
normative power or legitimacy pull that causes states to comply with them because they 
believe that, given their identity, it is the right thing to do (Katzenstein, 1996; Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999; Wendt, 1999).  States are then said to follow a 
“logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998). 
These two major schools, of course, offer pure or simplified models of 
understanding state compliance with international norms and soft law.  In actuality states 
may be motivated by both forms of logic simultaneously or at different stages of a norm’s 
cycle.  These two logics are not mutually exclusive. This study’s position is that these 
two schools do not offer necessarily alternative or competing explanations but rather 
synergistic approaches to understanding compliance.  The more meaningful and policy-
relevant question is when and how each of these mechanisms of compliance matters most 
thus helping us discern, for example, variation in the depth of countries’ compliance with 
international soft law.  Under what circumstances are countries more likely to commit 
and comply with the IDP regime?  What factors increase the likelihood of commitment 
and compliance?  It is important to understand, for example, when and why some 
countries may commit to the regime by instituting domestic legislation on internal 
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displacement but fail to implement it appropriately, and why and when others implement 
these laws and comply with them on a consistent basis.  The following section elaborates 
on each broad theoretical approach, citing some examples and extrapolating some 
hypotheses that may be tested in the case of compliance with the GP. 
 
Rationalist-Instrumentalism 
The rationalist-instrumentalist approach, characteristic of the neo-realists and neo-
liberal schools in international relations (IR), (Gilpin, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 
1993; Mearsheimer, 1994; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979) argues that in an anarchic 
environment states engage in a cost/benefit analysis that focuses on material interests and 
external constraints when determining whether to comply with international norms.18 To 
one extreme of the rational-instrumentalist understanding of IR is the belief that 
compliance with sovereignty-constraining norms, such as human rights laws, can only be 
the result of coercion by more powerful states that use their material power to impose 
their will on weaker and more dependent countries (Krasner, 1993).  While in principle 
this should bode well for human rights norms, such as the GP, given that the United 
States and European Union have relatively good human rights records, powerful 
countries are rarely consistent in their application of human rights questions to their 
foreign policy and they rarely grant human rights questions priority (Neumayer, 2005).   
A more nuanced rationalist-instrumental theory acknowledges that hegemonic 
powers may play a key role in norm diffusion through the exercise of both material and 
                                                
18 Although there are significant differences between the neo-realists and neo-liberal schools, primarily surrounding 
the importance of relative gains over absolute gains, for our purpose both approaches can be collapsed under the same 
neo-utilitarian umbrella.  See (Ruggie, 1998) 
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normative influence on weaker states.   According to this theory socialization19 occurs 
primarily after wars and political crises, periods marked by international turmoil and 
restructuring as well as the fragmentation of ruling coalitions and legitimacy crises at the 
domestic level.  Socialization is distinct from, but not independent of coercion manifested 
as the manipulation of material incentives (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990).  The rational-
instrumentalist understanding of IR thus suggests three broad international mechanisms 
in which material interests and constraints may influence outcomes and which may be 
tested in the case of the GP: coercion, issue-linkage, and cooperation. 
States may commit to and implement the GP because they are coerced by other 
more powerful countries or even international institutions through the use of positive 
incentives and penalties (“sticks and carrots”).  Mechanisms of coercion may include the 
use of military force, the threat of economic or military sanctions and/or the promise of 
military and economic assistance.  Even some constructivists suggest that material 
incentives and threats are often important at the early stages of norm diffusion 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).  We 
would expect countries that are under military occupation (such as Iraq and Afghanistan), 
or have a significant foreign military presence (or UN peace-keeping mission), and which 
are of particular strategic importance to western powers inclined in addressing internal 
displacement in order to achieve peace and political stability to be most likely to 
experience this type of coercion. 
                                                
19 Broadly defined, “socialization” is the process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse 
expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting (Johnston, 2008).  It involves the transmission of rules of 
socially appropriate behavior for actors.  In international relations, socialization is simply defined as the 
process by which international norms are internalized by states and their leaders, assuming a “taken for 
granted” nature, and implemented domestically. (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Risse, 1997; Risse & 
Sikkink, 1999). 
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Another more subtle mechanism of instrumental pressure involves the explicit or 
implicit linkage of state behavior towards human rights, more generally, and towards 
issues of internal displacement more specifically, with other areas of strategic importance 
to targeted countries (E. B. Haas, 1980; Lohmann, 1997).  This may occur when 
international organizations, such as the European Union (EU), NATO or the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), make accession to membership 
conditional on the attainment of certain human rights standards or when powerful 
countries insert human rights provisions into preferential trade agreements (E. Hafner-
Burton, 2009). 
A third possible rational-instrumentalist mechanism of compliance involves 
opportunities for voluntary cooperation. Although internal displacement, like other 
human rights issues, can be conceived as an issue primarily of domestic concern it is 
likely that some cases of internal displacement produces significant externalities or need 
for international cooperation.  Displacement crises can affect the political stability of 
neighboring countries either because IDPs threaten to burden a neighbor by migrating 
across borders or because IDP camps in a neighboring country become a source of 
logistical support and recruitment for local insurgency groups (Terry, 2002).  Efforts to 
negotiate a binding agreement for the protection of IDPs in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa, for example, were largely driven by material incentives to solve a collective 
action problem (Beyani, 2008).  However, such opportunities for cooperation are likely to 
be rare and largely confined to cases where displacement is more concentrated and 
borders are more porous. 
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Constructivism 
Constructivist theories in IR emphasize mechanisms that draw on the normative 
power of international rules independent of the exercise of state power.  Compliance is 
often less a matter of rational calculation or imposed constraint than one of internalized 
identities and norms of appropriate behavior. In these cases policymakers are said to 
follow a  “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998).  Under this view, states 
comply with international norms because they view them as legitimate or appropriate 
(Katzenstein, 1996; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999; Wendt, 1999).  
Many theories of compliance in the international legal literature, most notably Frank’s 
“legitimacy theory” (1990) and Koh’s “theory of obedience” (1997, 1998) also adopt 
similar normative explanations of state behavior.20  Some constructivists, however, do 
recognize that at the beginning, norms often require some sort of material incentives or 
coercion to prompt states to commit even if, according to their own perspective, states do 
not really intend to comply with the norms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  
 
 
Cultural Match 
Constructivists have argued that compliance with an international norm is more 
likely to occur when there is some sort of “cultural match” between the norm and the 
target country.  States are most likely to accept a rule’s legitimacy if it resonates with a 
country’s traditions, habits and values as embodied in their laws and institutions 
(Acharya, 2004; Checkel, 1999; Gurowitz, 1999; Hurd, 1999; Risse & Sikkink, 1999).21 
Checkel (1999) defines “cultural match” as “a situation where the prescriptions embodied 
                                                
20 Also see: (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) and (Goodman & Jinks, 2004) 
21 According to Busby, different terms describe this same concept: grafting (Price), cultural match (Cortell 
& Davis, Checkel) fit (Kingdon), the nature of political discourse (Hall), resonance (Snow, Ikenberry), 
political culture (Risse-Kappen), legitimacy (Jacobsen), concordance (Legro), congruence (Acharya).  See 
(Busby, 2007) 
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in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, 
the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies 
(organizational ethos and administrative procedures).”    
Constructivst theories of IR specify two basic mechanisms of state socialization 
and norm diffusion.  Both mechanisms involve the actions of individuals (“norm 
entrepreneurs”) and international organizations such as international tribunals, advocacy 
networks, epistemic communities and arbiters of moral authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).   
 
Socialization from “Above” 
The first mechanism focuses on channels of socialization “from above” namely 
through direct international exchanges of political elites with norm-promoters at the 
international level.  Borrowing from insights in institutionalist sociology, some 
constructivists argue that individuals and groups experience pressure to assimilate to the 
surrounding culture through international institutions such as regional organizations, the 
rulings of international tribunals and coordinated international advocacy campaigns.  This 
mechanism may involve the persuasion of elites through moral argumentation and social 
learning (Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2000) or they may involve more subtle processes of 
acculturation that consist of micro-mechanisms of peer-pressure, orthodoxy, mimicry and 
status maximization (Goodman & Jinks, 2004; Johnston, 2001).  According to this 
explanation elites do not necessarily have to become convinced about the appropriateness 
of a certain norm, but at least have to be convinced of the necessity to conform to or 
emulate scripts of legitimacy (Krasner, 1999; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; O. W. Meyer, 
Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997).  This path to compliance is sometimes marked by a 
passive acceptance of the norm and a “decoupling” of rhetoric (aimed at outside actors) 
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and action (aimed at domestic actors) (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Schmitz & Sikkink, 
2002).  In other words, the dominant mode of action is characterized by an outward 
“logic of appropriateness” and an inward self-interested “logic of consequence.”  
Although constructivists disagree as to the long-term significance of this decoupling 
between superficial rhetoric of norm adoption and state behavior, I suspect that at least 
initially, top-down mechanisms of socialization may lead to shallower compliance than 
would other forms of socialization from below.  As explained by Dai (2005), in the 
absence of established international monitoring mechanisms, sustained compliance with a 
new norm may require domestic social mobilization. 
In the case of internal displacement, most of the effort to socialize states at the 
international level is performed by the Representative to the UN Secretary General 
(“RSG”).  He has tried to influence states through official country visits, the publication 
of reports and through intense lobbying within the United Nations and UNHCR, the UN 
agency for refugees that has increasingly taken the lead on issues of displacement.22  A 
number of international and regional human rights and development organizations such 
as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Inter-American Commission for Human 
Rights (IACHR), and others, have on occasion helped to promote the application of the 
Guiding Principles.  They do this by educating governments, lobbying within regional 
organizations and sometimes engaging in naming and shaming campaigns but their 
involvement with this issue has been more sporadic than that of the RSG and UNHCR.  If 
this mechanism of socialization from above is at play our study should find that countries 
                                                
22  Although UNHCR’s initial mandate did not specifically include internal displacement it has, for many 
years, been assisting and protecting millions of IDPs.  Following the 2005 UN reforms and the adoption of 
the “cluster approach,” UNHCR has taken the lead in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of IDPs 
and the management of their camps (Weiss & Korn, 2006). 
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are more likely to commit and comply with the GP after being targeted by these entities – 
perhaps following close exchanges with the RSG during country visits.   
Opportunities for international socialization also exist through the operational 
activities of regional organizations (such as the African Union, the OAS and the OSCE) 
that have officially endorsed the GP.  Socialization may also have resulted from the 
activities and rulings of regional tribunals such as the Inter-American Commission for 
Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Transnational Activism 
A second version of constructivism argues that state socialization occurs from 
below through the social mobilization of principled activists and domestic interest groups 
which exercise pressure on the governing elites (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).  
Socialization may be a bottom-up process exclusively which results from the 
mobilization of domestic principled and interest groups, as much of the social movement 
literature suggests (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnuco, 1997) or may involve a more complex 
boomerang strategy in which pressure is exerted on the state simultaneously at the 
international and domestic levels through the coordinated actions of transnational activist 
networks (TANs) composed of NGOs and other potentially like-minded actors (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).   
If this bottom-up mechanism of state socialization is taking place we should 
expect to see a change in state behavior in states where civil society is mobilized on 
behalf of the displaced.  This mobilization may take the form of intense lobbying of 
policy makers, legal challenges in domestic courts, the engagement of influential 
epistemic communities, and domestic shaming campaigns.  The emergence of activist 
networks, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change.  In order to be 
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effective activist networks must also be afforded the space, in terms of civil and political 
liberties, and domestic institutions such as independent courts through which to exert 
pressure on their government.  Stable democracies and countries with relatively high 
levels of civil and political liberties, and countries with independent courts and a strong 
rule of law tradition should offer activists the best prospects to alter state behavior 
(Simmons, 2009). 
According to a constructivist view point, the successful diffusion of internal 
displacement norms should also depend on the normative resonance or “cultural match” 
of the GP with existing domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system 
(constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and 
administrative procedures) (Checkel, 1999).  Because the GP are based on existing 
international human rights and humanitarian norms, we should expect countries that have 
signed and ratified most international human rights treaties and conventions as well as the 
signatories of the 1951 Convention on Refugees to be most likely to commit to and 
implement the GP.  
When countries are driven to comply because of normative concerns (whether 
through pressure exerted form below, from above or both) there should be some semantic 
evidence that countries are justifying their behavior towards IDPs because of ideational 
considerations.  Shifts in policy should be marked by evidence of shaming, 
argumentation, persuasion and dialogue that make appeals to normative commitments, 
collective identity, and morality.       
The diffusion of IDP norms is likely to involve many of the normative and 
instrumental mechanisms of norm diffusion described above. In some cases they may 
operate simultaneously at different levels or at different stages of the norm cycle.  Some 
of these processes are more likely to be dominant in particular countries.  As suggested 
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by Checkel (1999), mechanisms of norm diffusion vary as a function of domestic 
structure.  While “bottom-up” mechanisms marked by domestic social mobilization in 
support of international norms should prevail among liberal and corporatist states; “top-
down” mechanisms based on social learning should be most effective in authoritarian 
states.  Hegemonic powers, like the US and its western allies, may also play a more 
important role in countries under occupation.  
For the most part, because of the GP’s origin as soft law developed by activists 
with little participation from states, their diffusion should be largely dependent on the 
transnational socialization efforts and work of transnational human rights activist 
networks (“TANs”), as suggested by a number of constructivists theorists (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).  Their model, in fact, 
explains quite nicely how the IDP norms became institutionalized at the international 
level in the first place.  These networks employ a mixture of different normative and 
instrumental pressure mechanisms at different stages of a norm’s life cycle.  Whereas in 
the initial stages of the socialization process instrumental adaptation tends to prevail, later 
on, argumentation, persuasion and dialogue become more significant while 
institutionalization and habituation mark the final steps in the process (Risse-Kappen et 
al., 1999). 
According to this model, the mechanism by which transnational socialization takes place 
is rather simple. Motivated by altruism, norm entrepreneurs work to persuade states to 
adopt a new norm. Once the new norm has been adopted by a critical mass of states, a 
norm cascades internationally and those who embrace the norm pressure others to accept 
it. This results in an internalization of the norm across an international dimension 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This process of transnational socialization includes 
strategic bargaining, moral consciousness-raising through argumentative discourse and 
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institutionalization and habitualization (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).  Under this scenario, 
countries are motivated by logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1998) or a desire to 
conform to share ideas of norms and behavior rather than a rational calculation to 
maximize material gains. 
Norm entrepreneurs can at times be states, usually members of the community of 
liberal democracies (Risse-Kappen 1996) but usually consist of transnational advocacy 
networks (“TANs”) that pressure states that violate human rights to change their behavior 
(Keck & Sikkink 1998). Keck & Sikkink (1998) define TANs as “networks of activists 
distinguished by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their 
formation.”  They are communicative structures that link actors working internationally 
on a particular issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and 
dense exchanges of information and services.23  What is novel about TANs is their ability 
to utilize non-traditional international actors to use information strategically to help 
create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressure, and obtain leverage over 
much more powerful organizations and governments (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).   They 
frame issues in a way that makes them more understandable to their targeted audiences, 
instilling a sense of urgency and encouraging action. TANs serve as a source of 
information and testimony.  They can also promote norm implementation by pressuring 
target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with regional and 
international standards. 
Major actors in TANs may include: international and domestic NGOs (including 
research and advocacy organizations); local social movements; foundations; the media; 
churches, trade unions and intellectuals; parts of regional and international organizations; 
                                                
23 Keck and Sikkink define networks as forms of organizations characterized by voluntary, horizontal, and 
reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange.  They are much more versatile than hierarchies and are 
particularly effective around issues where information plays a critical role (1998). 
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and parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of government.  Among these, 
international and domestic NGOs play a central role, usually initiating actions, pressuring 
more powerful actors to take positions, and often providing support and training to other 
NGOs. 
TANs usually emerge when channels between domestic groups and their 
governments are obstructed or severed or when such channels become ineffective in 
resolving conflict.  This sets in motion what Keck & Sikkink refer to as a “boomerang” 
pattern of influence, in which domestic activists take their claims to the international 
level.  Taking advantage of the emerging opportunities for global activism that emerged 
in the last decades of the 20th Century and a broader “internationalist” cultural shift that 
grew of the activism of the 1960s, TANs seek to exert influence in many of the same 
ways that other political groups or social movements do.  Among others, their tactics 
include: informational politics (the ability to move political usable information quickly 
and credibly where it will have the most impact); symbolic politics; leverage politics (or 
lobbying); and accountability politics or efforts to force more powerful actors to act on 
vague policies or principles they formally endorsed. 
According to Risse & Sikkink (1999) advocacy networks serve three important 
purposes, which constitute necessary conditions for sustainable domestic human rights 
change.  First, they put norm-violating states on the international agenda in terms of 
moral consciousness-raising. Secondly, they empower domestic opposition groups and 
legitimate their claims against norm-violating governments, and in part, help protect the 
physical integrity of such groups from government repression, which can be critical in 
allowing for social mobilization in target countries.  Finally, they also challenge norm-
violating governments by creating a transnational structure to pressure such regimes 
simultaneously “from above” and “from below” (Brysk, 1993). 
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Regional Isomorphism  
Regional isomorphism refers to the tendency among states within a region to converge on 
certain policies (Gellers, 2012).  Much of the literature on norm commitment and 
compliance has noted the importance that regional factors have on norm diffusion.  
Where a country is located and what its neighbors are doing seems to matters in 
determining patterns of appropriate international behavior (Simmons, 2009; Simmons & 
Elkins, 2004).  The literature, however, fails to explain why we repeatedly observe clear 
regional patterns of international norm diffusion (Heather Smith 2004).  In her study of 
international commitment to international human rights treaties, Simmons alludes to the 
existence of a sort of international, and particularly regional, peer pressure.  In the 
absence of a strong value commitment, she finds that the strongest motive for ratification 
of human rights treaties may be: “the preference that nearly all governments have to 
avoid social and political pressure of remaining aloof from a multilateral agreement to 
which most of their peers have already committed themselves” (Simmons, 2009).  She 
finds that as more countries, especially regional peers, ratify human rights accords, it 
becomes more difficult to justify non-adherence and to deflect criticism for remaining 
nonparty.  In her view, the timing and incidence of regional clustering suggest a strategic 
logic rather than evidence of normative socialization. 
Constructivists, in contrast, view regional clustering as proof that normative 
socialization is taking place at the regional level and that the relevant actors are, in fact, 
internalizing these norms.  It is likely that IDP soft law, like other human rights norms, 
has been internalized by countries in certain regions in great part because of the key role 
played by regional organizations.  Constructivists view international organizations as 
important teachers of norms (Finnemore, 1993).  Regional organizations are, after all, 
social environments, which both constrain and transform their members.  These 
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organizations have the ability to socialize agents (both individual policy-makers and 
states) through multiple micro-mechanisms that may include strategic calculation, role-
playing, and normative suasion (Checkel, 2005).  Regional homogeneity—the existence 
of shared language, institutions, and shared understandings – also provide a setting that 
facilitates the work of TANs (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). 
 
Domestic Factors  
The prospect that the international mechanisms of norm diffusion, described above, are 
successful in promoting commitment and compliance with the Guiding Principles is 
likely to depend on a number of domestic structural factors pertaining to countries’ 
particular displacement crises.  Specifically, I believe that it is reasonable to expect that: 
(1) the cause of the displacement crisis; (2) the perceived enormity of the displacement 
crisis; (3) the capacity of the state to implement the guidelines and; (4) the status of the 
domestic conflict (whether a the conflict is active or peace has been achieved) will 
greatly affect countries’ propensity to implement the GP and possibly even to commit to 
complying with them in the first place.   
While countries’ commitment to the IDP regime may be initially spurred by 
instrumental and normative pressure from abroad, implementation may be primarily 
dependent on domestic factors.  Implementation of international law refers to the process 
of putting international norms or obligations into practice by incorporating them into 
domestic law through legislation, judicial decision, executive degree, or other processes 
and then enforcing these laws (Shelton, 2000).  Legal theory conceptually treats 
implementation as neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for compliance (Raustiala 
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& Slaughter, 2002).24 In practice, however, implementation is usually a critical step 
towards compliance.  Shelton (2009) has argued that in the case of soft law these two 
concepts are inseparable: “there is no compliance without implementation and there is no 
implementation without compliance.”  For Koh (1997, 1998), the internalization of 
international norms into the domestic legal system, in fact, represents the highest form of 
compliance and the culmination of the legal process. 
Although implementation assumes the institutionalization or adoption of domestic 
laws and policies in accordance with the Guiding Principles, it also involves the 
enforcement of these.  In some counties with internal displacement, there exist some 
well-acknowledged gaps between the institutionalization of IDP laws and the 
enforcement of these.  As pointed out by Deng (2007), even in countries that have passed 
domestic law based on the Guiding Principles, compliance has not always been assured.  
It is estimated that 30 percent of the returns carried out by the government of Angola in 
2002 actually complied with Angola’s own law. 25   
For the purpose of this study, at the very minimum, implementation of the GP 
should involve the codification of laws and policies on displacement, the allocation of the 
necessary budgetary and institutional resources, and the monitoring and enforcement of 
these laws, including the continuous collection of data on the displacement situation. 
I believe that in the absence of strong international monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, implementation of IDP regime depends on the ability of domestic forces 
and institutions to hold governments accountable to their promises.  These factors can 
                                                
24 Compliance can occur for reasons completely exogenous to implementation.  Raustalia and Slaughter 
(2002)illustrate this by pointing out that the economic collapse of the USSR led to perfect but coincidental 
compliance with many environmental agreements.  
25 See Global IDP Project, “Angola: While Large Numbers of IDPs Are Returning Home, Authorities Have 
Largely Ignored Minimum Standards” (December 2002), quoted in (Deng, 2007) 
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affect both countries’ capacity and political will to institutionalize, implement and 
monitor compliance with the GP.   I will now examine each of these factors individually. 
 
(1) Cause of Displacement Crisis 
IDPs are displaced for a variety of reasons.  In many cases the regime in power is 
principally responsible for displacing its own people collectively or individually by 
targeting civilians.  In other cases people are displaced by third party armed groups, 
foreign or domestic, or by generalized violence.  It can logically be expected that regimes 
that are primarily responsible for causing displacement would also be more reticent to 
comply with international norms to protect and assist IDPs.26   
Orchard (2010a) has coined the term regime induced displacement (“RID”) to 
describe situations “when the government or government-sponsored actors deliberately 
use coercive tactics to directly or indirectly cause large numbers of their own citizens to 
leave their homes.”  According to Orchard (2010a) four distinct elements differentiate 
RID from other causes of displacement.  A country’s government must be either directly 
or indirectly involved in displacing people, for example, through government-sponsored 
third parties such as the Janjaweed militias in Darfur.  Displacement must constitute a 
deliberate and coordinated action,27 and the Action must be coercive.  This can range 
from the indiscriminate use of force and human rights violations in ethnic cleansing 
campaigns to more indirect policies such as the deliberate starvation or restriction of 
access to humanitarian assistance.  Finally, the size of the displacement must be 
                                                
26 Interview with: Roberta Cohen, (Co-founder and former Director of the Brookings Project on Internal 
Displacement), March 28, 2013, Washington, DC and telephone interview with Joseph Zapater (UNHCR, 
IDP Team member, Office of International Protection), May 24, 2012.  
27  According to Orchard, the widespread abuses by disaffected soldiers, similar to what occurred in Sierra 
Leone between 1991 to 1994 would not constitute RID. 
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significant.28  Instances of RID particularly challenge the ability of international and non-
governmental organizations to provide forced migrants and specially IDPs with basic 
levels of protection.  They also can conceivably represent a major obstacle to the 
diffusion of the GP.   
This concept RIP is arguably problematic because, in most cases, governments to 
a larger or lesser degree usually bear some responsibility for their displacement crises.  
There is, of course, wide variation on the level to which states are responsible for causing 
displacement.  This ranges from governments’ refusal to act in a timely manner or to 
protect a remote minority from attack by rebel groups (as was the case of Central African 
Republic in the early 2000s) to more coordinated efforts of ethnic cleansing (Serbia’s 
campaign in Kosovo in 1998-1999).  RID is clearly not a dichotomous variable.  
Measuring RID is also particularly problematic because, in most cases, the extent of the 
state’s responsibility for producing displacement is the subject of much debate; and in the 
midst of war there is rarely enough reliable information with which to make a clear 
determination.   
Notwithstanding these issues, regimes that view IDPs as enemies or outsiders, 
either because of ethnic or ideological reasons, should be less likely than others to 
comply with obligations to protect and assist IDPs.  For international humanitarian 
advocates, resolving displacement in countries where the government is in the hands of 
an ethnic group that is combatting another ethnic group is particularly difficult.29  
Countries in which displacement is the result of individualized political persecution by 
                                                
28 Orchard places the significance threshold at 100,000 IDPs. 
29 Interview with Roberta Cohen, (Co-founder and former Director of the Brookings Project on Internal 
Displacement).  March 28, 2013. Washington, DC. 
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the state (i.e. Zimbabwe, Iraq during the 1990s, and Haiti 1991-1993) should also be less 
likely to acknowledge or, in any other way, call attention to their displacement crises. 
Other governments may want to commit to the regime in order to call 
international attention to a crisis that is not of their making. Countries suffering 
displacement as a result of inter-state war, in which IDPs have been displaced by foreign 
agents should be most likely to commit and comply with the GP.  In these cases 
commitment can serve as a signaling mechanism to call international attention to the 
conflict and elicit international support.  It is not surprising that some of the first 
countries to institute domestic legislation to protect IDPs, such as Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan, were involved in internationalized conflicts.  
 
(2) Perceived Enormity of the Displacement Crisis 
Internal displacement crises around the world vary significantly in terms of their 
visibility, size, geographical scope, and intensity.  While in some countries displacement 
is practically invisible because it is relatively small, slow, or confined to remote regions, 
as was the case of the displacement that resulted form the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas 
during the 1990s, in other countries displacement is highly visible.  In some countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, between one fifth and one half of the population has 
been episodically displaced.30  This variation greatly affects the way that a country’s 
political elites and its population perceive the problem and hence the political urgency 
given to addressing displacement.31  
                                                
30 During the worst part of Liberia’s civil war in early 1990s there were over one million IDPs accounting 
for approximately one half of that country’s population.   
31 Telephone interview with Nuur Mahamud Sheek (IDMC, Country Analyst). April 26, 2012. 
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Countries in which the perceived enormity of the displacement crisis is greatest 
should be more likely than others to commit and comply with the IDP regime.   Large 
and rapid displacement amplifies the humanitarian costs of the crisis giving credibility to 
normative appeals to protect and assist IDPs.  Large-scale displacement is also more 
likely to be treated as a threat to a country’s national security and political stability. 
 
(3) State Capacity 
Compliance with international norms to a large extent is constrained to a large 
extent by a states’ capacity to effectively draft, implement, monitor, and enforce domestic 
law.32  For the purpose of this study, capacity refers broadly to the strength, reach and 
ability of institutions of governance.  It includes many factors such as the state’s presence 
and control over the national territory, physical access to IDPs, and access to the 
necessary financial, technical, and bureaucratic resources to institute what are essentially 
very costly and complex obligations.  Betts & Orchard (2014) emphasize the need for 
domestic epistemic communities and designated experts to help translate very generic 
international norms into implementable policies at the domestic level.  In the absence of 
domestic expertise international experts and consultants may undertake a dominant role 
(Betts, 2010a; Ferguson, 1990; P. M. Haas, 1992). 
Orchard found that Nepal has been unable to implement its IDP policy because of 
the chronic weakness of the post-conflict government (Orchard, 2014).  As Chayes and 
Chayes have pointed out (1993, 1995), lack of capability may prevent countries from 
complying with international law even when countries intend to comply. In examining 
                                                
32 Interviews with internal displacement experts at UNHCR and IDMC. 
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patterns of compliance with international environmental commitments VanDeveer and 
Dabelko (2001) have said of implementation “it’s about capacity, stupid.”   
Capacity is a particularly critical factor with regards to displacement because 
countries with IDPs tend to be undergoing severe institutional crises.  During wars and 
internal conflicts state resources available for humanitarian purposes are limited.  Many 
of the thirty guidelines of the GP require direct access to IDPs and impose potentially 
costly positive obligations on the state.  Principle #18, for example, specifies a state’s 
obligation to provide IDPs with an adequate standard of living (which includes access to 
food, potable water, basic shelter, clothing and essential medical services and sanitation).  
Similarly, principle #23 specifies states’ obligation to provide IDP children with free and 
compulsory education at the primary level. 
This study takes into consideration that states may be unwilling to commit to, and 
unable to implement, ambitious international prescriptions they lack the material capacity 
to meet regardless of whether they believe these prescriptions to be legitimate.  Other 
things being equal, relatively underdeveloped and fragile states may be less likely than 
others to comply with the IDP regime.  
 
(4) State of Hostilities 
One final important structural factor that must be accounted for is the state of 
hostilities in countries with IDPs. All things being equal, countries at peace should be 
more likely than countries at war to comply with the IDP regime. There are three main 
reasons for this.  First, countries that have achieved peace should be less likely to view 
IDPs as potential enemies (particularly in cases where conflict is drawn along ethnic lines 
like Sri Lanka).  Secondly, it is generally easier for countries at peace to comply with the 
GP’s many provisions.  It is easier to access and monitor IDPs once violence has ceased; 
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the IDPs themselves become significantly less vulnerable; their numbers tend to diminish 
as many of them return voluntarily to their homes; and, once hostilities have ended, 
humanitarian organizations are also more likely to assist states in caring for IDPs.33  
When the state is not fighting it is also more willing to divert resources (institutional and 
budgetary) from war to humanitarian efforts.  Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, 
when hostilities end, assisting displaced populations to return and reintegrate may 
become an integral part of a state strategy to achieve durable peace and stability.  By 
assisting IDPs and preventing further displacement states can simultaneously address the 
root causes of a conflict (Fagen, 2009; Khoser, 2007; Klopp, Githinji, & Karuoya, 2010).  
For these reasons it is not uncommon for peace treaties and negotiated settlements to 
include provisions concerning the fate of IDPs.34  
 
METHODS  
Large-N Statistical Analysis 
In order to study the global patterns of compliance with the GP this study utilizes 
a mixed methods approach.  In the first phase, in Chapter Two, I utilize a large-n 
statistical analysis of an original panel dataset, which includes all documented war-
induced internal displacement crises from 1990 to 2010.  This dataset was constructed 
using publically available data collected by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 
(“IDMC”) and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement.   
                                                
33 Telephone interview with Nadine Walicki (IDMC, Country Analyst).  April 19, 2012. 
34 Some examples include the peace process in Guatemala in the late 1980s, the Dayton Peace Accord in 
1995, the Georgian peace process in the mid-1990s and Burundi’s Arusha Peace agreement in 2000.  See 
(Brookings-Bern PID, 2007). 
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The study proceeds to explore the dataset, through the use of descriptive statistics 
and event history analysis, to tease out the merits of various IR theories of compliance 
with international soft law in explaining states’ commitment to the IDP regime.  The 
point of this exercise is not so much to formally test a number of hypotheses using 
regression analysis but rather to discern the relevance and validity of competing theories 
of soft law compliance by looking broadly at patterns of commitment with the GP during 
a twenty year period, with the expectation that this will allow us to refine a number of 
working hypotheses that can be further explored through qualitative case studies. 
Having gained a better understanding of why countries commit to the IDP regime 
by enacting domestic legislation on internal displacement, I then conduct an in-depth 
qualitative case study on Colombia.  The purpose of this case study is to: (1) trace the 
casual mechanisms that lead a country with a major displacement crisis to commit to 
complying with the regime; (2) determine to what extent normative and instrumental 
considerations explained state behavior, and; (3) get at the more important question of 
implementation and enforcement of the GP, which is difficult to analyze quantitatively.  
Although a single case study cannot be expected to solve the puzzle in a definitive way it 
can demonstrate how a more comprehensive study of compliance with the GP can be 
done given greater time and resources.   
 
Extensive Primary Data Collection 
In order to trace the processes that led Colombia’s to commit and deepen its 
compliance with the international IDP regime during the past twenty years I conducted 
extensive primary data collection in Colombia and Washington DC.  The qualitative 
research involved, over 40 semi-structured key informant interviews conducted in person 
and over the telephone in Washington, Geneva and Bogotá.  The subjects interviewed for 
  40 
this study included internal displacement experts at UNHCR, IDMC and the Brookings 
Project on Internal Displacement, Colombian and US-based human rights activists, IDP 
leaders, Catholic Church officials, academics, journalists and humanitarian workers.  I 
also interviewed some of the principal architects and enforcers of Colombia’s IDP policy 
and legislation including a number of key legislators and Colombian government officials 
who served in the past four administrations, like former Colombian president Ernesto 
Samper Pizano.   
I also interviewed a number of magistrates of Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
credited with challenging the state’s policy on displacement as well as several key 
lawyers at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).  I also able to 
interview a number of key American human rights and USAID representatives at the US 
mission in Bogotá and at the US State Department headquarters in Washington DC, as 
well as representatives of the UNHCR and OHCHR missions in Bogotá.  This case study 
also involved extensive archival research at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, 
and the Bogotá-based Center for Research and Popular Education/Peace Program 
(CINEP/PPP) and Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ).  
Finally, with the help of the Colombian Catholic Church’s social outreach agency, 
I was able to conduct an on-sight visit of one of one of Colombia’s largest IDP 
settlements in the municipality of Soacha, on the southern edge of Bogotá where I visited 
an IDP reception center, and interviewed several displaced families, IDP leaders and 
humanitarian workers.   
 
Case Selection Justification 
Colombia represents a critical case for the study of commitment with the IDP 
regime because it represents deviant case of compliance, it is intrinsically important and 
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it is rich in data.  Colombia is a deviant because the country has achieved a level of 
commitment and compliance with the IDP regime developing a complex and ambitious 
framework for the protection and assistance of IDPs rarely seen in other cases.  For this 
reason, norm entrepreneurs have repeatedly hailed Colombia’s national response to 
displacement as an example to be emulated by other countries with IDPs (Ferris et al., 
2011).   
Colombia is an intrinsically important case because the country has been home to 
one of the largest and longest lasting displacement crises in the world. Until it was 
recently surpassed by Syria (with 6.5 million)35, Colombia was for many years home to 
the largest IDP population in the world.  As of 2014, it was estimated that between 4.9 
and 5.7 million Colombians had been displaced by violence and human rights abuses 
since 1985.  This number surpassed by a wide margin the magnitude of the next 
displacement crises in the world: The Democratic Republic of Congo (2.7 million), 
Sudan (2.2), Iraq (2.1) and Somalia (1.1 million) (IDMC, 2014a).36  Colombia’s 
internally displaced population corresponds to over 10% of the country’s population and 
over 30% of the rural population, making Colombia’s, according to former UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, the “worst humanitarian crisis in the 
Western hemisphere.”37 
Colombia also offers a data rich case (Van Evera, 1997).  Because Colombia’s 
displacement crisis has been closely monitor by a myriad of international and domestic 
actors during the past two decades there are abundant archival data and many key 
                                                
35 See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures (last visited October 22, 2014) 
36 The figure for Sudan does not include S. Sudan. 
37 See: “Colombia has the biggest humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere, UN says.” UN News 
Center. (May 10, 2004) 
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10691&Cr=colombia&Cr1#.VE6yTd5Cjwc) 
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participants are available for interviews.  As pointed out by Van Evera (1997), other 
things being equal, cases rich in data are preferable to infer and test theories using 
process tracing, which involves intensive analysis of the development of a sequence of 
events over time (George & Bennett, 2005).  Cases rich in data are “hypothesis-
generating” case studies (Levy, 2008) whose purpose, after all, is to develop more 
general theoretical propositions about commitment and compliance with soft law, which 
can then be tested through other methods, including large-N methods.  In this sense we 
are not so much looking at a case that does not fit nicely into existing theory (e.g. deviant 
or least likely cases) but rather at an important and perhaps “archetypal” case of 
compliance that can help specify the casual mechanisms responsible for leading countries 
to commit and comply with a soft law regime. 
There are arguably a number of factors that set Colombia apart from most 
displacement crises around the world – the majority of which take place in poorer, 
weaker and less stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  A case study on Colombia, 
however, provides an excellent opportunity for theory building and testing using 
available empirical data.  Although I would have liked to include additional cases from 
other regions of the world in this study, the time and resource constraints inherent in a 
doctoral dissertation do not make this possible.  The concluding chapter of this book 
suggests a number of cases that should be included in a future research agenda. 
This study utilizes a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods because 
this allows for a more comprehensive look at the issue of compliance with the IDP 
regime than any method alone.  A statistical large-n study of patterns of commitment 
provides an initial understanding of the “big picture” on the global state of commitment 
with the IDP regime.  Quantitative analysis also provides a good method to examine the 
merits of competing theories of international norm diffusion on the entire universe of 
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cases.  The qualitative cases study, in turn, can uncover through a more thorough 
examination, how the various causal factors of compliance, intimated by the quantitative 
study, interact in affecting state behavior.  
The question of commitment and compliance with the IDP regime remains, 
admittedly, very understudied and under-theorized.  This study offers an explanation of 
why and how countries may be taking these norms seriously.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study finds that commitment with the GP, both globally and in the case of 
Colombia, is driven by a variety of factors.  While in some cases commitment involves 
the imposition of IDP norms by hegemonic powers after military intervention or an 
internationally brokered peace agreement (i.e. Iraq), in most cases the process has been 
driven by the work of norm entrepreneurs exercising simultaneous pressure from within 
and from aboard in a strategy suggestive of the “boomerang” pattern of international 
activism (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and the spiral dynamics of norm diffusion (Risse-
Kappen et al., 1999).  Given the origins of a regime with limited state participation, it is 
not surprising that transnational activist networks, linking domestic activists and 
international norm entrepreneurs, have played a key role in promoting domestic 
legislation on internal displacement. 
The large-n study also shows strong evidence of regional clustering.  Although 
IDP norms are arguably international and not regional, they have diffused along regional 
lines at different rates and at different times.   The case study on Colombia reveals that 
regional factors were key drivers for Colombia’s commitment and deepening compliance 
with the IDP regime.  More specifically, this study found that the region’s previous 
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experience with wars and displacement in Central America, as well as the pre-existence 
of regional norms on forced migration and mature regional human rights institutions and 
activist networks went a long way in explaining why Colombia committed and 
increasingly complied with the GP.  Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that 
mechanisms of these norms’ diffusion can only be fully understood when they are 
examined within the broader regional context. 
The case of Colombia also suggests that norm implementation may largely 
depend on domestic rather than international politics.  In fact, domestic actors, or norm 
consumers, play a significantly less passive role than intimated by international relations 
theory.  As pointed out by Acharya (2004), much of the existing literature on norm 
diffusion has downplayed the agency role of local actors.  He calls attention to the 
phenomenon of localization whereby norm-takers build congruence between 
transnational norms and local beliefs and practices.  This study suggests that activists at 
times go beyond reshaping international norms and essentially pick and choose some 
aspects of international normative frameworks, which they find useful in promoting their 
political agendas and sometimes reframing the issue of displacement entirely.  
 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK  
Chapter Two presents the large-n statistical study of patterns of commitment with 
the Guiding Principles.  The following three chapters (Chapters Three, Four and Five) 
trace the story of Colombia’s deepening level of compliance with the IDP regime during 
the last two decades, from denial of the problem, to commitment, implementation and 
eventually deep compliance with the regime.  Chapter Three traces the events that led 
Colombia to institute Law 387 in 1997 – one of the first and most comprehensive laws in 
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the world for the protection and assistance and of IDPs.   Chapter Four tells the story of 
Colombia’s Constitutional Curt’s intervention and a seminal ruling (T-025) that in 2004 
forced a resistant Uribe administration to finally implement Colombia’s IDP laws.  
Chapter Five trace the events that led to the institution in 2011 of Colombia’s gown 
breaking Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448) by the Santos administration, 
which finally made the resolution of the issue of land abandoned and stolen from IDPs a 
priority and turned Colombia into a “poster child” of compliance with the IDP regime.  
Chapter Six concludes this study by discussing the importance of regional factors in 
explaining countries’ commitment to and compliance with the IDP regime future research 
agenda.  
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Chapter 2: Large-n Study of Global Patterns of Commitment with the 
Guiding Principles 
INTRODUCTION 
Commitment to the regime for the protection of internally displaced persons 
(“IDPs”) is an understudied and under theorized field.   A number of studies have been 
written about the IDP regime’s unlikely emergence and its legal foundations (Bagshaw, 
2005; Cohen & Deng, 1998b; Phuong, 2004; Weiss & Korn, 2006).  Much has also been 
written about the many challenges presented by the problem of internal displacement 
(particularly by Brookings and IDMC).38 For the most part the literature has been geared 
towards a legal and humanitarian audience and has been focused on a limited number of 
cases.  With the exception of work done by Orchard (2010a, 2010b, 2014) few scholars 
have studied the IDP regime from an international relations perspective.  Moreover, to 
date, none has taken a rigorous and systematic look at patterns of commitment and 
compliance with the regime.39 This is not surprising because commitment and 
compliance with soft law instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (“GP”) is hard to measure and operationalize, and because data on 
compliance has been scattered and scarce up until recently.    
This study attempts to address this empirical gap by compiling an original 
comprehensive cross-sectional time series dataset of all documented IDP crises for the 
                                                
38 See for example: (Cohen & Deng, 1998a; Hampton, 2012; Korn, 1999; Muggah, 2008; Vincent & 
Sørensen, 2001).  A number of special issues of Forced Migration Review have also been dedicated to the 
issue of internal displacement (Nov 2003, Feb 2003, Oct 2005, Dec 2008, and Sep 2009) 
39 The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement perhaps came closest to presenting a global survey 
of compliance (Ferris et al., 2011).  However this study only examines a subset of 15 countries with 
internal displacement and is hindered by several limitations inherent in using the 12 broad benchmarks 
outlined in the Framework for National Responsibility as measures of compliance. 
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past two decades, and taking an initial examination, through statistical analysis, at 
patterns of commitment with the IDP regime. The study proceeds to explore the dataset 
through the use of descriptive statistics and event history analysis, in an attempt to tease 
out the merits of various IR theories of compliance with intentional norms in explaining 
states’ commitment with the IDP regime. More specifically this section explores the 
following hypotheses using quantitative methods in an attempt to eliminate possible 
explanations for commitment. 
 
• Countries are more likely to commit to the Guiding Principles (“GP”) 
when they are subjected to instrumental international pressure from 
powerful states that have financial and military leverage. 
• Countries are more likely to commit to the GP when they are subjected to 
normative pressure from international activists networks, institutions and 
norm entrepreneurs. 
• Countries are more likely to commit to the GP because they are pressured 
to address their internal displacement crisis as a result of domestic social 
mobilization.  
• Countries are more likely to commit to the GP when the norm’s human 
rights and humanitarian prescriptions are convergent with domestic 
norms.  
• Commitment is largely determined by countries’ capacity to implement the 
GP.  
• Commitment is largely determined by the nature and size of the 
displacement crisis.  Countries where the state is primarily responsible for 
displacing its own people are less likely than others to commit to the GP.  
Likewise, countries with large displacement crises are more likely to 
commit. 
• Countries at peace are more likely than countries at war to commit to the 
GP. 
 
In order to examine the validity of these general hypotheses listed above on an 
original dataset this study proceeds to test the explanatory force of several proxy 
variables, presenting the results and refining the working hypotheses. 
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There are various reasons why quantitative analysis can provide the most 
rigorous, objective, and comprehensive mans to take a first look at the question of 
commitment.  Given that the study of patterns of commitment with the IDP regime is still 
at its nascent stage, a large-n statistical analysis can be a useful first step in an iterative 
process of theory development and empirical testing.  A large-n study permits us to test 
the merits of a wide number of theories of compliance on the largest possible number of 
cases to narrow down the number of possible explanations for commitment.  Once the 
possible hypotheses have been refined they can then be tested through qualitative means 
on a selected sub-set of cases.   
Internal displacement affects a very large and varied number of countries.  There 
have been over 60 documented countries with internal displacement over the past two 
decades.  This represents a little over one third of all countries in the planet.  Between 
these counties there is wide variation across many dimensions including: the magnitude, 
type and cause of displacement, as well as the country’s levels of democracy, 
development and state capacity.  Countries with internal displacement include highly 
developed western democracies, such as Israel and Cyprus as well as poor, fragile, or 
repressive states such as Somalia, Myanmar, and Sudan.  Displacement affects very large 
countries, such as India, and much smaller countries, such as East Timor.  For this reason, 
I believe that a qualitative examination of a sub-set of cases at this stage in the research 
program would present a serious threat to external validity and lead to possibly biased 
results.  
Given the large number of theories that we want to consider at this stage in the 
research program, it is preferable to look at the largest possible number of cases.  Initial 
efforts to survey the state of commitment and compliance were limited to anecdotal 
evidence because data was not available (Cohen & Deng, 1998b; Ferris et al., 2011; 
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Korn, 1999; Orchard, 2010b).  Thanks to greater international efforts to monitor 
situations of internal displacement by organizations such as the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Center (IDMC) in Geneva, there is presently enough data available to 
consider the totality of cases of internal displacement in the past 20 years.  Quantitative 
methods allow us to take advantage of this by taking into account all documented cases 
of internal displacement. A smaller sample could lead to degrees of freedom problems 
greatly restricting the scope of this study.  It is no surprise that large-n analysis has often 
been utilized in political science as a first step to examine issues of commitment and 
compliance with international norms.40  It is quite possible that an analysis that considers 
the entire population of internal displacement cases may reveal some unexpected 
findings. 
While a statistical study of this type may highlight some revealing correlations it 
will not be enough to establish causality and may tell us very little about why and when 
certain factors predict compliance. Many of the proxy indicators available for this type of 
analysis are sometimes too general to tell a coherent story.  If, for example, measures of 
democracy or state capacity prove to be statistically significant in predicting 
commitment, we will not be able to say how exactly these complex and multi-
dimensional factors affect policy outcomes.  A more detailed qualitative examination of 
the processes of commitment and compliance is then necessary to shed more light on why 
they matter.  A large-n statistical analysis, however, can give us a much better idea of 
what to look for. 
 
                                                
40 See for example: (E. M. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002; Keith, 1999; Simmons, 2009)     
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Commitment vs. Implementation  
It must be remembered that this section examines exclusively patterns of 
commitment and not compliance with the IDP regime.  These are two different but 
related concepts.  At its most basic level compliance can be defined as: a state of 
conformity or identity between actors’ behavior and a specific rule (Raustiala & 
Slaughter, 2002).  Compliance is a highly abstract concept and, as could be expected, it is 
highly dependent on the nature and specificity of a rule or norm.  Some constructivist 
scholars have even argued that the concept of compliance cannot be objectively 
determined (Kingsbury, 1998). In the case of the GP, some efforts have been made to 
define (Brookings-Bern PID, 2005) and to measure compliance (Ferris et al., 2011) using 
a set of 12 general benchmarks of national responsibility.  Unfortunately this framework 
has proven to be of limited use for measuring compliance because many of the 
benchmarks are underspecified or difficult to measure given the data available. 
Commitment, more simply refers to a state’s signaling mechanism that it intends 
to comply with a given norm.  As discussed in the introduction, commitment does not 
automatically translate into compliance.  Nevertheless understanding commitment is an 
important first step in understanding the broader question of compliance.  In the case of 
“hard law” instruments, such as international human rights treaties or conventions, 
countries’ signal their commitment by formally adopting and ratifying a legal document.  
In the case of a “soft law” instrument such as the GP measuring commitment is more 
problematic.  Theoretically there are a number of ways a state could signal its 
commitment.  This study, however, maintains that commitment can best be determined 
by looking at whether or not countries have instituted domestic laws or policies on 
internal displacement that reflect the GP effectively making these soft norm provisions 
the law of the land.  
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This chapter is composed of three sections.  The first section describes the dataset 
I constructed including the data, its sources, and modes of measurement utilized.  It then 
defines the dependent and independent variables I utilize to test the various hypotheses 
derived from the literature in international relations and forced migration studies.  In the 
second section I introduce the methods utilized to analyze the data and I present statistical 
results.  A third section summarizes the findings of the statistical analysis.  I first argue 
that commitment has had a real positive effect in attenuating the magnitude of 
displacement crises.  I then illustrate how commitment has been growing steadily around 
the world affecting different types of displacement crises.  I then illustrate how IDP norm 
has been adopted in certain regional clusters.  Using event history analysis I argue that 
commitment with the IDP regime appears to have been driven primarily by the work of 
UN norm entrepreneurs and has been highly suggestive of regional dynamics of norm 
diffusion.  
 
DATA 
The dataset created for this study is the first global longitudinal cross-sectional 
dataset for IDP crises.  Like other datasets of its kind,41 it should permit us to take a first 
systematic and comprehensive look at patterns of commitment and compliance with the 
IDP regime.   
                                                
41 See for example: (E. M. Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, & Meyer, 2008; Hughes, Krook, & Paxton, 
Forthcomming; Neumayer, 2005; Simmons, 2009; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). 
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The universe of cases 
The dataset includes all 60 countries with documented cases of internal 
displacement from 1990 to 2010 as documented by IDMC and the United States Council 
for Refugees (USRC).42 USCR was the first entity to collect and report IDP figures 
beginning in the 1980s when the issue of internal forced displacement became for the 
first time an issue of international concern.  Since 2001 these figures have been collected 
by IDMC, which was established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and 
endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee.   
The data excludes all other countries because, during this period, countries 
without internal displacement were not expected to commit to the regime by drafting 
legislation to protect IDPs.  Unlike most human rights regimes such as those regulating 
torture or the rights of children, the IDP regime does not have in place any sort of 
international treaty instrument (treaty or convention) that could be easily signed by any 
country to signal commitment.  This, of course, is changing with the drafting of regional 
treaties on internal displacement starting with the Kampala Convention that came into 
effect on December of 2012.  Moreover, as illustrated in the previous chapter, 
international entities charged with promoting the regime, such as UNHCR and the 
Representative to the UN Secretary General for Internal Displacement (“RSG”) – the UN 
official mandated to develop and promote an international normative framework to 
protect IDPs—focused their attention exclusively on countries affected by displacement. 
Between 1990 and 2010 there were no reported cases of countries without IDPs 
committing to the regime.  
                                                
42 See: http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDoc
ument.  Last visited 12/2012. 
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The dataset includes only crises that result from armed conflict and gross human 
rights violations (or the threat of them) and excludes all displacement crises caused by 
natural or man-made disasters.  The period under study begins in 1990 because, even 
though internal displacement has existed throughout human history, IDP crises were not 
monitored in any sort of systematic way until 1989 when USCR began to collect and 
publish IDP estimates. The dataset excludes 8 countries for which there was too little 
data.43  
 
Dependent Variable  
This study uses as a dependent variable a binomial variable that indicates whether 
a country has instituted laws and policies on internal displacement, which are in line with 
the Guiding Principles on IDPs (“GP”). As previously argued, perhaps the best way a 
country can signal commitment with this international regime is to institute domestic 
legislation which recognizes that IDPs have a number of rights afforded to them by 
international law and that the state is responsible for upholding them.   
Domestic legislation, of course it is not the only way to demonstrate commitment 
to the regime.  Statesmen can conceivably commit to the IDP regime rhetorically through 
public pronouncements or at international forums.  States can also openly object to the 
                                                
43 For six of these countries there was very little information available, including a good estimate of IDPs 
(Djibouti in 1993, Mali 1995, Nicaragua 1990-91, Moldova 2002-2003, Turkmenistan and Papua New 
Guinea, 1996).  Lack of information can be primarily attributed to one or a combination of following 
factors: the country suffered a comparatively marginal displacement crises (less than 20,000 IDPs), for a 
very small period of time (less than three years), and or the displacement crisis was resolved in the early 
1990s (as in the case of Nicaragua) before the international regime to protect IDPs took shape.  In all of 
these countries the displacement crisis was not monitored closely and did not receive the same level of 
attention as other countries.  South Africa (four million reported IDPs in the early 1990s) was excluded 
because apartheid constitutes a very different sort of displacement, which was treated as a special case by 
the international community. Due to the disputed status of Kosovo’s independence, IDPs from the Kosovar 
conflict are reported under Serbia.   
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new norm’s validity or signal their refusal to commit.  To date, however, not a single 
country has contested the content of the norms enshrined by the GP although a few did 
question the fact that the GP were developed outside of the traditional international 
negotiation and treaty-making mechanisms.44 
Commitment to these norms, however, is not truly credible until the principles are 
recognized to be legally binding the same way that a treaty becomes the law of the land 
once it is ratified.  Moreover, the framers of the GP recognize that in order for a country 
to comply for these norms and for the GP to become translated into concrete action on the 
ground, they must be internalized into countries’ domestic legislation (Kalin, 2005). To 
this end, the RSG, from an early stage launched an ambitious series of country visits and 
consultations to encourage among other things the adoption of a domestic legal and 
political framework to address internal displacement.   
It is important to note that, even though domestic legislation on displacement 
signals commitment to the regime and, in many ways is a necessary step towards 
compliance, it does not necessarily imply compliance.  Countries can conceivably have in 
place very advanced legal frameworks on internal displacement that they fail to 
implement.  This study, however, shares the constructivist perspective that views 
commitment and compliance as two ends of a continuum (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999) and 
recognizes that rhetorical adoption of norms without the sincere commitment to comply 
is a common feature of the dissemination stage in the life-cycle of a norm (Deng, 2007). 
As argued earlier, in the case of internal displacement, the chosen dependent variable is a 
necessary step towards compliance.   
                                                
44 According to Cohen, when the Guiding Principles were presented the governments of China, Egypt and 
Sudan voiced their opposition to the new norm.  This opposition, however may have represented more of a 
reaction to the appointment of an RSG and his advocacy in favor of the idea that the international 
community has the right to intervene where states fail to protect their own IDPs rather than to the specific 
list of IDP protections outlined in the GP (Koser, 2011). 
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The dependent variable was generated based on Brookings’ public Index of 
National and Regional Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement.45  The Brookings 
index contains a compilation and summary of national laws, policies, decrees and other 
documents relating to internal displacement, which were obtained from public records 
and/or were provided with in-country governmental and non-governmental 
representatives.  Although Brookings claims that their list is “not exhaustive,” their index 
represents the most comprehensive compilation of laws and policies available in the area 
of internal displacement and is often used in IDP research.46   
Out of 60 countries that have undergone internal displacement from 1990 to 2010, 
21 countries instituted some sort of law or policy to address internal displacement.  Table 
1 provides a list of all the relevant laws and policies which signified several countries’ 
initial commitment to the regime. 
  
                                                
45  See http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/resources/laws-old.  Last visited on 12/12. 
46  See in particular: (Ferris et al., 2011; Orchard, 2010b, 2014) as well as IDMC’s yearly reports.  
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Table 1: List of Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement 
State	   Year	   Law-­‐Policy	  	  
Russia	   1993	   Federal	  Law	  on	  Forced	  Migrants	  (1993,	  amended	  1995	  and	  2003)	  
Guatemala	   1994	   Agreement	  on	  Resettlement	  of	  the	  Population	  Groups	  Uprooted	  by	  the	  Armed	  
Groups	  
Tajikistan	   1994	   The	  Law	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan	  on	  Forced	  Migrants	  
Bosnia	  
Herzegovina	  
1995	   General	  Framework	  Agreement	  for	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Annex	  VII	  
Georgia	   1996	   Law	  of	  Georgia	  on	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  	  
Colombia	   1997	   Law	  387	  on	  internal	  displacement	  
Armenia	   1998	   Law	  on	  Population	  Protection	  in	  Emergency	  Situations	  
Azerbaijan	   1999	   Presidential	  Decree	  ‘On	  status	  of	  refugees	  and	  forcibly	  displaced	  (persons	  
displaced	  within	  the	  country)	  persons’	  
Burundi	   2000	   Arusha	  Peace	  and	  Reconciliation	  Agreement	  for	  Burundi,	  Protocol	  IV	  
Angola	   2001	   Council	  of	  Ministers	  Decree	  No.	  1/01-­‐Norms	  on	  the	  Resettlement	  of	  Internally	  
Displaced	  Populations	  
Sierra	  
Leone	  
2001	   Resettlement	  Strategy	  
Liberia	   2002	   Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  and	  Protection	  of	  Liberian	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  
Serbia	   2002	   National	  Strategy	  for	  Resolving	  the	  Problems	  of	  Refugees	  and	  Internally	  
Displaced	  Persons	  
Sri	  Lanka	   2002	   National	  Framework	  for	  Relief,	  Rehabilitation	  and	  Reconciliation	  
India	   2003	   National	  Policy	  on	  Resettlement	  and	  Rehabilitation	  for	  Project	  Affected	  Families	  
Nepal	   2004	   Relief	  Program	  for	  Internally	  Displaced	  People	  Due	  to	  Conflict	  for	  FY	  2004/05	  
Peru	   2004	   Law	  No.	  28223	  Concerning	  Internal	  Displacements	  
Uganda	   2004	   The	  National	  Policy	  for	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  
Turkey	   2005	   Integrated	  Strategy	  Document	  
Iraq	   2008	   National	  Policy	  on	  Displacement	  
Sudan	   2009	   National	  Policy	  on	  Internal	  Displacement	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Independent Variables 
For the purpose of this study I have generated a number of variables relating to 
possible pressure mechanisms and intervening structural factors which are listed in Table 
2 and are discussed in more detail in the section below. 
Table 2: Possible Causal Mechanisms of Norm Compliance 
Casual Path Mechanism & Dominant 
Mode of Action 
Testable Hypotheses Indicators 
International 
Instrumental 
Pressure 
Coercion and inducement 
through incentives and 
penalties; Issue linkage. 
Process is marked by 
domination and adaptation. 
States follow self-interested 
logic of consequence. 
Countries more likely to commit include: 
1. Highly dependent and weak states 
when hegemonic pressure is 
observed. 
2. Countries with foreign military 
presence (including UN PKO) 
 
Dependence on Foreign 
Development Aid 
(measured as proportion 
of GDP) 
Presence of peace-
keeping forces 
International 
Normative 
Pressure 
Top-down acculturation of 
governing elites through 
mechanisms that include 
pressure to assimilate to the 
surrounding culture within 
international institutions that 
endorse norm or flowing close 
contact and exchanges with 
norm entrepreneurs. 
Countries more likely to commit include: 
1. Countries that are pressured to 
commit by the RSG. 
2. Countries in which UNHCR 
protects IDPs 
3. Countries in regions where other 
states have already committed to the 
regime. 
 
 
Country visited by RSG 
(y/n) 
UNHC present (y/n) 
Region / Measure of 
Regional Density 
(proportion of countries 
with IDPs in the region 
that have committed to 
the IDP regime) 
Cultural 
Match 
States that commit with the GP 
are states in which the norm’s 
humanitarian and human rights 
prescriptions are convergent 
with domestic norms as 
reflected in domestic 
discourse, legal systems and 
bureaucratic agencies. 
States commit with the GP when: 
1. The GP’s humanitarian and human 
rights prescriptions are convergent 
with domestic norms as reflected 
by prior international 
commitments. 
2. States have a proven record of 
respect for human rights. 
3. States are democratic. 
Measure of 
embeddedness into the 
international HR regime. 
è  
Physical Integrity Index 
(CIRI) 
Freedom House Measure 
of democracy 
Social 
Mobilization 
Bottom-up socialization of 
governing elites as a result of 
social mobilization and the 
coordinated actions of 
transnational activist networks. 
States follow logics of 
appropriateness. 
States with dense human rights networks are 
more likely than others to commit to the IDP 
regime. 
States where human rights INGOs are most 
engaged are also most likely to commit to the 
IDP regime. 
INGO density è Count 
of human rights 
international non-
governmental 
organizations (“INGOs”) 
with presence a in the 
country. 
INGO shaming events è 
Count of the number of 
reported human rights 
INGO shaming events. 
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Table 3: Possible Intervening Structural Factors 
Structural 
Factor 
Testable Hypotheses Indicators 
State 
Capacity 
States with a higher capacity to implement the 
prescriptions of the GPID will be more likely to 
comply. 
State Fragility Index 
GDP per capita  
Magnitude of 
Displacement 
States in which IDPs are most visible (scope & 
intensity of crisis, patterns of displacement) will 
be more likely to comply. 
Magnitude of displacement crises measured by: (1) 
number of IDPs (log); and (2) proportion of 
population that is displaced. 
Peace/War States are more likely to comply when they have 
achieved a cessation of hostilities and/or have 
negotiated a peace agreement. 
State of hostilities (Peace/War) 
Underlying 
Cause of 
Displacement  
Cases where the displacement is the result of 
international conflicts are more likely than others 
to commit to the regime. 
Cause of displacement (international war; internal 
war; individualized political persecution) 
Regime 
Induced 
Displacement 
(RID) 
Countries where the state is primarily responsible 
for displacing its own people are less likely to 
commit to the regime. 
RID (yes/no) 
Protraction Countries with protracted displacement are less 
likely than countries with episodic displacement 
to commit to the regime. 
Protraction (country has had more than 25,000 IDPs 
for over 5 years) (y/n) 
 
Variables Relating to Normative International Pressure 
Among other things, this study is interested in testing the hypothesis that 
countries commit to the IDP regime as a result of normative international pressure “from 
above.”  Perhaps the three most important sources of this type of international pressure 
are: the Office of the Representative to the UN Secretary General for Internally Displaced 
Persons (“RSG”)47; the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); 
and the various regional human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission and European Commission for Human Rights. 
 
  
                                                
47 As of September 2010 this person is referred to as: UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
IDPs. 
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RSG Visits 
As explained in an earlier chapter, the originator and perhaps the most important 
champion of the GP has been the RSG.  Since it obtained its mandate in 1992, the RSG’s 
principal mission has been to develop an international framework to respond to the 
problem of internal displacement and to promote international norms to protect IDPs.  It 
has done this with very few resources and the logistical assistance of the Brookings 
Project on Internal Displacement.  To this end, the RSG has conducted an extensive 
country visits campaign and has regularly issues reports calling international attention to 
IDP situations.   
Although it is difficult to measure the level of attention given or pressure 
exercised by the RSG to any particular IDP crisis it is possible to gauge the level of 
engagement the RSG has had with a country by looking at the number of times he visited 
that a particular country.  In order to do this the dataset incudes a variable that count the 
number of times the RSG visited a particular country.48  This variable can reasonably 
serve as a proxy indicator for RSG pressure because, given the limited resources at his 
disposal, the RSG has only been able to conduct an average of less than 3 country visits a 
year.  The RSG usually decides which countries to visit very carefully while taking into 
consideration where his attention is most needed and where he is most likely to have a 
considerable impact.  To date, the RSG has conducted over 51 country visits.  Many of 
these were follow-up visits to countries he visited earlier.  This variable was coded using 
data from OHCHR.49 
 
                                                
48 Ferris et al (2011) suggest that engagement by the RSG would be a great variable to test.   
49  See: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Visits.aspx, last visited 9/12. 
  60 
UNHCR Protection 
UNHCR, known as the UN agency for refugees is today the principal 
international entity in change of protecting IDPs.  Although UNHCR’s original mandate 
did not specifically cover IDPs, but because of the agency´s expertise on displacement, it 
has for many years been protecting and assisting millions of them.  Following important 
UN reforms in 2005 and the establishment of the “cluster approach”, UNHCR has had 
the leading role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of IDPs as well as 
coordination and management of camps (Weiss & Korn, 2006).  Other UN agencies, such 
as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) have certainly contributed to some extent or another in norm promotion, but 
their involvement with the issue of displacement in host countries has been more ad hoc.    
To test the effect of UNHCR’s presence on countries’ propensity to commit to the 
regime the dataset includes a binary variable that indicates whether UNHCR actively 
protected IDPs in a particular country.  This data was reported by UNHCR for the period 
1993-2011.50  
 
Regional Pressure 
Normative international pressure to commit with international norms can also take 
place at the regional level.  Nye defined international region “as a limited number of 
states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” 
(Nye, 1968). In a broad sense, regions are characterized by a shared sense of identity and 
purpose.  Regional neighbors don’t just share a geographical proximity but may also have 
a common history, culture, language, religion, and political institutions that facilitate 
                                                
50 See http://popstats.unhcr.org.  This variable does not necessarily signify that the totality of a country’s 
IDP population is under its protection of UNHCR but simply that IDP issues are a part of UNHCR’s 
agenda. 
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communication and the spread of ideas.  They are the sites of large flows of people, 
information, and goods.  To a larger of lesser extent regions may be politically and 
economically integrated and share common governance institutions. 
Historically, regional multilateral organizations and human rights institutions 
have been a source of the regional diffusion of human rights norms. Organizations such 
as the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) can pressure countries to 
comply with human rights norms though direct methods of naming and shaming.  
Regional norm diffusion, however, can also take the shape of less direct processes of 
social acculturation such as mimicry, social influence, and persuasion (Goodman & Jinks, 
2004; Johnston, 2001, 2008). 
These regional forms of pressure and socialization are difficult to capture 
quantitatively.  The dataset attempts to control for regional mechanisms of norm 
diffusion by including a regional variable using the World Bank’s classification51 which 
divides the world broadly into six regions: Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe & 
Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific, and South 
Asian Region.  The study also includes a measure of the regional density of commitment.  
This last indicator measures the proportion of countries, among those that have 
experienced internal displacement, that have signaled commitment to the regime through 
domestic legislation.  It is hoped that this variable can somehow help to capture the 
phenomenon of regional isomorphism, which is referenced repeatedly in the literature on 
norm diffusion (Acharya, 2004; Checkel, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Gellers, 
2012; Simmons, 2009; Simmons & Elkins, 2004).  
                                                
51  Although there are a variety of ways to parcel out regional distributions the World Banks’s makes perhaps most 
intuitive sense and has been used in previous studies on international human rights norms diffusion.  See, Simmons’ 
seminal study of the human rights regime.  (2009)  
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Variables Relating to International Instrumental Pressure 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is unlikely that the diffusion of 
international IDP norms is the result of coercive pressure by powerful countries on 
weaker countries. The regime historically has lacked powerful international state 
sponsors.  Hegemonic powers, such as the US have, so far, never used force or the threat 
of force to push the IDP agenda.52 Nevertheless this study aims to test the hypothesis that 
countries that have traditionally championed human rights (i.e. the US and the EU) may 
exert some type of instrumental influence to modify countries’ behavior with regards to 
IDPs, albeit using softer mechanisms of issue-linkage.53   
Although it is difficult to capture quantitatively when or to what extent material 
pressure is exercised internationally, it is possible to determine when opportunities for the 
use of external leverage exist. We would expect, for example, countries to be more 
vulnerable to international pressure to comply with the GP when international 
peacekeeping forces are on the ground.  We would also expect countries that are highly 
dependent on development aid to be more vulnerable to issue-linkage.  
To this end, the dataset includes a dummy variable that indicates when a country 
hosts an internationally mandated peacekeeping operation (UN, NATO, AU, etc.).54  
Also, as a proxy measure of a countries’ dependence on international economic 
assistance the dataset includes a variable to indicate the volume of foreign aid received as 
                                                
52 It is possible that some countries have undergone pressure from occupying powers or states or entities with a 
military presence in that country to address the issue of internal displacement (i.e. Iraq from the Iraqi Provisional 
Authority, Timor-Leste from the UN Peace Keeping Ops, and Somalia from Uganda) but these seem to represent rare 
exceptions.   Experts interviewed characterized the US’ response to internal displacement as highly selective (i.e. 
comparatively little pressure on Colombia and Afghanistan). 
53 USAID, for example, has had in place since 2004 an official policy on assistance to IDPs whose purpose, among 
other things is to: “encourage wider international recognition and support for the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement as a useful framework for dealing with IDPs.   
54 This data was obtained from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and reported in the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2011. 
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a proportion of GDP. This value was calculated using the figures reported by The World 
Bank Development Report 2011 (for years 1998-2007).   
 
Variables Relating to Social mobilization  
Much of the literature on human rights norm diffusion gives credit to social 
mobilization for pressuring states into committing and complying with human rights 
norms (Murdie & Davis, 2012; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999; Simmons, 2009).  Although it 
is difficult to capture such pressure quantitatively, various studies have tired to utilize a 
number of proxy indicators.  
One indicator commonly used to measure social mobilization (or civil society 
strength) is a count of the number of international human rights organizations with 
domestic participation in a country, using as a source the Yearbook of International 
Organizations (E. M. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002; Keith, 1999; 
Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004).  Hughes et al (Forthcomming) operationalize a similar 
indicator to measure domestic ties to women’s transnational organizing.  The data also 
include a variable developed by Murdie and Davis (2012) that measures the network 
density of human rights international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) by 
counting the number of human rights INGOs having national sections, individual 
members, or affiliate organizations in a state in a given year.55  
Another variable included in the data to measure the extent of engagement by 
INGOs in a certain country, also used by Murdie and Davis (2012), quantifies the number 
of shaming events by INGOs for each country for every given year.  This variable was 
                                                
55 Unfortunately there is not a readily available, comprehensive dataset for this measure that includes all 
countries and years in this analysis.  This variable was missing a significant amount of data (slightly over 
40%).  To compensate for this, the dataset also includes a measure of INGO engagement. 
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generated using data from Reuters’ Global News Service reports concerning human 
rights organizations collected by the IDEA project.  Although it is unlikely that most 
“human rights shaming events” would relate specifically to issues of internal 
displacement, this is perhaps the best indicator of human rights INGO pressure available.   
 
Variables Relating to Cultural Match 
For some time constructivists have argued that preexisting local understandings, 
beliefs and obligations condition the impact of international norms on policy debates 
(Cortell & Davis, 2000). An international norm’s level of domestic salience has been 
often referred to as “cultural match.”  Checkel (1999) defines cultural match: as a 
situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with 
domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, 
laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures). 
When such a match exists and an international norm resonates with domestic norms and 
institutions, diffusion is said to be more rapid (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hugill & 
Dickson, 1988).  Domestic actors are likely to take the norm as a given and comply with 
its obligations.  Conversely if a norm clashes with preexisting domestic beliefs and 
obligations it is unlikely to effectively generate the necessary support to affect policy 
changes. 
As discussed previously, it is difficult to conceptualize or measure “Cultural 
Match” with the GP.  To test the effect that cultural match has on countries’ propensity to 
commit to the IDP regime the data include three possible proxy indicators of cultural 
match.  A first indicator measures countries’ level of embeddeness in the existing 
international human rights and humanitarian regimes within which the IDP regime is 
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entrenched. This indicator counts the number of intentional human rights treaties and 
conventions each country is party to for every given year and was calculated using a 
dataset generated by Simmons (2009).  
Although countries’ level of commitment with relevant international norms – 
many of which are the basis of the GP – is certainly important, it is not a perfect measure 
of cultural match.  To date, most of these international human rights instruments have 
been almost universally adopted including by notorious human rights violators who pay 
little subsequent attention to these norms.  Conversely, for reasons unrelated to these 
norms, some countries, such as the US, have refused to sign on to many international 
human rights treaties while maintaining a historically solid record of compliance with 
their obligations.  To compensate for this weakness the dataset includes two other 
possible indicators of cultural match – a measure of democracy and a measure of 
countries’ respect for human rights. 
Traditionally, democracies have been the natural allies of human rights 
(Simmons, 2009).  Human rights ideals had their genesis and their greatest international 
champions within the western democratic tradition.  Studies also suggest that democratic 
countries are more likely to comply with human rights norms than autocratic countries 
(Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999).  It is not surprising that the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action at the 1993 UN Human Rights Convention refers 
to democracy and human rights as: “interdependent and mutually reinforcing freedoms” 
(Donnelly, 1998). Because the IDP regime is clearly embedded in the human rights 
regime a measure of countries’ democracy will capture another important dimension of 
“cultural match.” 
As a measure of democracy the data include Freedom House’s yearly composite 
civil liberties and political rights scores.  These are widely used in empirical research and 
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by the policy community. Of all subjective measures, the Freedom House ratings are 
perhaps the most conceptually similar to major definitions of democracy and have less 
measurement error than other alternatives (Bollen & Paxton, 1998).56  Although Freedom 
House breaks down its index into separate scores for political rights and civil liberties, to 
get a more comprehensive measure of democracy, the dataset utilizes the added scores of 
civil and political rights, which is then treated as a continuous variable (Hughes et al., 
Forthcomming). 
As a measure of a country’s respect for human rights the dataset includes 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Terror Index.  This is an 8-point additive index that 
takes into account countries’ behavior with respect to torture, extrajudicial killing, 
political imprisonment, and disappearance. There are other widely used human rights 
measures, such as Amnesty International’s Political Terror Index and US Department of 
State’s Terror index.  However CIRI’s human terror index is perhaps a better measure of 
respect for human rights because it can be treated as a continuous variable and it is highly 
correlated with two other indices. 
 
Variables Relating to Important Domestic Factors 
As explained in the previous chapter, there are a number of domestic factors 
pertaining to countries and their displacement crises that could possibly affect the success 
of the different pressure mechanisms in promoting commitment with the IDP regime.  
Principal among them are the causes, magnitude and duration of each displacement crisis.  
When considering the effects of different sources of pressure it is important to control, 
                                                
56 In auxiliary models, I tested an alternative measure of democracy from the POLITY IV project but found no 
substantive changes to the results reported. 
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for example, for the extent to which states are responsible for displacing their own 
population.  Other factors that need to be considered are the state of hostilities – whether 
countries have achieved peace or continue to be at war – and states’ capacity to 
implement these norms.  The following section describes several important domestic 
structural factors that are controlled for in this study. 
 
Magnitude of Displacement Crisis 
The magnitude of a displacement crisis may affect a country’s propensity to 
commit to the IDP regime in two possible but potentially contradictory ways.   All things 
being equal, a comparatively large displacement crisis could lead policymakers to 
experience more domestic and international pressure to address the problem than they 
would if they had a comparatively small crisis.  Among other things, large IDP crises are 
harder to ignore.   Human rights activists and international norm entrepreneurs are more 
likely to focus their attention and their limited resources on what they perceive to be the 
most urgent cases of displacement.   Conversely, countries with very small IDP 
populations could be more likely to ignore the issue particularly if they are facing more 
pressing problems.  Mexico may be a good example of this phenomenon.  Despite having 
an IDP population since the outbreak of the Zapatista uprising in 1994, Mexico until 
recently was one of the few countries in Latin America that did not commit to the IDP 
regime.57   This may have been explained by the fact that Mexico’s displaced population 
is relatively very small (less than 16,000 or .0001 of the total population) so it did not 
                                                
57 In February 2012, the Chiapas state congress passed a bill on internal displacement which had been 
drafted with the support of various UN agencies and civil society representatives. It is the first such law to 
be passed in Mexico, and it incorporates the Guiding Principles. (See: http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/031D4DA9792CF185802570A7004CFD1A?opend
ocument) 
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raise the same level of alarm among international and domestic audiences as IDP crises in 
Colombia Peru and Guatemala. 
On the other hand, having a comparatively large IDP population could also make 
some countries less willing to commit to the regime because commitment represents a 
more onerous and costly responsibility.  In Cyprus, for example, approximately one third 
of the population has been displaced for over 20 years.  In some countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa between one fifth and half of the population has been episodically displaced.58  
Despite significant advances in data collection, forced migration experts 
recognize that estimating IDP figures remains somewhat problematic (Danevad & 
Zeender, 2003; Sert, 2008). Unlike UNHCR and the transnational refugee regime, the 
IDP regime lacks the mandate and the institutional capacity to estimate the number of 
IDPs in any sort of systematic way.  Instead, IDMC, a relatively small NGO, does its best 
to collect countries IDP estimates by compiling statistics generated by a variety of 
entities including UN agencies, local governments as well as other NGOs and 
humanitarian organizations.  In some cases the figures are often reported as a broad 
range.  IDMC admits that: “in some countries, lack of humanitarian access makes it 
impossible to compile anything but a rough estimate.”  In other countries where estimates 
vary widely, IDMC calculates a median figure using the highest and lowest estimates 
(Danevad & Zeender, 2003) .  Nevertheless, having gained substantial experience in the 
politics behind IDP figures in many countries, IDMC feels competent to critically assess 
the reliability of the various sources and chooses, in most cases, the most conservative 
figure among available estimates.  
                                                
58 During the worse part of Liberia’s civil war in early 1990s there were over one million IDPs accounting 
for approximately one half of that country’s population.   
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Some experts have argued that, aside from the fact that they are difficult to 
collect, IDP statistics are inherently political (Ramussen, 2006).  In internal armed 
conflicts various actors, including aid agencies, donors, and local governments have 
incentives to exaggerate or downplay the estimated numbers of IDPs (Holtzam & Nezam, 
2004; Stoddard, 2004). Another problem with estimations is that there is no clear 
agreement on when a person ceases to be displaced – instead there are only ad hoc or 
inconsistent determinations on the cessation of IDP status, which sometimes arbitrarily 
decreases or increase the estimated number of IDPs (Sert, 2008).   
Because of the various issues listed above, this study treats estimates rather 
conservatively.  In cases when IDMC reports a range, this I use the lowest estimate as 
other studies have done in the past (Orchard, 2010b). Despite its limitations, this is 
ultimately the best information available, and I trust that, for the purposes of this study, a 
rough estimate of the magnitude of the displacement crisis is sufficient.   
To control for the absolute size of the displacement crisis the dataset includes an 
estimate for the number of IDPs for each country for each year.  This is a continuous 
variable based on reports by the US Committee for Refugees (USCR), for the years 1990-
2000 and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), for years 2001-2010.   
As an indicator of the relative magnitude of the displacement crisis the data also 
include a measure of the relative size of IDP crisis, which represents the estimated 
number of IDPs as a proportion of a country’s total population (as reported in the World 
Bank Development Indicators).  
 
State of Hostilities  
As explained in the previous chapter, another important structural factor that must 
be accounted for is the state of hostilities in countries with IDPs. Ceteris paribus 
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countries at peace should be more likely than countries at war to commit to the IDP 
regime.  To control for countries’ state of hostilities the dataset includes a variable coded 
manually using data from the Correlates of War (COW), Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP), as well as IDMC and press reports.  This is a binomial variable that indicates for 
any given years, whether hostilities were active or inactive.  Cases were coded inactive 
when a peace treaty or cease-fire agreement was signed or when a some sort of peaceful 
protracted stalemate was achieved, as is the case for example in the Golan Heights or 
Cyprus. 
 
Protraction  
The data include a binomial variable to control for protracted displacement.  
Protracted situations of displacement are defined as countries with more than 25,000 
IDPs which have been displaced for over 5 years.59  These situations are qualitatively 
different form episodic displacement, where IDPs are on the move for a relatively short 
time and tend to return as soon as the security situation at home improves.60  Protracted 
displacement are situations for which there is not a quick solutions and where IDPs do 
not really have the option to return to their homes (2007). In the absence of quick 
answers to displacement, all other factors being equal protracted displacement represent a 
particular humanitarian challenge for states which could affect willingness to commit to 
the regime (Mundt & Ferris, 2008).61   
                                                
59 Although there is not a universally accepted definition of a protracted situation for internal displacement, 
the UNHCR uses the crude measure of refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more who have been in 
exile for five or more years in developing countries.  Quoted in (Mundt & Ferris, 2008) 
60 Some examples of episodic displacement include: East Timor (2006-2009); Ghana (1995); Guinea-
Bissau (1998-1999) and Haiti (1990 & 1993). 
61 Also see Statistical Yearbook 2006; Trends in Displacement, Protraction and Solutions. (Annex).  
UNHCR (Dec.  2007). 
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Cause of Displacement 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the underlying cause of displacement is 
likely to affect countries’ propensity to commit to the IDP regime.  While most internal 
displacement is the result of internal armed conflict, whether in the form of civil wars, 
insurgencies, ethnic clashes of generalized violence; in some cases displacement is the 
results of inter-state war or individualized political persecution.   
It is possible that countries undergoing inter-state conflict, where displacement is 
mostly the result of actions committed by an external party, may commit to the IDP 
regime as a signaling mechanism to call international attention to the conflict and elicit 
international support.  Not surprisingly, some of the first countries to institute domestic 
legislation to protect IDPs, such as Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, were involved in 
internationalized conflicts. Conversely, countries where displacement is the result of 
individualized political persecution by the state (i.e. Zimbabwe, Iraq during the 1990s, 
and Haiti 1991-1993) may be less likely than others to call attention to their displacement 
crises. 
The data include a categorical variable that indicates whether internal 
displacement was primarily the result of: internal conflict, international conflict, or 
individualized political persecution.  This variable was manually coded using IDMC 
country and yearly reports as well supplemental data from press reports, the Correlates of 
War dataset, and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set.62  
  
                                                
62 PITF Historical Armed Conflict and Regime Crises 1955-2010, last updated on May 7, 2010. 
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Regime Induced Displacement 
The data also include a categorical variable called “Regime Induced Displacement 
(“RID’)” to capture the responsibility of the state in displacing its own population.   This 
important concept as originally defined by Orchard (2010a).  However, while it is 
important to differentiate cases where the state is primarily responsible for producing the 
displacement, the concept of RID is somewhat problematic.  Although this study as well 
as Orchard’s codes RID as a dichotomous variable (it is either happening or it isn’t 
happening), in reality RID operates within a spectrum.  Rarely can states be absolved 
completely of responsibility for internal displacement occurring within their territory.  In 
most cases, the extent of the state’s responsibility for causing internal displacement is the 
subject of much debate and in the midst of war there is rarely enough reliable information 
with which to make a clear determination.  Because of this, I have coded this variable 
conservatively to include only cases where evidence for the regimes’ responsibility for 
displacing their own population was overwhelming.  
Orchard initially constructed a qualitative dataset in which he coded most 
reported cases of internal displacement using Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International and the US State Department Country Reports.  Because his dataset 
excludes a significant number of crises (23) between 1991and 2006, I have manually re-
coded all IDP crises myself using the same sources in addition to IDMC’s yearly and 
country reports. 
 
State Capacity 
State capacity, as previously discussed, could determine countries’ ability and 
willingness to comply with the GP.  Although state capacity is most likely to affect 
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countries’ ability to implement rather than commit to demanding and costly international 
guidelines it is possible that countries may take their ability to implement these nomrs 
into consideration when deciding whether to commit to them. 
Although measures of state capacity to comply with particular prescriptions of the 
GP are difficult to operationalize and are not widely available, it is possible to test the 
effects of state capacity in a very general way.  To this end, the data include the State 
Fragility Index (SFI) of countries as reported by the Polity IV Project as well as 
countries’ log GDP per capita.  Whereas the SFI – a 25 point score – provides a general 
measure of states’ level of effectiveness and legitimacy GDP per capita provides a 
general measure of economic development.63    
 
METHOD 
In order to explore quantitatively what factors are driving commitment with the 
international IDP regime this study conducts three sets of statistical analysis.  In a first 
instance I attempt to establish that commitment has a notable effect on the size of 
countries’ displacement crises.  The study then proceeds to present a broad overview of 
the state of commitment with the regime and to reveal some interesting patterns using 
descriptive statistics.  Finally the study tests the explanatory power of the various factors 
derived from international relations theory and forced migration studies described above 
by running a series of event history models. 
The purpose of the descriptive statistics is to generate a clear picture of 
commitment with the regime and its evolution since its inception.  The purpose of the 
                                                
63 Simmons (2009) GDP per capita logged (in constant 2000 USD) as reported by the World Bank 
Development Indicators.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators last visited 8/2012. 
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event history analysis is to tease out the merit of competing hypotheses of norm diffusion 
by determining what factors best predict a country’s propensity to commit to the IDP 
regime by instituting domestic legislation to protect IDPs.  This process should allow us 
generate more refined hypothesis about the causal dynamics of commitment that can later 
be tested though qualitative case studies. 
 
WHY COMMITMENT MATTERS: THE EFFECT OF COMMITMENT ON THE MAGNITUDE 
OF DISPLACEMENT 
This section makes the case that commitment matters by suggesting that, on 
average, countries that commit to the regime see a significant decrease in the proportion 
of IDPs.  It also takes an initial look at the evolution of commitment between 1990 and 
2010 using descriptive statistics, partly to determine if there are any obvious explanations 
for what is driving commitment.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, a country’s commitment to the regime is an 
important and necessary first step in addressing the problem of displacement.  As the 
framers of the GP have repeatedly advocated, for countries to comply with the GP they 
must first institute domestic legal and political frameworks that recognize the rights of 
IDPs enshrined in these norms and recognize the state’s responsibility to address the 
problem. 
Until now, however, there has been little empirical evidence to suggest, in any 
systematic way, that commitment or compliance with the IDP regime are associated with 
changes in displacement crises.  The creation of this original dataset grants us the 
opportunity to take a first look at whether the institution of domestic legislation to 
  75 
address internal displacement correlates with changes in the magnitude and trend of 
displacement.   
There are, of course, many factors that could theoretically affect the magnitude of 
a country’s displacement crises aside from commitment.  The underlying causes of 
displacement, for example, could be removed through a cessation of hostilities or a 
change in regime leading to a return of IDPs.  Cease-fires of peace treaties may be 
negotiated, peacekeeping operations or foreign intervention may put an end to an ethnic 
cleansing campaign.  Given the imperfect nature of much of the data, this study cannot 
pretend to properly control for all of these factors.  
However a cursory look at changes in the magnitude of internal displacement 
crises at the country level (measured as the proportion of a country’s population that is 
displaced) before and after commitment seems to indicated that displacement tends to 
decrease after commitment. 
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the magnitude of displacement crisis for the 21 
countries that have committed to the regime.  The figure centers each country curve at the 
year of commitment (t = 0). With the exception of two outliers, Liberia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina,64 the magnitude of countries’ displacement crisis appears to fluctuate 
between 0 and 30% of the total population with displacement peaking around the time of 
commitment. 
  
                                                
64 During the mid 1990s, at the height of Liberia’s First Civil War, the country saw a relatively short but 
intense burst of displacement.  In 1994 approximately 54% of the country’s population of 2.04 was 
displaced.   By 1999 the IDP estimates had decreased to approximately 50,000.  A second wave of 
displacement during Liberia’s Second Civil War (1999-2005) saw much smaller wave of displacement 
(peaking at 500,000 in 2003).  The second outlier in the dataset is Bosnia, which experienced a massive 
burst of displacement following the breakup of Yugoslavia (peaking at 1.3 million or 39% of the country’s 
population by 1995). 
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Figure 4: Fluctuations in the Magnitude of Displacement for Committed Countries for 
Years Before and After Commitment 
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A plot of the average magnitude of displacement (Figure 5) suggest that, on 
average, countries that committed to the regime by instituting domestic legislation to 
protect IDPs saw a dramatic decrease in the magnitude of displacement within the fists 
five years.  
Figure 5: Average Magnitude of Displacement Before and After Commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is difficult to estimate the significance of this trend using statistical tools 
available, particularly given the limitations of the data.  A segmented regression test 
(allowing for a knot and a jump at the time of commitment) confirms that there is a 
significant change in the slope of the regression curve following commitment as 
illustrated by Figure 6.65  The change in the intercept or “jump,” however, did not prove 
                                                
65 This regression involves fitting separate line segments, demarcated by a knot and a jump that might 
account for non-linearity between the predictor and outcome.  A knot allows for a change of slope (or trend 
in the magnitude of the displacement crisis) while a jump (or change in intercept) allows for an immediate 
decrease in the magnitude of displacement when a country commits.  
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significant.  This should not be surprising given that displacement crises cannot be 
alleviated overnight. 
 
Figure 6: Regression Curve of Magnitude of Displacement Before and After 
Commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because this dataset only looks at countries that committed to the regime, it is of 
course, possible that the results capture a problem of selection.  We can’t discount the 
possibility that countries that commit are also countries that are already seeing a radical 
shift in the their IDP crisis either because of a change in state behavior or an exogenous 
change in the underlying cause of displacement (i.e. peace agreement, military 
occupation etc.) which may have lead to a very overstated effect of commitment.66   
                                                
66 A differences-in-differences model is one attempt to deal with selection bias.  This test looks for change 
from baseline among countries that committed and those that did not.  A difference-in-differences test that I 
ran on a dataset that including all countries did not show that commitment had any significant effect on the 
magnitude of countries’ displacement crises.  This method, however, is somewhat problematic for my type 
of dataset because it is only able to compare two arbitrarily selected points in time (pre and post treatment 
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With this in mind, a prima facie look at the data provides enough evidence to be 
cautiously optimistic that commitment with the regime, as signaled by the enactment of 
domestic law and policies in accordance with the GP, in fact matters greatly. Having 
established that my dependent variable is important, this chapter now turns to the central 
question of this dissertation to uncover the factors that lead countries to commit to the 
IDP regime. 
 
EVOLUTION OF COMMITMENT WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
In an attempt to better understand quantitatively what is driving commitment this 
study takes an initial look at the evolution of commitment between 1990 and 2010 using 
descriptive statistics.  This simple exercise not only seeks to address an important data 
gap by providing descriptive information about the state and evolution of displacement 
but may also reveal some patterns that could be suggestive of the motives and processes 
driving commitment.   
 
Growth in Commitment 
The data first reveal that in the past two decades commitment with the IDP regime 
has grown steadily.  A look at the adoption of laws and policies on internal displacement 
shows that, since the inception of the regime in 1992, there has been a steady increase in 
the number of countries that have instituted domestic legislation to address internal 
displacement (Figure 7).  By the end of 2010, 21 countries had in place laws and policies 
that signaled commitment.  Some of theses, including legislation in Armenia, Russia, 
Guatemala, Georgia and Colombia pre-dated by a few years the official adoption of the 
                                                                                                                                            
with treatment being roughly in between).   For cases when commitment may have occurred right before or 
after the time interval, effects of commitment may not have had time to fully manifest themselves. 
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Guiding Principles by the United Nations and in many ways anticipate the principles.  
This, of course, is not unusual, because since 1992, when the RSG’s mandate was 
established, the RSG’s and other entities in the international community strongly pushed 
countries suffering from internal displacement to assume responsibility and address the 
problem.    
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Figure 7: Adoption of Domestic Legislation to Protect IDPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 (on page 68) provides a chronological list of all domestic instruments on 
internal displacement that signal a commitment with the regime that were adopted from 
1990 to 2010. 
The data also show that the growth in commitment has kept place with the 
dynamic nature of the problem.  The proportion of IDPs protected by domestic legislation 
promoted by the regime has grown steadily, as illustrated by figure 8.  By the end of 2010 
close to 70% of the world’s IDPs lived in countries that had committed to the regime.67 
  
                                                
67 This figure may have changed slightly with the explosion of IDP crises in Nigeria and Syria post-2010. 
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Figure 8: Proportion of IDPs Protected by Domestic Legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because internal displacement is a dynamic phenomenon that is constantly in flux 
– new crises emerge as others are resolved – an increase in the number of countries 
committing to the regime does not necessarily translate into an increase in the number or 
proportion of IDPs being affected by that commitment.  The data demonstrates that, at 
least until 2010, the regime kept pace with the evolution of displacement. 
The data also reveals that commitment to the regime has taken various forms.  As 
Wyndham, Orchard, and others have observed (Ferris et al., 2011; Orchard, 2014; 
Wyndham, 2006), national legislations have generally followed four different models.  
Wyndham (2006) categorized these as:  
1. A brief instrument adopting the Guiding Principles 
2. A law or policy developed to address a specific cause or stage of displacement  
3. A law or policy developed to protect a specific right of the internally displaced 
4. A comprehensive law or policy addressing all causes and all stages of 
displacement 
0
.2
.4
.6
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 ID
Ps
 C
ov
er
ed
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
  83 
 
While Wyndham provided only a few examples of each type of law, the 
remaining laws in the dataset were coded using her typology.  The data show that most 
countries adopted either a policy aimed at addressing a specific cause or stage of 
displacement (type 2) or a comprehensive law or policy addressing all causes and stages 
of displacement (type 4). Liberia provided the only example of a brief instrument 
adopting the GP (type 1).  In the case of Nepal, a type 2 law was initially adopted in 2004 
but was later amended to become a type 4 law addressing displacement more 
comprehensively.    Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of commitment to the regime by 
type of legislation. 
 
Figure 9: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement by Type of Law 
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Commitment  
Having established that commitment, in various forms, has steadily increased 
during the past two decades, I now look closely at the types of countries that have 
committed to the regime.  A cursory look at the data reveals that commitment has grown 
steadily in countries suffering from different types of displacement and conflict.   
A breakdown of commitment by cause of displacement reveals that, commitment 
has grown among countries undergoing purely internal conflict and countries undergoing 
international conflicts.68   Interestingly enough none of the cases where displacement was 
the direct result of individualized political persecution (i.e. Zimbabwe, Iraq and Haiti in 
the 1990s) instituted domestic legislation to protect IDPs.69  
Figure 10:  Commitment by Cause of Displacement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
68 The difference in the rate of commitment may simply reflect the fact that there are many fewer countries 
where displacement is the result of international wars than countries where it is the result of internal 
conflict. 
69 Iraq eventually committed to the regime following the toppling of Saddam Hussein and occupation by 
Western forces, by that time causes of most displacement had changed. 
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Commitment, however, has increased among countries where the regime is 
principally responsible for causing the displacement (RID) (see Figure 11). In the past 20 
years the proportion of countries with RID that have committed to the regime has grown 
steadily.  By 2010, over 40% of them had in place some sort of domestic legislation to 
protect IDPs.  
 
Figure 11: Proportion of Countries with RID that have Committed to the IDP Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A first look at commitment also appears to suggest that the state of hostilities does 
not affect countries’ rate of commitment.  As illustrated in Figure 12, the proportion of 
countries with active conflict that have committed to the regime has increased.  This is 
somewhat surprising and encouraging given that, as previously discussed, countries at 
war should theoretically be less likely to commit.  Although the slight drop in 2007 
appears worrisome it may simply reflect that certain large conflicts have ceased to be 
active.  Once again, this is an indicator that is tested later using event history analysis. 
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Figure 12: Proportion of Countries with Active Conflict that have Committed to the IDP 
Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An initial look at the rate of commitment suggests that the proportion of countries 
with protracted displacement that have committed to the regime has also increased 
steadily.  As of 2010, 40% of these countries had in place domestic legislation to protect 
IDPs. 
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Figure 13: Proportion of Countries with Protracted Displacement that have Committed to 
the IDP Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps the most striking finding revealed by a cursory look at the data is that the 
rate and timing of commitment to the regime over the past two decades appears to have 
followed clear regional patterns as illustrated by Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement by Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although all regions of the world were affected by internal displacement between 
1990 and 2010, commitment with the IDP regime appears to have occurred in regional 
clusters.  The first group of countries to adopt legislation on internal displacement, during 
the 1990s, are in Europe/Central Asia and Latin America.70  Despite the fact that Sub-
Saharan Africa accounted for approximately one half of all internal displacement the 
continent did not begin to see commitment until the year 2000 when Burundi drafted an 
IDP policy as part of the Arusha Peace agreement, which was soon followed by the 
institution of laws in Angola (2001), Sierra Leone (2001) and Liberia (2002).  This was 
then followed by a regional wave of commitment in South Asia, as Sri Lanka (2002), 
                                                
70 The first countries in Europe and the former USSR to commit were: Russia (1993); Tajikistan (1994); 
Bosnia (1995); Georgia (1996); Armenia (1998); and Azerbaijan (1999).  In Latin America the first 
countries to commit were: Guatemala (1994) and Colombia (1997). 
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India (2003) and Nepal (2004) all drafted national policies on internal displacement in a 
two-year period.   
With the exception of Iraq (2008) – which arguably constitutes a special case 
because the country was in essence occupied and administered by Western powers 
following the end of the Second Gulf War – the Middle East and North African region 
did not experience a similar dynamic of norm diffusion.  Likewise, by the end of the 
2000s, none of the countries with internal displacement in East Asia/Pacific committed to 
the regime. 
This is certainly an intriguing pattern, which appears to suggest that the diffusion 
of the IDP norms may depend, to a large extent, on regional mechanisms of pressure and 
socialization (Acharya, 2004; Checkel, 1999; Finnemore, 1993; Gheciu, 2005; Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). These regional factors are tested more 
rigorously, later on, using event history analysis. 
 
Effect of UNHCR involvement in IDP Crises 
The creation of a large-n dataset of IDP crises databases allows us to take a first 
systematic look at the effects that UNHCR has had on internal displacement around the 
globe.  Given UNHCR’s increased involvement with this issue we are particularly 
interested in learning whether UNHCR’s presence in host countries has had an effect in: 
(1) attenuating displacement crises, and (2) increasing the likelihood that host countries 
will commit to the IDP regime by enacting domestic legislation. 
The data, in fact, confirms that between 1990 and 2010 UNHCR became 
increasingly engaged in countries with IDPs.  This does not necessarily signify that the 
totality of host countries’ IDP populations were under UNHCR’s direct protection, as is 
the case of refugees.  Often times only a small proportion of IDPs in these countries 
  90 
receive direct aid and shelter from the UN agency.  It does, however signify that internal 
displacement is part of UNHCR’s mandate in these countries and consequently the 
agency has the potential to affect policy outcomes including commitment to the IDP 
regime.   
To some extent or another, UNHCR has been involved in protecting IDPs since 
the 1970s.  During the 1990s the agency played a particularly prominent role in 
protecting IDPs in the Balkans, the South Caucasus, Colombia and Sri Lanka (Cohen, 
2005). By the late-2000s, after the UNHCR assumed responsibility for leading the UN’s 
IDP cluster, the agency was protecting IDPs in the vast majority of affected countries. 
Whereas in 1993 only approximately 30% of the world’s IDPs were located in a country 
with UNHCR presence, by 2010 that number was closer to 80%. 
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Figure 15: Percentage of IDP Crises Covered by UNHCR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data also shows that, on average, UNHCR’s presence in IDP crises correlates 
with a significant reduction in the magnitude of displacement in those countries as shown 
in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16:  Relative Size of IDP Populations in Countries With and Without a UNHCR 
Presence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph illustrates that, over time, the mean percentage of IDPs, in countries 
with a UNHCR presence, declined significantly.  This suggests that UNHCR has had a 
positive effect in alleviating the problem in countries where it is involved in protecting 
IDPs. 
An alternative explanation is that this correlation suffers from the effects of 
selection bias.  In other words, UNHCR may not have had a direct effect in alleviating 
displacement crises but may simply have correlated with a downturn in the number of 
IDPs that was cause by other factors – i.e. regime change, peace negotiations, or an end 
to hostilities. This is certainly a possibility worth considering because UNHCR rarely 
operates in a host country without the formal invitation and consent of the state.  Given 
the limitations of the data it is difficult to know through quantitative means what is 
happening, controlling for all possible factors.  It may however be possible to obtain a 
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better understanding of the real effect of UNHCR on host countries’ IDP situation 
through process tracing in qualitative case studies.  
A subsequent event history analysis conducted on the dataset, and which is 
discussed in more detail in the Event History section, also suggests that UNHCR’s 
presence in host countries is strongly correlated with countries’ higher propensity to 
commit to the IDP regime by adopting domestic legislation on internal displacement, 
even when controlling for a number of other factors (see Figure 17).  
Although these statistical results are in no way conclusive, they certainly provide 
prima facie reasons to be optimistic about the effects of UNHCR’s growing involvement 
in the issue of internal displacement.  This is particularly encouraging because the UN 
agency has historically been reluctant to take on this added responsibility for fear of 
diluting or threatening its core mandate.71 
So far the dataset has shown that commitment matters and that, on average, 
countries that enact domestic legislation to protect IDPs see a reduction in the magnitude 
of their displacement problem.  Using descriptive statistics, I have illustrated that 
between 1990 and 2010 commitment to the IDP regime grew steadily, increasing the 
proportion of the world’s IDPs protected by domestic frameworks.  Quite surprisingly, 
the data suggested that commitment increased regardless of cause of displacement (even 
                                                
71 In particular, UNHCR was concerned that its involvement in IDP protection efforts may have negative 
outcomes in cases where: (1) involvement might constitute or contribute to a strategy that is intended to 
contain displaced persons within the borders of their own country; (2) there is a risk that countries of 
asylum may renounce their protection obligations toward refugees, on the basis that the UN’s IDP response 
in the country of origin provides them with an ‘internal flight alternative’; (3) UNHCR’s impartiality could 
be negatively impacted thus jeopardizing humanitarian access to refugee populations; (4) UNHCR’s 
involvement with IDPS may compromise its relationships with host governments which could negatively 
affect its activities for refugees; (5) collaboration with other UN agencies in responding to IDP crises could 
allow countries of asylum to question the applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which states that the Convention shall not apply to persons who are receiving protection or assistance from 
UN agencies other than UNHCR (Feller, 2006). 
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among countries where the state was the principal agent of displacement), the state of 
hostilities (whether countries were at war or at peace), and protraction.  These findings 
may suggest that many of the structural factors expected to affect commitment matter 
very little.  On the other hand, a cursory overview of the evolution of commitment 
showed that commitment has followed strong regional patterns perhaps suggesting that 
regional dynamics may have played a very important role in the IDP norm’s diffusion.  
Moreover an initial look at the effect of UNHCR presence also suggested that that UN 
institution has had a positive and unexpected impact on internal displacement in host 
countries. 
In order to better tease out correlation and explore the explanatory power of 
various factors identified by international relations theory in predicting countries 
commitment it is necessary to conduct some sort of regression analysis.  This study now 
turns to this task using event history analysis.  
 
EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS 
When looking at norm diffusion it is important to consider not only whether a 
particular country adopts a new norm but also when it commits.  As explained by Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), event history analysis can provide researchers leverage 
on the issue of timing of political change.  It allows researchers to answer a more 
extensive set of questions than conventional analysis by using information on the 
number, timing, and sequence of changes in the dependent variable. Not surprisingly this 
method has been commonly used to study issues of norm diffusion in in the fields of 
international relations and comparative politics (Allison, 1984; Hughes et al., 
Forthcomming; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Strang, 1991).  
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This study uses a Cox proportional hazard model.72  The hazard model estimates a 
survival function that represents the probability that a country will not experience the 
event (e.g. commitment to the regime) later than some specified time t. The effect of each 
factor is reflected in the hazard ratio: A ratio greater than 1 increases and a ratio less than 
1 reduces the likelihood that an uncommitted country will institute domestic legislation 
for IDPs in any given year.  Once a country commits to the regime by instituting 
domestic legislation on internal displacement, it is dropped from the analysis.  
 
Model Specification 
The Cox proportional hazard model utilizes year as the unit time variable.  The 
“event” is defined as a country’s first institution of domestic legislation that signals 
commitment to the IDP regime.  Table 1 on page 59 lists all laws and policies which, 
according to Brookings’ Project on Internal Displacement, constitute commitment with 
the GP. The analysis treats the event as an irreversible and non-repeatable occurrence.73  
For this reason, the models utilized ignore all country data pertaining to years following 
commitment. 
The models define the onset of risk – when a country enters the analysis – as the 
year when each country first experiences internal displacement.  For countries where the 
displacement crisis pre-dates the inception of the regime risk is said to begin in 1992, 
when the UN instituted the IDP mandate and promoted the institution of national legal 
frameworks to address the problem.  In doing this, the study makes the reasonable 
                                                
72 This method has become the preferred method to analyze policy adoption using binary time-series cross-
sectional data (BTSCS) because, unlike alternative models such as the standard logit and probit approaches, 
the Cox model avoids the need to parametrize the baseline hazard function (Jones & Branton, 2005).  
73 While in theory, a country could repeal its commitment to the regime none has done so.  I’m also afraid 
that that treating the event as repeatable may penalize latecomers to the regime who did not suffer 
displacement until much later in the time period examined and bias my results. 
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assumption that countries that have not suffered from internal displacement are not likely 
to draft legislation to address the problem.  As discussed earlier, given the “soft law” 
nature of the guiding principles, countries without IDPs have not been pushed to institute 
the Guiding Principles in domestic legislation and would have little reason to do so. 
Once a country enters the analysis, as a result of the onset of displacement, it is 
considered by the models to remain perpetually at risk – even if displacement ends.  This 
is a necessary and reasonable assumption for two reasons.  First, it is rare for a country to 
suffer a single, isolated case of displacement.  The majority of the countries in our sample 
suffer from either protracted or chronic displacement because the underlying causes of 
displacement – namely ethnic antagonisms, internal conflict and the state’s fragility – 
were rarely resolved after the end of a particular crisis.  Secondly, countries that suffer 
displacement tend to remain targets of human rights pressure by international and 
domestic entities that want to avoid a repeated crisis, particularly when many of the 
underlying causes that provoked the displacement have not been resolved.  Following an 
initial survey of displacement around the world it is feared that specifying the model 
otherwise could generate biased results. 
Because various countries enter risk at different times, the model is specified to 
use “internal clock” time rather than “calendar time.” To avoid endogeneity, and to 
ensure that time-dependent covariates precede the event, most time-dependent variables 
are entered in lagged form (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  In other words, the 
model will only consider the prior values of time-dependent variables (such as RSG visits 
or State Fragility Index) to minimize potential biases from reverse or simultaneous 
causation. 
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Missing Data / Multiple Imputation 
Due to the difficulty in obtaining data for all of the variables for all countries and 
for all years, missing values appeared throughout the dataset.  Listwise deletion, the 
default in most statistical software, would have resulted in a sizable loss of observations 
and also likely introduced bias if the deleted observations were not missing completely at 
random (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001).  The problem of missing data was 
consequently handled through multiple imputation using tools available in Stata 12 
(StataCorp 2012). 
Specifically, twenty data sets were created in which each missing observation was 
imputed using the method of chained equations (Raghunathan, Lepkowski, Van Hoewyk, 
& Solenberger, 2001).  This method iterates through all of the variables for which values 
must be imputed and then fits a regression model for each missing variable using other 
complete and incomplete data variables as predictors.74  
The table below displays summary statistics for all of the variables used in the 
study.  The first column lists the variable, the second and third columns present the mean 
and standard deviation before imputation, and the fourth and fifth columns present the 
mean and standard deviation after imputation.  The central tendencies of the variables did 
not change appreciably as a result of the imputations.  The standard deviations, however, 
did become much smaller following the imputations.  
                                                
74 This regression model yields predicted values, and the imputation randomly selects a value on the basis of the 
distribution of predictions given values on the independent variables.  Once one variable has had its missing values 
updated, it becomes an independent variable in the regression for the next variable with missing data. The algorithm 
iterates repeatedly through all of the variables, updating missing values for one variable at each step in the chain.  As 
the sequence proceeds, imputations improve.  This continues until convergence occurs, at which time the imputations 
demonstrate consistency from one iteration to the next. 
 
To ensure that the chain was allowed sufficient time to reach convergence, a burn-in period of 500 iterations was run.  
During this period, regression models were used to predict the missing values on the basis of values on the other 
variables, with imputations taken at iteration t used to improve imputations at iteration t + 1.  Following the completion 
of the burn-in period, convergence for each imputed variable was checked using trace plots.   
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Table 4: Univariate Summaries of Imputed Variables  
	   	   	  	  	   Pre-­‐Imputation	   Post-­‐Imputation	  
	  	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
RSG	  Visit	  (Lag)	   0.2916	   0.4547	   0.2824	   0.0132	  
IDPs	  Protected	  by	  UNHCR	   0.2777	   0.4481	   0.2563	   0.0143	  
Regional	  Density	  (Lag)	   0.2119	   0.2546	   0.2068	   0.0074	  
Europe-­‐Central	  Asia	   0.1923	   0.3943	   0.1914	   0.0115	  
Latin	  America-­‐Caribbean	   0.1027	   0.3037	   0.1030	   0.0089	  
Relative	  Size	  of	  IDP	  Crisis	   0.0341	   0.0673	   0.0327	   0.0019	  
IDP	  Estimates	  (Log)	   12.2748	   1.7120	   11.7813	   0.0672	  
Regime	  Induced	  Displacement	   0.4372	   0.4962	   0.4524	   0.0152	  
International	  War	  	   0.2045	   0.4036	   0.1648	   0.0117	  
Political	  Persecution	   0.0305	   0.1721	   0.0487	   0.0066	  
Peacekeeping	  Operations	  (Lag)	   0.2174	   0.4126	   0.2129	   0.0122	  
International	  Aid	  (Lag)	   0.5168	   0.8428	   0.4409	   0.0304	  
Embeddedeness	  in	  HR	  Regime	   7.6211	   3.4710	   8.1809	   0.1046	  
Democracy	   9.3706	   3.0317	   9.3288	   0.0888	  
Physical	  Integrity	   3.0569	   2.0247	   3.0790	   0.0657	  
Shaming	  Events	   3.6284	   6.9486	   3.5940	   0.2034	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  (Log)	   6.4314	   1.1917	   6.4350	   0.0349	  
State	  Fragility	  Index	   15.1161	   5.2089	   15.4976	   0.1543	  
HR	  INGO	  Density	   29.1162	   16.3234	   36.0245	   0.7056	  
 
 
Results 
Using the imputed data, survival analysis was conducted by incrementally 
building models to: (1) determine which variables appear to significantly increase the 
probability of commitment, and then (2) determine if these variables remain significant 
with the addition of controls.  After exploring the full models, the proportional hazards 
assumption is tested and different functional forms are explored in the Diagnostics 
section. 
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Models 
As a first step, a series of simple (bivariate) Cox survival models were run to 
determine which variables, or group of variables, appeared to have a significant effect on 
countries’ commitment.  The results are presented in Table 5, where each row represents 
a separate model that contains only the respective variable as the sole predictor. 
 
Table 5: Results of Bivariate Analysis 
	  	   Coef	   SE	   HR	   t	   p	  
RSG	  Visit	  (Lag)	   1.2084	   0.4401	   3.348	   2.75	   0.006	  
UNHCR	  Protection	   1.8213	   0.4694	   6.180	   3.88	   0	  
Regional	  Density	  (Lag)	   1.6450	   0.9899	   5.181	   1.66	   0.097	  
Europe-­‐Central	  Asia	   1.3818	   0.4568	   3.982	   3.03	   0.002	  
Latin	  America-­‐Caribbean	   0.4137	   0.6255	   1.512	   0.66	   0.508	  
Relative	  Size	  IDP	  Crisis	   5.1145	   1.9714	   166.417	   2.59	   0.009	  
IDP	  Estimates	  (Log)	   0.5768	   0.1680	   1.780	   3.43	   0.001	  
Regime	  Induced	  Dis.	   0.5226	   0.4446	   1.686	   1.18	   0.24	  
International	  War	  	   0.0831	   0.5626	   1.087	   0.15	   0.883	  
Political	  Persecution	   -­‐3.4361	   3.9027	   0.032	   -­‐0.88	   0.379	  
Peace	  Keeping	  Ops	  (Lag)	   0.7105	   0.4788	   2.035	   1.48	   0.138	  
International	  Aid	  (Lag)	   -­‐0.0805	   0.3170	   1.000	   -­‐0.25	   0.8	  
Embeddedness	  in	  HR	  
Regime	   0.1377	   0.0754	   1.148	   1.83	   0.068	  
Democracy	   -­‐0.0316	   0.0658	   0.969	   -­‐0.48	   0.631	  
Physical	  Integrity	   -­‐0.2225	   0.1249	   0.801	   -­‐1.78	   0.075	  
Shaming	  Events	   0.0066	   0.0294	   1.007	   0.23	   0.822	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  (Log)	   0.0132	   0.1695	   1.013	   0.08	   0.938	  
State	  Fragility	  Index	   0.0109	   0.0423	   1.011	   0.26	   0.797	  
HR	  INGO	  Density	   -­‐0.0045	   0.0166	   0.996	   -­‐0.27	   0.786	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This first set of results shows significance for several of the variables relating to 
international normative pressure and region.  When the country is visited by the RSG, the 
unadjusted likelihood of commitment at the next point in time is 3.348	   times larger, 
which is easily significant (p = .006).  Moreover, protection by UNHCR increases the 
unadjusted likelihood of adoption more than six fold.  This estimate is also precise, 
yielding a p-value less than .001.  The regional density of commitment does show a 
sizeable unadjusted effect on the hazard rate (HR = 5.181), but there is too much 
variability in the sample to be able to reject the null hypothesis that the true hazard ratio 
is 1 (p = 0.097).  Not controlling for other factors, countries in Europe and Central Asia 
are almost four times more likely than countries in other regions to commit to the IDP 
regime (HR = 3.982, p = .002).  The Latin America-Caribbean regional dummy, 
however, is not significant (HR = 1.512, p = .508).75 
These initial results corroborate what the descriptive statistical analysis appeared 
to suggest; namely that international normative pressure and regional differences are 
critical factors in the diffusion of IDP norms.  Further testing is warranted, however, to 
control for other factors. It is also interesting that while indicators for interaction with UN 
actors most concerned with internal displacement (e.g. UNHCR and the RSG) appear to 
be significantly correlated with a higher propensity to commit, indicators for 
transnational activism (the measure of human rights INGO density and a count of INGO 
shaming events) do not show significance.  There are three possible explanations for this. 
First, it is possible that different forms of international normative pressure vary in 
their effectiveness.   Not all international norm entrepreneurs are the same after all. 
Countries may attribute a lot more weight for example to the actions and pronouncements 
                                                
75 We do not test for Middle East-North Africa and East Asia-Pacific dummies because there aren’t 
enough observations in the dataset to report a hazard ratio. 
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of inter-governmental UN institutions such as UNHCR than to non-governmental entities 
such as Amnesty International Jesuit Refugee Services. 
A second possibility is that the estimates for INGO variables are the result of 
missing data.  There ism after all, a lot of data missing for the INGO density variable 
(close to 40%) that may have resulted in the generation of unrealistic imputed values.76   
A third possibility is that significance exhibited by the UN indicators is really 
capturing a problem of selection.  It is possible that countries that have a propensity to 
commit also have a propensity to invite the RSG and UNHCR to visit and set up 
operations to help them address the problem of displacement and that these UN entities 
don’t really have an independent effect on commitment after all.   
This study has sought to minimize the risk selection by lagging the independent 
variables and by including a number of controls.  Given the limitations inherent in 
quantitative analysis and the imperfect nature of the data, it is not possible to completely 
discount the possibility that these results may exhibit selection bias.  A qualitative 
examination of the processes and motivations that led countries to commit, however, can 
shed some light on this puzzle.  
Of the remaining indicators, only two variables – both of which are related to the 
magnitude of the displacement crises – yielded p-values that are smaller than .05.   
Countries where the proportion of the population displaced is larger (Relative size of IDP 
crisis) have a higher likelihood of committing.  The large hazard ratio on this variable is 
due to the measurement of the variable as a proportion rather than a percentage of the 
total population.  Each percentage point increase would yield an increase of 66% in the 
hazard to commit (changing a percentage to a proportion, HR = .01*166 = 1.66).  
                                                
76 More specifically, the dataset generated by Murdie and Davis stopped at year 2004 which left a six-year 
gap in our dataset for all countries.  Moreover, there was not any data for a number of countries in our 
sample (Yemen, Macedonia, Bosnia, Eritrea). 
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Additionally, the log of the estimated number of internally displaced persons significantly 
increases hazard rates.  Each additional unit on the log scale of this variable increases the 
likelihood of adopting principles by 78% (p = .001). Quite surprisingly, none of the other 
variables turned out to have statistically significant effects on commitment.  These 
included all factors relating to the cause of displacement, international instrumental 
pressure, state capacity, social mobilization, and cultural match.  These indicators are 
tested again later in a full model. 
After considering the simple models on Table 5, Table 6, combines all of the 
variables relating to international normative pressure and region in a single model.  This 
should make it possible to determine the extent to which each of these variables 
contributes to a significant independent effect after controlling for the others. 
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Table 6: Result of Cox Analysis: Variables Indicative of International Normative 
Pressure 
	  	   Coef	   SE	   HR	   t	   p	  
RSG	  Visit	  (Lag)	   0.577	   0.498	   1.781	   1.16	   0.247	  
IDPs	  Protected	  by	  UNHCR	   1.825	   0.616	   6.202	   2.96	   0.003	  
Regional	  Density	  (Lag)	   -­‐4.439	   2.297	   0.012	   -­‐1.93	   0.053	  
Europe-­‐Central	  Asia	   2.813	   1.216	   16.654	   2.31	   0.021	  
Latin	  America-­‐Caribbean	   3.181	   1.296	   24.07	   2.45	   0.014	  
HR	  INGO	  Density	   0.003	   0.021	   1.003	   0.16	   0.872	  
 
 
In this model, the indicator for RSG visit declines substantially in size and loses 
its significance (HR = 1.781, p = 0.247).  The UNHCR variable, however, changes very 
little and retains its significance (HR = 6.202, p = .003).  Regional density is just short of 
significance (HR = .012, p = .053).  Both regional dummies, however, are now shown to 
have a much larger and significant effect.  Controlling for all other international 
normative pressure factors, countries in Europe and Central Asia were sixteen times (p = 
.021) more likely than countries anywhere else outside of Latin America to commit to the 
regime. Similarly, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had a likelihood of 
adoption that was over 24 times higher than the rest of the world outside of Europe and 
Central Asia (p = .014).  These results would suggest, once again, that that regional 
dynamic matter greatly.   
The loss of significance for the RSG variable, however, is inconsistent with 
expectations.  One possible reason for this may be that the explanatory power of this 
variable overlaps with other measures of normative pressure.  A subsequent analysis, in 
fact, provides evidence that multicolinearity is indeed a plausible explanation for the 
change in significance. 
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Table 7 presents a full model all of the indicators of normative pressure 
previously tested, as well as other variables as controls.  The results for the measures of 
normative pressure largely confirm what was observed in the previous table, while the 
controls remain – consistent with Table 5 – largely non-significant.  
Table 7: Results of Full Cox Model, Including Controls 
 	  	   Coef	   SE	   HR	   t	   p	  
RSG	  Visit	  (Lag)	   0.62	   0.59	   1.587	   1.04	   0.298	  
UNHCR	  Protection	   2.03	   0.86	   7.583	   2.36	   0.018	  
Regional	  Density	  (Lag)	   -­‐4.41	   3.12	   0.012	   -­‐1.41	   0.158	  
Europe-­‐Central	  Asia	   6.08	   2.11	   435.024	   2.88	   0.004	  
Latin	  America-­‐Caribbean	   5.65	   2.06	   283.3	   2.74	   0.006	  
Relative	  Size	  of	  IDP	  Crisis	   4.19	   4.77	   66.185	   0.88	   0.379	  
IDP	  Estimates	  (Log)	   0.92	   0.42	   2.519	   2.22	   0.027	  
Regime	  Induced	  Dis.	   -­‐0.79	   0.89	   0.453	   -­‐0.89	   0.374	  
International	  War	  	   -­‐1.33	   1.31	   0.263	   -­‐1.02	   0.308	  
Political	  Persecution	   -­‐3.76	   8.03	   0.023	   -­‐0.47	   0.64	  
Peacekeeping	  Ops	  (Lag)	   -­‐1.44	   0.99	   0.237	   -­‐1.46	   0.145	  
International	  on	  Aid	  (Lag)	   -­‐0.20	   0.45	   0.815	   -­‐0.45	   0.651	  
Embeddedness	  in	  HR	  
Regime	   0.25	   0.14	   1.278	   1.78	   0.075	  
Democracy	   -­‐0.43	   0.25	   0.652	   -­‐1.74	   0.082	  
Physical	  Integrity	   -­‐0.48	   0.28	   0.62	   -­‐1.72	   0.087	  
Shaming	  Events	   -­‐0.04	   0.05	   0.961	   -­‐0.8	   0.421	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  (Log)	   -­‐1.16	   0.65	   0.313	   -­‐1.79	   0.073	  
State	  Fragility	  Index	   0.08	   0.14	   1.079	   0.54	   0.59	  
HR	  INGO	  Density	   -­‐0.02	   0.04	   0.979	   -­‐0.56	   0.576	  
 
 
The indicator for RSG visits has, after adjusting for the other variables, only a 
modest positive impact on the likelihood of adopting the UN Guiding Principles (HR = 
1.587).  This effect is again non-significant (p = .3).  The indicator for UNHCR 
protection, however, is significant and powerful.  UNHCR protections yield a near eight-
fold increase in the likelihood of adoption (HR = 7.583, p = .014).  After adjusting for all 
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of the control variables, the effect of the regional dummies becomes even more 
pronounced.  The dummy variables for Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and 
the Caribbean yield enormous hazard ratios, which reflect the fact that most countries in 
those regions eventually commit to the GP.  To the extent there is any variation in these 
regions, the control variables can explain almost all of it.  It is thus possible to say that 
regional dynamics appear to be a very powerful predictor of adoption after controlling for 
other factors. 
Among the other factors, only the log of the estimated number of IDPs showed 
significance.  The hazard rate increases 2.519 times for each unit increase in the log of 
the IDP estimates.  None of the other variables yield estimates that are precise enough to 
reject the null hypothesis that the true hazard ratio equals one.   
 
Survival functions 
To obtain a more intuitive understanding of the effect size of UNHCR protection, 
Figure 18 plots the adjusted survivor functions for cases when UNHCR protections are in 
place and for cases when they are not.  The survivor function was calculated using the 
full Cox model (presented in Table 7) holding all of the other variables at their means.  
The x axis plots time, whereas the y axis plots the probability that a country has not yet 
committed to the regime by instituting domestic legislation on displacement.  Whereas 
both curves start out close to each, the probability that a country with UNHCR 
protections continues without committing to the Guiding Principles plunges rapidly.  The 
probability also decreases for countries without UNHCR protections, but does so at a 
much slower rate.  By the end of the time series, the probability that a non-UNHCR 
country has failed to commit is still above .5, while it has dropped nearly to zero for 
countries where UNHCR is present. 
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Figure 17: Adjusted Survivor Function by UNHCR Protections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analysis cannot discount the possibility that UNHCR’s effect is due mostly 
or in part to a question of selection. UNHCR’s involvement in IDP protection and 
commitment to the regime may be both independent results of a country’s more 
amorphous predisposition to address the internal displacement crisis.  I attempt to control 
for selection by lagging the UNHCR variable and including a number of control variables 
in the full model.  To eliminate the possibility of selection, ultimately UNHCR’s effect 
has to be examined further through the use of qualitative methods. 
 
Effect of RSG Visits 
As noted previously, the lack of significance for the RSG variable is inconsistent 
with expectations that international IDP norm diffusion is driven by norm entrepreneurs. 
It is possible that this variable’s lack of significance may be due to multicolinearity 
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among the other independent variables.  To test this hypothesis, an additional model is 
run, illustrated in Table 8, which drops the UNHCR variable along with the regional 
dummies and log of IDP estimates.  The remaining controls are retained.  This returns the 
RSG variable to significance, though the size of the hazard ratio is reduced somewhat 
relative to the bivariate model (Table 5 on p. 113)  (HR = 2.906, p = .031).  These results 
suggest that the previous lack of significance was due to the overlap RSG visits had with 
the other normative variables and not because its effect could be explained away by any 
of the controls. 
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Table 8: Results of Full Cox Model Including Controls (Dropping Some Variables) 
	  	   Coef	   SE	   HR	   t	   p	  
RSG	  Visit	  (Lag)	   1.0668	   0.4936	   2.906	   2.16	   0.031	  
Relative	  Size	  of	  IDP	  Crisis	   5.4750	   3.1178	   238.643	   1.76	   0.079	  
Regime	  Induced	  Dis.	   0.0121	   0.5914	   1.012	   0.02	   0.984	  
International	  War	  	   0.0241	   1.1142	   1.024	   0.02	   0.983	  
Political	  Persecution	   -­‐3.9482	   6.6082	   0.019	   -­‐0.6	   0.55	  
Peacekeeping	  Ops.	  (Lag)	   0.4062	   0.6208	   1.501	   0.65	   0.513	  
International	  on	  Aid	  (Lag)	   -­‐0.3974	   0.3847	   0.672	   -­‐1.03	   0.302	  
Embeddedness	  in	  HR	  
Regime	   0.2141	   0.1207	   1.239	   1.77	   0.076	  
Democracy	   -­‐0.2840	   0.1851	   0.753	   -­‐1.53	   0.125	  
Physical	  Integrity	   -­‐0.5148	   0.2100	   0.598	   -­‐2.45	   0.015	  
Shaming	  Events	   -­‐0.0217	   0.0400	   0.979	   -­‐0.54	   0.588	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  (Log)	   -­‐0.1368	   0.3913	   0.872	   -­‐0.35	   0.727	  
State	  Fragility	  Index	   0.0603	   0.1107	   1.062	   0.54	   0.586	  
HR	  INGO	  Density	   -­‐0.0367	   0.0285	   0.964	   -­‐1.29	   0.2	  
 
Figure 18 displays the adjusted survivor function on the basis of the model in 
Table 6 by RSG visit. 
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Figure 18: Adjusted Survival Function by RSG Visit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B details the diagnostic tests conducted on the Cox proportional hazard 
models employed in this analysis.   
 
DISCUSSION 
An initial large-n statistical study of commitment with the international regime to 
protect IDPs suggests several interesting findings.  First of all, the data suggests that 
commitment matters.  On average countries that institute domestic legislation to protect 
IDPs as proscribed by GP see a significant decrease in the magnitude of displacement.  
Although these results provide reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the effectiveness 
of these norms, due to the limitations inherent in this type of quantitative analysis, further 
research will be necessary to confirm that a general downward trend in displacement 
among committed countries is the result of the new norm and of other external factors. 
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This analysis has also shown that, during the period under review (1990-2010) 
commitment grew steadily covering an increasing proportion of IDPs.  Commitment 
grew even among counties that theoretically should have been most disinclined to 
commit. This included counties where: (a) displacement crises were protracted; (b) where 
the state was primarily responsible for displacing its own population; and (c) where the 
war was still ongoing. 
Descriptive analysis suggests that commitment with the regime historically 
diffused along regional clusters.  Whereas countries in Europe/Central Asia and Latin 
America/Caribbean were the first to adopt international norms on displacement, countries 
in Middle East/North Africa and East Asia/Pacific have lagged behind.   This may 
indicate that the norm has diffused largely along regional pathways.  The more rigorous 
survival analysis further corroborated the idea that regional differences are the most 
important predictor of commitment.  On the other hand, factors relating to structural 
domestic conditions, social mobilization, cultural match and opportunities for 
international instrumental pressure to commit failed to show significance.  
The data also suggest that UNHCR’s involvement in countries’ internal 
displacement crises had a positive effect in (a) reducing the magnitude of displacement in 
host counties and (b) increasing the likelihood that that host countries would commit to 
the IDP regime by enacting domestic legislation.  This is potentially an important finding 
because it may offer a quick policy solution to an important problem.  The survival 
analysis showed that, controlling for other factors; involvement by important 
international norm entrepreneurs (UNHCR and the RSG), in countries with internal 
displacement significantly increases these countries propensity to commit to the regime.  
Although other international normative factors did not show significance this finding 
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suggests that commitment with the IDP regime has been principally driven by 
international normative pressure at the institutional level. 
Although the large-n statistical analysis does not paint a very conclusive picture 
of what is driving commitment with the regime, the latter two findings appear to suggest 
that commitment may be driven by the actions of certain UN norm entrepreneurs and by 
regional norm dynamics above anything else.  Given the limitations inherent in the data, 
it is also difficult to examine this correlation much further using quantitative methods.  
As is to be expected in a nascent and underexplored area such as internal displacement, 
many key indicators are not widely available and some of the proxy indicators used may 
be too imperfect or underspecified to explore the question of commitment much further.  
This study however, does allow us to generate more refined questions about the 
processes and motivations of commitment that can be explored further though qualitative 
methods.  How, for example, have international norms on internal displacement spread 
regionally? What are the agents, mechanisms, and motivations that have led some 
countries to commit? Who are the regional agents responsible for diffusing the GP? What 
role have the various regional intergovernmental bodies played in diffusing the Guiding 
Principles?  What mechanisms have they employed and how effective have these been?  
Finally, what role have regional human rights activist networks and regional hegemons 
(or first adopters) played in spreading these norms to their neighbors? 
Case studies may shed some light on how and when have institutions, such as 
UNHCR and the RSG, been able to influence policy.  When, for example, have they been 
most successful? More importantly I would like to uncover whether their involvement 
really made a difference in leading host countries to adopt norms on internal 
displacement, as the survival analysis appears to suggest, or if countries that are more 
predisposed to commit also selected to host these institutions. 
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Case studies may also help to determine what domestic structures have facilitated 
the adoption of these norms and what domestic factors have hindered their adoption. Why 
have some states that are clearly responsible for displacing their own populations choose 
committing to a regime designed to protect IDPs? Are countries with displacement crises 
resulting from ethnic conflicts somehow less likely to commit?  
Careful process tracing may also help uncover the mechanisms and motivations 
that led certain states to commit to non-binding norms.  To what extent did governing 
elites implement legislation on internal displacement because they believed it was the 
right thing to do and to what extent did they believe it was in their interest to do so? To 
what extent were they motivated by mechanisms of mimicry, peer pressure, naming and 
shaming and argumentation from various normative actors motivated states to commit? 
In order to answer these questions this study now will look at the sequence of 
events that led Colombia to commit to the IDP regime by enacting domestic legislation 
on internal displacement in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles.  
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Chapter 3: The Road to Rhetorical Commitment: Law 387 
INTRODUCTION  
Colombia is currently the country with the second largest IDP crisis in the world 
after Syria.  As of 2015 it was estimated that between 4.9 and 5.7 million Colombians 
have been displaced by violence and human rights abuses since 1985.  This number 
surpassed by a wide margin the magnitude of the next largest displacement crises in the 
world: Nigeria (3.3 million), Iraq (3.3 million), Sudan (3.1 million), the DRC (2.7 
million), and Somalia (1.1 million).77 The internally displaced population corresponds to 
over 10% of Colombia’s population and over 30% of the rural population. 
Propelled by four decades of a complex multi-party conflict between the armed 
forces, illegal armed groups – most notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and drug cartels – the IDP situation in Colombia is arguably the most 
persistent humanitarian crisis in Western Hemisphere.  Moreover, the intensification of 
the internal conflict and its expansion into the majority of the territory since the 1980s 
caused the numbers of displaced to grow at an alarming rate during the past decades. 
At the same time, Colombia is perhaps the country with the most advanced 
institutional responses to the problem of internal displacement and is often hailed 
internationally as an example to follow.  Colombia was also one of the first countries in 
the world to commit to the IDP regime by instituting legislation to address internal 
displacement. Despite their precarious situation, IDPs in Colombia have better legal 
protections and receive a higher level of attention from government authorities than most 
IDPs around the world.  Colombia, at least on paper, has one of the world’s most 
                                                
77 See: IDMC Global Figures (http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures).  Last visited on April 
2015.  The figure for Sudan does not include S. Sudan. 
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developed legal and institutional frameworks to protect the rights of IDPs.  Over the last 
twenty years this framework has been improving and Colombia has deepened its 
commitment with the international IDP regime despite the fact that Colombia has 
remained at war and its displaced population has continued to grow. 
In 1992 Colombia became one of the first countries in the world to acknowledge 
the phenomenon of internal displacement and to recognize the states’ responsibility to 
address the crisis in accordance with international norms.  In 1997 Colombia instituted 
one of the first and most comprehensive legal frameworks to address their displacement 
crisis in the world – anticipating by a full year the introduction of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement.  A groundbreaking ruling by Colombia’s 
Constitutional Court in 2004 made this soft law instrument legally binding at the level of 
constitutional law.  Over the years, thanks in part to the involvement of the Constitutional 
Court, Colombia’s legal and institutional framework to address displacement has become 
perhaps the most highly developed in the world.  Not surprisingly Colombia’s legislation 
and jurisprudence relating to internal displacement has often been hailed by international 
refugee advocates as a model to be emulated by other countries with IDPs (Ferris et al., 
2011).  Even though Colombia’s framework to protect IDPs has not always been properly 
implemented, according to Elizabeth Ferris of the Brookings’ Project on Internal 
Displacement: “Colombia stands out because of its commitment to finding solutions.”78  
In 2011 Colombia took a significant step further when President Juan Manuel 
Santos signed into law an ambitious and complex piece of legislation known as the 
Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (“Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras,” or Law 
                                                
78 Elizabeth Ferris.  “International Perspectives on Solutions to Internal Displacement.” Speech given at the 
Conference on Durable Solutions for the Displaced Population: International and National Experiences, in 
Bogotá, Colombia May 28-29, 2013.  See: http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2013/05/28-
colombia-displacement-idps-ferris. 
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1448) to address the principal grievances of Colombia’s IDPs.  This law, which became 
the centerpiece of Santos’ first administration, aimed to return over 16 million acres of 
stolen or abandoned land and provide reparations to over 4 million victims of human 
rights violations – the vast majority of whom are IDPs.79   The scope and reach of this 
law were in many ways unprecedented.  The law is projected to cost over  $26 billion and 
to take over a decade to fully implement.    
Human Rights Watch, a major human rights INGO based in Washington, referred 
to this law as a historic step in “addressing the legacy of violence and abuse that has 
affected millions of citizens.”80  This legislation was particularly significant because 
Colombia continues to be at war and has yet to sign a peace agreement with the FARC.  
Although some parts of the law face legal challenges and many observers, even within 
the Santos administration, recognize that its implementation will be difficult, the law has 
been hailed internationally.   
What then explains Colombia’s high level of commitment and compliance with 
the international IDP regime?  Why did the country begin complying with international 
norms on internal displacement early on when many other countries lagged behind?   So 
far these questions have not really been addressed in a comprehensive way.   
Colombian and international experts suggest that there are a number of structural 
factors that set Colombia apart from most countries suffering from internal 
displacement.81 First, unlike most countries with internal conflicts, Colombia has been 
                                                
79 See: Colombia Reports.  “Santos Signs Victims Law into Regulatory Decree.” December 20, 2011. 
(http://colombiareports.co/santos-signs-victims-law/) 
80 See: Human Rights Watch.  “Colombia: Victims Law a Historic Opportunity.” June 10, 2011.  
(http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/10/colombia-victims-law-historic-opportunity) 
81 Telephone interview with Professor Robert Goldman (former Chairman of the IACHR). April 18, 2012.  
Telephone interview with Sebastian Albuja (IDMC, Americas Country Analyst).  May 22, 2012.  Interview 
with Roberta Cohen (Brookings- PID). March 28, 2013.  Washington, DC. 
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able to maintain a relatively strong democratic tradition and a very independent judiciary.  
Colombia has benefited from a comparatively vibrant civil society with a free press and 
well established civic, academic and political institutions.  Moreover, the conflict in 
Colombia, unlike those of most countries, is not drawn along ethnic lines, which 
presumably makes it more likely that the government will assume responsibility for IDPs 
rather than to treat them as outsiders.  Colombia has also historically been very sensitive 
to international criticism.  In the experience of several OAS and UN officials 
interviewed, Colombia, more than most countries, wants to be perceived as a law-abiding 
member of the international community and is very sensitive to international criticism.  
As a result Colombia has taken the pronouncements of international bodies and human 
rights monitoring groups very seriously.  When Colombia is accused of violating or 
failing to implement international norms, the government can be counted on to prepare a 
sophisticated and serious response in international forums.  However, because 
Colombia’s reality often fails to match the lofty pronouncements and the sophisticated 
image it projects internationally, many refer to Colombia as a “schizophrenic state” 
(Girlado, 1999). 
Although many of these factors may have contributed to explaining Colombia’s 
level of commitment, they do not really explain why Colombia only began instituting 
IDP protections when it did.  After all, internal displacement has been a reality in 
Colombia for much of the country’s history and until relatively recently Colombia’s 
human rights record was arguably dismal.82  Moreover, the large-n statistical study in the 
previous chapter demonstrated that many of the factors that allegedly set Colombia apart 
                                                                                                                                            
 
82 Telephone interview with Joel Charny (InterAction, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy & Practice).  
April 4, 2012. 
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– particularly its level of development, democracy, and civil society – in general are not 
very good predictors of commitment.  In order to better understand what drove 
Colombia’s commitment with the international IDP regime, this study now takes a closer 
look at the history of the development of Colombia’s legal and institutional framework to 
address displacement.  
This study finds that Colombia’s increasing commitment and compliance with the 
international IDP regime was the result of the interaction between three factors: (1) 
domestic social mobilization, (2) linkages to transnational – particularly regional—
activist networks, and (3) instrumental pressure from abroad, exercised mostly by a US 
that was increasingly entangled in Colombia’s conflict.  This story is marked by 
processes of organization, legitimation and formation of domestic human rights groups 
who gradually learned how best to employ domestic and international levers of influence 
and to frame more effectively Colombia’s crisis and by a process of socialization 
whereby Colombia’s governing elites become increasingly sensitized to the international 
human rights discourse.   
Regional factors played a key role – and were possibly more influential than 
international factors – in the development of Colombia’s commitment to the IDP regime.  
Latin America’s robust human rights regime administered by the Inter-American Court 
and Commission, the 1984 Cartagena Refugee Convention, and a myriad of powerful 
human rights organizations and lobbying groups that came of age in the 1980s as a result 
of the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and the civil wars in Central America, 
exercised a formidable influence on Colombia’s policy.  The wars and subsequent peace 
processes in Central America were of particular importance.  Among other things they 
provided lessons for activists, examples for policymakers and in other ways a lens 
through which the international community interpreted the conflict in Colombia.  It also 
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spawned a number of regional human rights organizations with significant experience 
with displacement that became very influential in Colombia.  
After providing a brief overview of Colombia’s conflict and displacement crisis 
the next three chapters will trace the developments that led to the three most important 
policy commitments to the IDP regime:  Colombia’s 1997 Law on Internal Displacement 
(Law 387), the Constitutional Court’s historic sentence T-025 which declared the 
existence of an “unconstitutional state of affairs,” and Colombia’s 2011 Victims’ 
Reparation and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448).  In the process, I will seek to identify 
the factors that affected policy-makers’ decision to commit to the international IDP 
regime and to outline how these interacted in making Colombia into such a model case.  
Colombia’s conflict and ensuing displacement crisis are indeed very complex.  There are 
many actors involved and many factors. Tracing exactly how policies came into being 
can shed some light on what factors drive a country to comply with the UN Guiding 
Principles.  
 
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT  
Both internal displacement and armed conflict have been a constant reality for 
most of Colombia’s modern history.  Although Colombia claims to be one of the oldest 
continuous democracies in the hemisphere, since independence, elections have been 
accompanied by troubled political life and violence.  At the root of Colombia’s problems 
lie the enormous disparities in land and wealth distribution, a lack of government 
legitimacy, the ineffectiveness of established intuitions, a traditionally oligarchic political 
and social system based on clientelism, the state’s use of terror, a breakdown of social 
relations, the inaccessibility of power for the majority of Colombians, the absence of the 
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state in many regions of the country and a highly militarized society (Obregón & 
Stavropolou, 1998).  
Colombia’s precarious situation deteriorated significantly and the levels of 
violence became more brutal during the last two decades of the 20th century with the 
development of an illicit drug industry that permeated all sectors of Colombian society 
and turned the country into the world’s principle cocaine supplier.   A seminal study 
commissioned by the government in the 1980s noted that violence in Colombia, 
“empowered by its own dynamic and creating its own reality” had become in some way 
“institutionalized” as a mechanism for solving problems.83   By the 1990s, homicide and 
kidnapping rates skyrocketed making Colombia one of the most dangerous places on 
earth.84  Yet, despite its endemic violence and displacement crisis Colombia 
paradoxically has been able to maintain a minimum level of electoral and institutional 
stability and even experienced robust economic growth.  This can be partly explained by 
the fact that the worst of the conflict has been confined to rural areas, which are home to 
only a third of Colombia’s population. 
Land, and the fight to control land have historically been central to Colombia’s 
conflict and displacement crisis.  The first zones of conflict and displacement were also 
the early “frontier zones, ” or “zones of colonization;” that is they were remote areas of 
relatively new agricultural land (Weiss Fagan, Fernandez Juan, Stepputat, & Vidal 
                                                
83 Comisión de Estudio Sobre la Violencia, Colombia, Violencia y Democracia: Informe Presentado al Ministerio de 
Gobierno (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987).   Violence has generated its own field of study in 
Colombia commonly known as “violentologia.”  Other notable studies include: Paul Orquist’s Violence and Conflict in 
Colombia (New York: Academic Press, 1980) Germán Guzmán, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna’s La 
Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un Proceso Social (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962); Gonzalo Sánchez and 
Ricardo Peñaranda, eds., Padado y Presente de la Violencia en Colombia (Bogota: CEREC, 1991); Marco Palacios, 
Entre la Legitimidad y la Violencia: Colombia 1987-1994 (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1995). 
84 Of the 26,142 murders reported in 1996, 3,173 (13%) were politically motivated.  These included combat-related 
deaths, murder of civilians by organized armed actors, “social cleansing” killings (the murder of prostitutes, homeless 
people, drug addicts, and beggars) and selective murders of political adversaries by security forces and paramilitaries 
(Obregón & Stavropoulou, 1998, p. 402). 
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Lopez, 2006).  Colombia’s celebrated sociologist Alfredo Molano has described violence, 
the fight over land and displacement as mutually determining historic phenomena 
(Molano, 2007).  
During the 19th Century, Colombia underwent at least a dozen national civil wars 
and fifty local uprisings against the central or regional governments (Pardo, 2004). These 
were unusually confrontations between Colombia’s two political parties (the Liberals and 
Conservatives) that maintained hegemony over the country’s political life for most of 
Colombian history while excluding all alternative social movements.   
From 1890 until 1930 the Conservative party ruled the country singlehandedly.  
In 1930 the Liberal party began to win consecutive elections but lost power to the 
Conservatives when it presented a divided ticket between Gabriel Turbay, the Liberal 
establishment candidate, and Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a charismatic populist candidate who 
appealed to Colombia’s growing urban middle class.  The assassination of Gaitán in 1948 
led to massive violent demonstrations in Bogotá (known as the Bogotazo) that quickly 
spread to the rest of the country, prompted a strong response from the conservative 
administration of Lauriano Gomez and immersed the country in a bloody ten-year-long 
civil war. 
It is estimated that during this period, known in Colombia as La Violencia (1948-
1965), more than 300,000 civilians (mostly poor peasants) were killed and more than 2 
million people were displaced (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).  Most of these forced 
migrants fled to the cities to escape the bloodbath.  Entire regions of the country were de-
populated only to be repopulated by peasant farmers loyal to the Conservative 
government.  Small landowners were expelled from some of the best lands of the country 
so that large agribusinesses with links to international markets (cattle ranches, sugar and 
banana plantations) could be established (Molano, 2007).  Many migrated to new areas of 
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colonization – the largely uninhabited parts of the country like the jungles of the 
Magdalena Medio, Urabá, the Eastern Planes, and the Amazon region (Vargas Castaño, 
1993) which later became the hotbeds of a Liberal and Communist armed insurgency. 
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Table 9: Phase I: Timeline of Events 
Year Event 
1948-58 A wave of violence between Liberals and Conservatives known as La Violencia results 
the death of 300,000 and the displacement of two million Colombians 
 
1966 Guerilla group FARC is formally organized 
 
1980s Intensification of the conflict in Colombia.  Approximately 3,000 people killed or 
disappeared every year  
 
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a regional non-binding agreement signed by a group 
of Latin American countries.  It broadens the definition of refugees to include IDPs and 
expresses a regional responsibility for their protection 
 
1990 First attempt to create a national IDP organization (CONADHES) fails 
 
1990 Cesar Gaviria Trujillo elected president of Colombia 
 
1991 New Colombian Constitution enacted.  Sets in place strong provisions for recognition of 
international human rights law as well as number of legal procedures and institutions for 
the protection of human rights 
 
 The Inter-American Human Rights Institute (IIDH) visits Colombia.  First National 
Seminary on internal displacement organized in Colombia (Chinauta).  The conference 
succeeds in bringing together for the first time, Colombian activists, humanitarians, and 
academics working with IDPs.  
 
1992 CPDIA is created in San Jose, Costa Rica to serve as a regional clearinghouse of 
information on IDPs, provide technical assistance, and advocate for the human rights of 
IDPs in the region.  That same year, CPDIA conducts first visit to Colombia   
 
 CODHES is formed.  The following year publishes Displacement: Human Rights and 
Armed Conflict 
 
 President Gaviria officially recognizes the problem of displacement though Presidential 
Decree 281 which sets up a $1.5 million emergency fund to aid victims of violence 
 
1993 After a visit to Colombia, IACHR issues special report expressing “grave concern with 
the rise of violence and human rights violations and calling on Colombia to adopt 
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention concerning victims of internal armed conflicts 
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Table 9: Phase I: Timeline of Events (Continued) 
Year Event 
1994 Ernesto Samper Pizano elected President of Colombia 
 
 The Displacement Support Group (GAD) an IDP umbrella organization is created in Colombia 
with the encouragement of international INGOs.  GAD soon becomes the principal intermediary 
between Colombian NGOs and international human rights network of activists and donors 
 
 IACHR for the first time lists Colombia under Chapter #4 of its annual report that catalogues the 
hemisphere’s most precarious situations 
 
 The RSG, Francis Deng, conducts first visit to Colombia.  During this visit the Colombian 
government initiates formal discussions with representatives of Colombian civil society, IDP 
organizations, and branches of the state to develop an integral public policy to address 
displacement.   Colombian NGOs use the occasion to call for the appointment of a Special UN 
Rapporteur for Colombia 
 
 During a speech commemorating Colombia’s Human Rights Day Celebration President Samper 
formally recognizes the problem of internal displacement and the state’s responsibility to address 
it 
 
1995 Catholic Church in Colombia publishes seminal study: Human Rights: Persons Displaced by 
Violence in Colombia – the first authoritative of Colombia’s displacement crisis at the national 
level.  The study estimates that close to 2% of the country’s population had been displaced by 
violence between 1985 and 1995 
 
 The Colombian Government issues a first draft of a National Program for the Attention of the 
Population Displaced by Violence (CONPES 2804) that takes into account the findings of the 
Catholic Church, CPEDIA, and the RSG’s recommendations 
 
 Colombia adopts Protocol II of the Geneva Convention 
 
1996 (March) US Department of State decertifies Colombia and cancels Samper’s visa over concerns 
that his campaign accepted funds from the Cali Cartel 
 
1997 Second policy planning draft (CONPES 2924) is issued correcting some of the structural 
problems of the prior policy planning draft (CONPES 2804).  
 
 UNHCR invited to set up a presence in Colombia to assist IDPs 
 
 (July) Law 387 adopting measures for the protection of IDPs displaced by violence is signed 
into law by President Samper 
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While La Violencia officially ended with a power sharing agreement between the 
two elite parties (known as the National Front) the conflict eventually morphed into a 
low intensity insurgency war in the countryside that has continued into the 21st century 
making it one of the oldest insurgencies in the world.  The principal insurgent group, The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (better known by its Spanish acronym FARC) 
had its genesis as a Liberal peasant self-defense group during La Violencia.  Inspired by 
the success of the Cuban revolution and fed by popular frustration with a political 
establishment that had failed to address gross inequality, this Marxist guerilla group 
gained a permanent presence in the countryside.   In fact, in some areas of colonization 
where the state was mostly absent, groups like the FARC often acted as the de facto state 
(Citurna.tv, 1989).  Soon the FARC were joined by a number of other guerilla groups (ie. 
ELN, M-19, EPL, Quintin Lame) that were led by middle-class intellectuals and political 
leaders often supported by Cuba.  
During the 1970s and 1980s Colombia’s Marxist insurgency degenerated into a 
“dirty war” in which some elements of the state, guided by a national security doctrine, 
aided by paramilitary organizations, and funded by wealthy land-owners waged a 
clandestine war against intellectuals, labor unions, peasant leaders, social activists and 
anyone suspected of sympathizing with the guerillas.   Although several attempts were 
made during the Betancour (1982-1986), Barco (1986-1990), Gaviria (1990-1994), 
Samper (1994-1998), and Pastrana (1998-2002) administrations to bring an end to the 
conflict by negotiating with the guerillas, the lack of a permanent national commitment to 
peace and the opposition of the elites and the military condemned these efforts to failure 
(Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).     
As drug trafficking permeated the political and economic life of the country, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the process of democratization and violence became much 
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more entangled.  Motivated by a need to protect their economic interests and tired of 
being harassed by the guerillas, drug traffickers soon began to exert their influence in 
politics and other areas.  During the 1980s drug traffickers became some of the country’s 
largest landholders and began to train, finance and arm the existing paramilitary (civilian 
self-defense) groups.   As these drug mafias concentrated their power, Colombia’s 
governing institutions also became increasingly more weak and corrupted and the country 
became engulfed in a second cycle of intense violence reminiscent of La Violencia.  The 
institutional crisis reached its climax when the Medellin cartel declared an all-out war on 
the state during in the late 1980s, when Colombia was negotiating an extradition treaty 
with the United States.  As part of this war the cartel assassinated the country’s attorney 
general as well as four presidential candidates, and launched an extermination campaign 
of a leftist political party (an offshoot of the FARC) resulting in the deaths of more than 
500 of its members.85   During the latter half of the 1980s approximately 3,000 people a 
year disappeared or were murdered for presumed political reasons.  This represented 
more people killed in Colombia every year for political reasons than during the entire 
period of the infamous Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (ICVA, 1991). 
Despite evidence that masses of people had been forced to migrate because of 
violence in many regions of the country since the 1950s, internal displacement was not 
recognized as issue of concern in Colombia until the 1980s.  During La Violencia, it is 
estimated that about 2 million peasants were displaced (Kirk, 1993).   As evidence of 
their existence there emerged in Bogotá an organization known as “Association of 
Refugees from Boyacá” (a neighboring department) which provided economic and legal 
assistance to persecuted liberal peasants (Vargas Castaño, 1993).   During the 1960s and 
                                                
85 See Dudley, Steven.  Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerilla Politics in Colombia.  New York: Routledge (2004). 
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1970s some reference was also made to migrantes forzosos (“forced migrants”) within 
the policy and conceptual framework of “urban poverty.”  Conceptually, however, these 
refugees were amalgamated together with the large numbers of people that migrated to 
the cities for economic reasons under the umbrella or poor migrants, and the emphasis 
was placed on incorporating them into modern society rather than addressing their 
specific needs or their rights as victims (Segura Escobar, 2000).   
Because the number of forced migrants was relatively low compared to the 
massive inflow of economic migrants, and because those escaping violence and 
persecution preferred to remain anonymous, it is not surprising that their plight was 
largely ignored.   Colombia, after all, had one of the highest urbanization rates of any 
Latin American nation during the 20th century (Cardona Gutiérrez, 1971).  Between 1938 
and 1973 the proportion of the population living in urban areas increased from 31 percent 
to nearly 60 percent with the rate of urbanization averaging 5.5 percent per year between 
1951 and 1964.86  
This, however, changed during the late 1980s and early 1990s when the conflict 
in Colombia intensified and expanded to other territories causing the rate of displacement 
to accelerate dramatically and making IDPs a lot more visible.  Between 1995 and 1996, 
the number of IDPs in Colombia nearly doubled (Weiss Fagan et al., 2006).  More than a 
million people were displaced between 1985 and 1998 (Cohen & Deng, 1998a).  At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Colombia’s conflict spread to a large number of regions, 
including urban areas.  The conflict began to involve a larger number and a wider range 
of actors and to employ a greater volume of economic and technological resources.  
                                                
86 See: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. See Country Studies: Colombia 
(http://countrystudies.us/colombia/36.htm). 
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Consequently, war in Colombia resulted in increasingly higher levels of destruction and 
degradation (Segura Escobar, 2000). 
This increase in the levels and complexity of the violence coincides with a 
conscious change in the strategy by the armed actors and their use of displacement, for 
the first time, as a tool of war.  During the 1980s the FARC adopted a new war strategy 
of geographic expansion, beyond their traditional strongholds and into more 
economically dynamic regions of the country in search of greater sources of funding to 
include not only cocaine and kidnapping but also other sources of wealth they could 
extort (Segura Escobar, 2000).  Expanding guerrilla activity and narcotics trafficking in 
the 1990s also led to the expansion and strengthening of paramilitary (or self-
denominated “self-defense” groups) that had originally been organized by large 
landowners to protect themselves from the guerillas.  Although there were few direct 
armed confrontations between guerrillas and paramilitaries they both began to engage in 
strategies aimed to undermining their enemy’s social base –known since Vietnam as 
“taking the water away from the fish” – by killing and displacing civilians they suspected 
of sympathizing or aiding the other side.  This logic of war turned everyone residing in 
conflict zones into potential military targets and resulted in the displacement of entire 
communities.   
Paramilitaries were initially responsible for most of the displacement during the 
1980s and early 1990s.  However, towards the end of the 1990s guerrillas also provoked 
large expulsions of people by attacking small and medium-sized municipalities.  
Displacement was also fueled by both parties’ increased forced recruitment of children, 
the proliferation of anti-personnel mines in the countryside, and by an increasingly 
aggressive government response – later funded by Plan Colombia – which included 
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indiscriminate bombings and the destruction of crops by the spraying of poisonous 
defoliants to eradicate illegal plantations (Segura Escobar, 2000).   
Over half a century of a protracted low intensity conflict gradually transformed 
Colombia into the country with the largest number of IDPs by 2014.  Although the 
country’s displacement crisis shared many of the characteristics of most IDP crises 
around the globe, the patterns and rate of displacement have made Colombia’s case 
somewhat unique.  The following section offers a brief overview of the current crisis. 
 
OVERVIEW OF IDP CRISIS 
Unlike many displacement crises in the world, forced displacement in Colombia 
is not primarily caused by confrontations between armed groups.  Assassinations, 
intimidation and personal threats are the principal reasons given by IDPs for fleeing their 
homes.  Until the 2000s, when the Colombian government, with the help of foreign 
assistance, conducted a military offensive against insurgents, confrontations between the 
different warring parties were rare.  Instead, guerillas and paramilitaries tended to settle 
scores by attacking civilians they suspected of supporting the other side.  Many observers 
agree that displacement in Colombia has been a deliberate strategy of war used to 
establish control over strategic territories, to expand the cultivation of illicit crops and to 
take procession of lands and private property (Global IDP Project, 2002). In fact, early 
studies estimated that 70% of IDPs had in one way or another lost land. This is a 
phenomenon further aggravated by the fact that IDPs, for the most part, lack land titles or 
any supporting documentation necessary to reclaim their lands (Global IDP Project, 
2002; Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). 
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As of March 2013, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) in 
Geneva estimated that Colombia had between 4.9 and 5.5 million IDPs (IDMC, 2013).87  
In 2012 alone there were 230,000 newly displaced people.  The majority of Colombia’s 
IDPs have been displaced from rural areas to urban centers.  However, during the past 
few years there has also been an increase in intra-urban displacement.  In 2012 alone 
more than 8,800 people were forced to flee from one city to another as a result of 
violence and human rights abuses (IDMC, 2013).   
As is commonly the case in internal displacement crises, women and people under 
the age of 25 account for most of the IDP population.  Women (often widows and single 
mothers) and their children account for almost 60% of the displaced (Obregón & 
Stavropolou, 1998).  Ethnic minority groups, including indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
people are also disproportionally represented within this population.  The men who flee 
alone or with their nuclear families are characteristically leaders of political movements, 
members of teachers’ and peasants’ unions and government officials such as judges and 
attorneys (Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia, 1995; Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998). 
More than 80% of the displaced relocate in urban areas.  Only 9% remain in rural 
zones.  The cities that receive most of the displaced include Bogotá, Medellin, Cali, 
Barranquilla, and Cartagena (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).  Most IDPs live amongst 
the urban poor, and after receiving initial support, do their best to cope with very little 
assistance from the government, the church and international agencies.  It is estimated 
that 94% of Colombia’s IDPs live below the poverty line and that 77 % live in extreme 
poverty (IDMC, 2013).  
                                                
87  As of December 2012 the official government registry included 4.9 million IDPs.  Because this number 
is cumulative it does not account for the possibility that some IDPs may have returned to their place of 
origin.  This registry, however, does not include people displaced by criminal armed groups know as 
BACRIM that emerged after the demobilization of paramilitary organizations. 
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Unlike most displacement crises around the globe internal displacement in 
Colombia has mostly consisted of a gradual and slow exodus of individuals and families 
– often characterized as “drop by drop” (“gota a gota”).  There have been some instances 
of collective displacement (27% of cases between 1996 and 2012) as a result of intense 
combat between insurgents and the military, but these tend to be rare (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Historica, 2013).  Typically, individual displacement occurs when the head of 
the family is threatened and is forced to leave immediately and the rest of the family 
usually follows (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).  
Displacement, like the conflict itself, has affected most of the Colombian 
territory.  By 2013, 1,116 of Colombia’s municipalities (97% of the national territory) 
had experienced some type of displacement.88   Over the years, the zones of expulsion 
expanded from the traditional strongholds of the guerillas and paramilitaries (i.e. 
Magdalena Medio, and Urabá) to new areas into which armed groups and narcotics 
traffickers have expanded in the past few decades. The zones of expulsion have 
traditionally been characterized by little or no access to channels of political 
participation, persecution of social or political dissidents, criminalization of popular 
protest, discrimination against indigenous or Afro-Colombian communities, armed 
conflict, drug cultivation or trafficking, lack of basic public services, and enormous 
disparities in wealth (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998). The most affected zones include: 
Los Llanos, Urabá, Magdalena Medio, Norte de Santander, Chocó and Valle del Cauca. 
  
                                                
88 These municipalities, of course, have been affected to different extents.  According to the Historical 
Memory Group, in the most critical cases 139 municipalities registered more than 10,000 IDP between 
1996 and 2012, accounting for 74% of the total displaced population.  Among these, 57 registered more 
then 20,000, 26 more than 30,000, 12 more than 40,000 and 9 more than 50,000 IDPs (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Historica, 2013).  
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Figure 19: Geographic Distribution of Internal Displacement in Colombia (2010)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IDMC Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010 
 
Living conditions for IDPs are extremely poor and dangerous, particularly in 
urban slums where they tend to resettle.  Given the circumstances in which displacement 
occurs, people rarely have the time to make the proper provisions to flee and are forced to 
find the most basic shelter in dilapidated structures or makeshift constructions.  For the 
most part they lack access to clean water and sanitation.  Although the situation has been 
gradually improving in terms of access to health care and education (as of 2010 roughly 
80% of IDP children attended school and 90% of IDPs were registered in a subsidized 
health system) only a small minority of IDPs have access to emergency humanitarian 
support and about half of all IDPs do not enjoy food security.  Also, because they lack 
  132 
access to sustainable livelihoods IDPs tend to be significantly poorer than the general 
population.  Female-headed households were particularly vulnerable; since 60% of them 
work in the informal labor market and 20% in domestic service, with comparatively 
lower pay and longer hours.  In the case of Afro-Colombian women, only 5% earned the 
minimal salary (IDMC, 2010).  
According to CODHES, Colombia’s leading IDP NGO that has been tracking 
displacement since 1985, Colombia has seen a steady yearly growth in the IDP 
population.  The greatest wave of internal displacement took place at the height of the 
armed conflict between 1996 and 2002 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2013).  
In 2002 alone there were an estimated 412,553 new cases of displacement.  Since 2003 
the number of newly displaced has fluctuated between 207,000 and 380,000 (CODHES, 
2012).  
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Figure 20: Internal Displacement in Colombia: Historical Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CODHES Documemento # 26: La Crisis Humanitaria en Colombia Persistente 
 
Despite the precarious situation of IDPs in Colombia and the fact that the number 
of IDPs has continued to grow because of conflict, Colombian IDPs benefited from some 
of the earliest and most comprehensive laws on internal displacement.  Law 387 (By 
means of which measures are adopted for the prevention of forced displacement, and for 
assistance, protection, socioeconomic consolidation and stabilization of persons 
internally displaced by violence in the Republic of Colombia) instituted in July of 1997, 
predated by one year, and in many ways anticipated the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement.  The law is also one of the most comprehensive pieces of 
legislation ever drafted to address displacement.  In many ways Law 387 signaled 
Colombia’s commitment to the emerging IDP regime.   The remainder of this chapter 
describes the sequence of events that led the Colombian government to institute this law. 
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THE ROAD TO 387 
Internal displacement was first articulated as a problem in political discourse in 
the late 1980s when news outlets began reporting the arrival of large numbers of people 
into Colombia’s major cities and municipal capitals.  The displacement of entire 
communities was accompanied by IDPs’ demands for humanitarian attention from 
national and local authorities.  As they increased in numbers IDPs also began to organize 
public demonstrations and, in some cases, the occupation of parks, plazas, schools and 
other public spaces (Osorio Péres, 2001).  
 
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
A number of local self-help organizations also began to sprout up among the 
displaced communities in the departments of Meta, Córdoba, Antioquia and the 
Colombian North East to help IDPs meet their basic needs, to develop preventive 
measures against further displacement and, in some cases, to facilitate organized returns 
and the recuperation of lost lands.  Many of these organizations had their roots in existing 
civic committees and peasant organizations.  Until 1997, however, these groups were few 
and isolated.  The most vocal IDP organizations were tightly linked with left-wing 
militants that saw in displacement an opportunity to confront the state.  For the most part 
these organizations faced severe difficulties (Osorio Péres, 2001).  
Because most of the displaced preferred to remain anonymous for fear of inviting 
political persecution, IDP organizations had trouble attracting new members and 
consequently never gained much national visibility. Even by Colombian standards, where 
affiliation to INGOs is comparatively low, IDP organizations were viewed with suspicion 
by refugees already scarred by the distrust and rejection they had experienced in their 
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places of arrival.  Most of them preferred to reach out to local parishes for solidarity or 
sought personal and family support (Segura Escobar, 2000). 
Like most Colombian human rights NGOs, IDP associations also became the 
targets of violence and threats by paramilitaries who suspected them of sympathizing 
with the guerillas.  Attendance at the 1990 annual convention of ASCONDAS 
(Colombian Association of Social Assistance), perhaps Colombia’s oldest and largest 
IDP organization, was reduced by half after the assassination of one of its leaders (ICVA, 
1991).  These associations were isolated, highly politicized and poorly coordinated.  
Although they had made some attempts to articulate the problem at the regional level, 
until the mid-1990s they had been unable to estimate the magnitude of displacement in 
Colombia or, even less, to generate a national strategy.  
A first effort to organize nationally was made in 1989 during the “First Congress 
of Victims of the Dirty War” which was organized by a left-wing peasant organization 
ANUC.89  Although Colombian NGOs recognized at the time that masses of peasants 
were increasingly abandoning their lands because of violence, and that this had the 
makings of a national crisis they did not articulate the problem as one of “internal 
displacement” (Osorio Péres, 1993).90  IDPs instead were grouped along with other 
victims of what they referred to as the “dirty war” – a term widely used in the hemisphere 
in reference to state repression by authoritarian regimes.  The phenomenon of forced 
migration in Colombia was framed more as an outcome of a political and social struggle 
than as a humanitarian problem.91   Following the Congress an effort was made to create 
                                                
89 ANUC (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos). 
90 As the war intensified IDP groups created alliances with some NGOs (i.e. Colombian Asociation of 
Social Assistance – ASCODAS – and the National Association of Solidarity Aid – ANDAS in 1991).  
According to Ozorio, it is interesting that the term “displaced” did not appear in any of these organization’s 
names. (Ozorio, 2001) 
91 Interview with Juan Manuel Bustillo.  Bogotá.  April 22, 2013. 
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an umbrella organization to represent internal refugees and other victims of human rights 
violations (CONADHEGS).  This initiative, however, never really took off as the 
organization remained highly threatened and marginalized.  This, of course, was not 
unusual. The work of the few Bogotá-based human rights groups that supported regional 
IDP organizations was notoriously difficult and dangerous.  This was particularly the 
case when it came to documenting the links between the military and paramilitary groups.  
Following an investigation into paramilitaries in Chucurí, for example, the human rights 
group Justicia y Paz was the target of an aggressive public relations campaign by 
Colombia’s military’s supporters, including the country’s two principal newspapers, who 
accused them and other human rights groups of operating as civil fronts for the guerillas.   
Not surprisingly these accusations were soon followed by the assassinations of many 
human rights workers (Kirk, 1993). 
Faced with an indifferent public and a hostile and dangerous environment at home  
Colombian human rights organizations began to appeal for international solidarity.  For 
some time, the few international human rights INGOs with a presence in Colombia 
(particularly the Danish-based Project Counseling Services—PCS) had been urging 
Colombian NGOs to develop greater links with other regional human rights organizations 
that had successful experiences working with IDPs in Central America.  Although many 
Colombian activists were initially disinclined to involve foreign groups, arguing that the 
situation in Colombia was in fact very different, they also recognized that they 
desperately needed help coordinating and obtaining greater legitimacy and visibility if 
they were to survive.92 
                                                
92 Interview with Juan Manuel Bustillo. Bogotá. April 22, 2013. 
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A first appeal was made to the international community in the summer of 1990 
when two of Colombia’s main human rights organizations invited the Geneva-based 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to visit Colombia.  That same year 
ICVA had made significant contributions in calling attention to the crisis in El Salvador 
and these NGOs wanted to initiate a similar campaign in Colombia.93  After visiting the 
country in 1991 ICVA produced an extensive report representing perhaps the first 
approximation at the national level of the displacement crisis in Colombia.  ICVA’s visit 
was followed in November by a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Institute 
(IIDH – a regional human rights INGO based in Costa Rica) and the first National 
Seminary on Internal Displacement in Colombia.  This conference, organized by IIDH in 
Chinaua, brought together Colombia’s principal human rights and IDP organizations, 
together with academics, representatives of the Colombian government, the Catholic 
Church, and a number of international observers form other countries in the hemisphere 
that had suffered displacement (e.g. Peru and Central America).   
Although the conference succeeded in bringing the different factions of 
Colombian civil society that, in one way or another, had worked to address the country’s 
displacement crisis (i.e. activists, humanitarians and academics) closer together, the 
discussions evidenced their inchoate grasp and fragmented response to the problem 
(Osorio Péres, 1993).  This seminary represents an important turning point in the 
development of social domestic mobilization around the issue of displacement.   
The conference succeeded in placing the issue of forced migration on the national 
agenda.  It also demonstrated that the work that had been done until then on behalf of or 
for the benefit of IDPs in Colombia was utterly unsatisfactory.  More specifically it was 
                                                
93 See letter from Javier Giraldo M. S.J., President of the Colombian Section of the International League 
for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples to The Executive Committee of the International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies.  June 8, 1990 (ICVA, 1991). 
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lacking in terms of: “agility, experience, institutional participation, regional information, 
organization, common purpose, and necessary documentation.”94  It also made clear how 
all parties could benefit from the regional network of activism and expertise that had 
emerged as a result of similar crises in Central America and Peru.  Over the next two 
years these linkages solidified.  Beginning in 1992 ICVA, for example, sponsored a series 
of Colombian and pan-Andean initiatives, including the institution of regular working 
groups and the first pan-Andean conference on displacement held in Lima in May 1993.  
During these encounters Colombians and Peruvians sought ways of bringing the issue of 
Andean displacement to the international level (Kirk, 1993). 
 
EVOLVING REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR IDPS 
The civil wars in Central America during the 1980s had provided the region with 
a formative experience, which marked the birth of a regional regime to protect internal 
refugees and victims of internal conflict.  These experiences had resulted in a number of 
innovative regional formulations and institutional responses for the protection of forced 
migrants.  The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees broadened the definition of 
refugees to include internally displaced persons and expressed a sense of regional 
responsibility for their protection.95  In 1989, the International Conference on Central 
American Refugees (CIREFCA), convened by UNHCR and the governments of Central 
America, put in place a number of national and regional mechanisms to assist in the 
                                                
94 According to the evaluation made by ILSA (Instituto Latinoamericano par una Sociedad y Derecho 
Alternativo) at the National Workshop on Internal Displacement (Bogotá, August 1992).  Quoted in Segura 
Escobar (2000). 
95 The Cartegena declaration is a non-binding agreement drafted by a number of government 
representatives and legal experts from the 6 Central American countries (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) and the members of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Panama, 
Colombia, and Venezuela) at the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees, in Central 
America, Mexico and Panama, held in Cartagena from the 19 to the 20th of November 1984. 
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reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs.  Its plan of action called for Central 
American governments and international donors to commit themselves to very far-
reaching humanitarian and development programs.  The Central American peace 
processes also resulted in the creation of an ambitious five-year United Nations 
Development Program for IDPs, Refugees, and Returnees in Central America (PODERE) 
that brought together various relief and development agencies to facilitate the 
reintegration of over two million uprooted persons (Cohen & Sanchez-Grazoli, 2001). 
Following these programs’ successful implementation the Inter-American Human 
Rights Institute (IIDH) created the Permanent Consultation on Internal Displacement in 
the Americas (CPEDIA) in 1992 to serve as a regional clearinghouse of information on 
IDPs, provide technical assistance to governments and organizations working with them, 
and organize forums and training programs to promote respect for human rights and IDPs 
(Cohen & Deng, 1998b).96 Although the initiative was relatively short-lived, CPDIA 
successfully conducted various country visits (to Guatemala, Peru and Colombia), and 
drafted an important body of legal principles, which were key to the formulation of the 
UN Guiding Principles.    
In 1992, at the invitation of the government, CPDIA visited Colombia to analyze 
the internal displacement problem and issue a confidential report. This report provided 
the first working definition of IDPs that was later widely adopted by domestic NGOs 
(including the Catholic Church) and served to define the issue in Colombian legislation.  
CPEDIA defined internally displaced persons as: 
 
                                                
96 This body was composed of a group of representatives of major international organizations such as UNHCR, UNDP, 
UNICEF, WFP, IOM, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and IIDH, NGOs such as the World Council 
of Churches and the Refugee Policy Group; as well as a number of independent experts and observers. 
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“Every person who has been forced to migrate within the national territory, 
abandoning his place of residence or his customary occupation, because his life, 
physical integrity or freedom has been rendered vulnerable or is threatened due to 
the existence of any of the following man-made situations: internal armed conflict, 
internal disturbances or tensions, widespread violence, massive violations of human 
rights or the circumstances originating from prior situation that can disrupt or 
drastically disrupt public order.” 97 
 
By tapping in to the existing regional norms and human rights networks and 
strengthening their ties with international INGOs Colombian activists succeeded in 
forcing the Colombian government for the first time to officially recognize the problem 
of internal displacement in 1992.  
After reaching out to the international community, Colombian NGOs received 
urgently needed training, legal support and expertise as well as a cover of legitimacy that 
made it increasingly difficult for the Colombian government to ignore their claims.   
Among other things, increased international scrutiny, in the form of reports and 
accompaniment in the field, made it more difficult to persecute and intimidate human 
rights activists in Colombia.   
More importantly, the internationalization of Colombian advocacy also led to a 
sort of depolitization of the issue of internal displacement.  Colombian activists gradually 
abandoned their rhetoric of “social injustice” that had been traditionally advanced by the 
militant left and learned to reframe the issue more effectively as a “humanitarian crisis” 
that called for the application of regional and international norms.  Colombian advocacy 
also increasingly adopted the language used to great effect by organizations such as IIDH 
and UNHCR in Central America.  In various reports produced during the early 1990s, the 
concept of “displaced” increasingly replaces the more generic concept “victim of 
                                                
97 Revised definition, approved in the course of the Technical Meeting of CPDIA on April 15, 1993.  Quoted in 
Obregón and Stavropoulou (1998). 
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violence,” and “displacement” replaced “internal exodus” (Osorio Péres, 2001).  
Advocates increasingly disassociate displacement from the pet issues of the militant left – 
their calls for agrarian reform and a critique of neo-liberal models of development – and 
increasingly associated it with a non-partisan call for the humanization of the war in 
Colombia and the application of international humanitarian law. Together with 
documentation of the crisis this reframing of the issue also made it easier for the 
government of Colombia to recognize the problem.   
According to Keck & Sikink (1998), transnational activists networks (or “TANs”) 
“frame” issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention, 
encourage action, and to “fit” with favorable institutional venues.  This is one of the 
principal tools TANs utilize to mobilize support for their cause and influence policy.  
Keck & Sikkink define framing to mean “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people 
to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action.” According to Snow et al. (1986), “by rendering events or 
occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, 
whether individual or collective.”  
Framing is a powerful way of bringing issues to the public agenda.  As Keck & 
Sikkink have demonstrated (1998), TANs can generate new policy issues by framing old 
problems in new ways; occasionally they help transform other actors’ understandings of 
their identities and their interests.  For example, the campaign for land use rights in the 
Amazon in the 1980s took on an entirely different character and gained a number of 
different allies when it was framed as an issue of deforestation rather than one relating to 
social justice or regional development.  
In a similar way interaction with international, and particularly Latin American, 
INGOs led Colombian IDP advocates to reframe the problem of internal forced migration 
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from an issue of social justice and land reform into one that was less political, and which 
concerned humanitarian norms and Colombia’s compliance with international standards. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) have noted that transnational advocacy campaigns have 
tended to be most effective when they: (1) involve issues of bodily harm to vulnerable 
individuals; and (2) involve legal equality of opportunity.  The first characteristic 
responds to a normative logic, the latter to a judicial and institutional one.  Colombian 
activists learned to emphasize both of these characteristics.   Simultaneously, they 
increasingly portrayed IDPs as innocent non-combatants caught in a war that was not of 
their making and they called on the government to comply with widely accept 
international human rights and humanitarian standards.   
By emphasizing the humanitarian crisis the IDP movement increasingly 
succeeded in broadening their alliances within Colombian civil society to include, most 
notably, a conservative Catholic Church.   By highlighting Colombia’s international legal 
obligations they hit a nerve with governing elites who were particularly sensitive to the 
country’s standing in the world and Colombia’s identity as a law-abiding democracy.  
International NGOs also helped better coordinate advocacy efforts in Colombia.  
Encouraged by international advocates, a group of six well known Colombian human 
rights NGOs created an umbrella organization that focused exclusively on displacement – 
the Support Group on Displacement (Grupo de Apoyo a Desplazados, or GAD) – in 
1994.98   GAD soon became the leading organization on issues of displacement and the 
principal intermediary with international activist networks and donors.  Among other 
things, they forcefully lobbied the Colombian government, supported nascent IDP 
organizations (such as ANDAS and ASCONDAS) and called domestic attention to the 
                                                
98 The number eventually grew to 13 organizations.  GAD later dissolved in 2001 because of differences 
between its members and budgetary problems (they purposely rejected money from Plan Colombia). 
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displacement crisis by publishing annual reports on the state of displacement as well as a 
newsletter called Exodo.  Most importantly GAD became the point of contact in 
Colombia for emerging international organizations seeking to promote the international 
IDP regime.  GAD, for example, was instrumental in facilitating a visit to Colombia by 
the UN’s Representative to the Secretary General on Internal Displacement (RSG), 
Francis Deng, in 1994 and another visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) in 1996.  These visits greatly contributed to bringing international 
attention to the crisis in Colombia.  GAD also kept the Colombian government 
accountable by publishing follow-up reports on the RSG’s and the IACHR’s 
recommendations.   
Without international support an organization like GAD would most likely not 
have survived for very long in Colombia.   GAD received most of its funding from 
international donors, most notably from the Norwegian Refugees Council (NRC) and 
Project Counseling Services (PCS) and derived much of its legitimacy from its 
international associations.  In 1996 GAD, for example, became a UNHCR partner in 
action (PARNAC), which made the organization a fixture at the UN headquarters in 
Geneva and significantly raised the organization’s profile at home.  
Perhaps the most important NGO on displacement that emerged around this time 
was CODHES (Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement).  The organization, 
which was created in 1992 by an exiled left-wing journalist, Jorge Rojas, and several 
Colombian academics, sought to call attention to the displacement crisis from a 
humanitarian perspective.  Although Rojas had spent most of his life as a left-wing 
militant while in exile in Ecuador during the 1980s Rojas became connected with an 
international network of refugee activists and somehow sensitized to the importance of 
framing Colombia’s displacement problem in humanitarian terms and collecting hard 
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data.  Upon his return to Colombia in 1991, he and his colleagues, with the support of the 
Catholic Church, helped put together the first nation-wide systematic evaluation of 
internal displacement in Colombia, which was published in 1995.99    
CODHES subsequently became the country’s principal think-tank on the issue of 
displacement, monitoring and publishing the numbers and trends of internal forced 
migration on a yearly basis.  Perhaps their greatest achievement was the development of 
the first system and database to estimate the number of IDPs in Colombia.  Its second 
director, Marco Romero, recognized that by quantifying the magnitude of internal 
displacement in Colombia and producing “hard numbers” CODHES forced the 
Colombian government to finally confront the problem. While the Colombian 
government tried on several occasions to discredit the claims that CODHES was bringing 
before the international community they failed because they could not provide their own 
estimates with which to challenge CODHES.  This eventually led the Colombian 
government to create its own registration system with which to monitor the crisis.  
According to Marco Romero:  “Once this system was in place the government could not 
ignore the problem as easily.”100 
Initially, CODHES focused its attention on a domestic audience but soon realized 
that it would have significantly more leverage if it took its message internationally.  They 
also encountered an international community eager to support their data collection and 
documentation efforts.  Over the years, CODHES received funding from, among others, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, USAID and the Spanish Government.  In order to appeal to an 
international audience CODHES framed Colombia’s crisis in human rights and 
humanitarian terms.  Its first publication, in 1993, (Displacement Human Rights and 
                                                
99 Interview with Marco Alberto Romero Silva (Director of CODHES).  Bogotá.  April 23, 2013. 
100 Ibid. 
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Armed Conflict) clearly set the tone of their human rights campaign by calling for the 
Colombian government to comply with its international human rights obligations.  This 
greatly contributed to further depoliticize the issue of displacement.  
 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
Internal displacement also emerged as an issue of public policy in Colombia as a 
result of the Catholic Church’s involvement.  Since the 1980s Catholic perishes had been 
at the forefront of the displacement crisis.  Because most IDPs tended to distrust state 
authorities many reached out to local parishes and grass roots Catholic organizations for 
help at the sights of reception.  At first the church was hesitant to become too involved 
with the issue.  But as parishes in conflict zones became increasingly overwhelmed by 
the large influx of refugees they too began to generate attention to the problem.   In other 
countries in the hemisphere – most notably in El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru – the 
Catholic Church had played a central role in addressing displacement.  Perhaps because 
the church in Colombia was traditionally more conservative than most in the region, this 
process was a little slower in Colombia.  At first the church’s National Social Ministry 
Secretariat (Pastoral Social) and the church’s Human Mobility section began supporting 
and working alongside local IDP organizations in places like Barrancaberjeja, 
Villavicencio and Ariari (ICVA, 1991).  In 1994 the Colombian Bishops’ Conference 
adopted internal displacement as the theme of its yearly conference and initiated a year-
long project to document the number of IDPs at the parish level from 1985 to 1994 which 
culminated in the publication, together with CODHES, of a report titled: “Human Rights: 
Persons Displaced by Violence in Colombia.”   This report published in 1995 represented 
the first authoritative survey of Colombia’s internal displacement crisis at the national 
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level.  The study estimated that between 1985 and 1995 more than half a million 
Colombians, or approximately 2% of the country’s population, had been displaced as a 
result of violence.101   
According to a number of experts the study was instrumental in putting internal 
displacement at the forefront of the national agenda and crystalizing the issue as a 
humanitarian problem that required the application of existing international norms.102  As 
a respected institution with right wing leanings, the Church gave credence to the claims 
of the displaced community without arousing political suspicion.  The study elevated the 
profile of displacement, contributed to further de-politicize the issue, and equipped 
activists with solid data with which to confront state authorities.  The Church’s study also 
motivated an unprecedented wave of scholarship on the different dimensions (i.e. 
psychosocial, socioeconomic, health, educational, ethnic, and gender) of the phenomenon 
of displacement resulting in a number of seminaries, reports and studies by NGOs, 
government entities, and academics.103  
 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
Until roughly 1993, the government of Colombia did not recognize internal 
displacement as a problem.  The government ignored the crisis either because it saw 
forced migration as an indistinguishable part of the process of colonization and internal 
migration or because it perceived it as a consequence of violence for which it repeatedly 
                                                
101 The study estimated that there were about 108,301 families (or 586,261 IDPs) had been displaced 
between 1985 and 1994. This figure signified that one in 60 Colombians was an IDP (Conferencia 
Episcopal de Colombia, 1995).   
102 Interviews with: Juan Manuel Bustillo (April 17, 2013), Flor Edilma Osorio Pérez (July 16, 2013) and 
Roberto Carlos Vidal Lopez (April 18, 2013) in Bogotá. 
103 See excellent bibliography compiled by Flor Alba Romero (1998). 
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denied responsibility.  From their perspective Colombia’s main problem resided in the 
fact that the state was not consolidated enough and that civilian authorities were not in 
control of much of the national territory (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).   During the 
Barco (1986-1990) and Gaviria (1990-1994) administrations the government did not take 
any concrete actions to address the problem (Osorio Péres, 2001).  The government’s 
National Planning Department was opposed to the creation of a new category of 
“displaced people” arguing that it could potentially marginalize the sections of the 
population that provided “civil resistance” by remaining in the conflict zones.104 Some 
factions in the government were more sympathetic.  The Office of the Presidential 
Advisor for Human Rights, which was established in 1987 and was partially financed by 
the UN, took the challenge of forced displacement a lot more seriously than other 
government agencies by collaborating with a number of NGOs and providing them with 
an institutional opening.  During the national seminar on displacement held in 1991, 
President Gaviria’s Human Rights Advisor, Jorge Orlando Melo, publically recognized 
that Colombia had regrettably ignored the problem of forced displacement for many years 
and that the government’s response had been inadequate.  He called upon civil society to 
generate more rigorous estimations of the problem, invited IDP organizations to dialogue 
with the government and welcomed international expertise to help formulate more 
coherent responses (Melo, 1992).  
The government’s approach to displacement was initially very ad hoc.  Beginning 
in 1988 the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights, for example, 
administered a fund that distributed about $500,000 during a four-year period to provide 
food, shelter, and medical supplies to some displaced families and communities who 
                                                
104 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Ponencia, p. 2.  Quoted in Vidal López (2007). 
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would occasionally contact them directly.  According to Marta Franco, who directed the 
fund, the program lacked any sort of direction and amounted to little more than “putting 
out fires” (Kirk, 1993).   
In 1992 the government for the first time officially recognized the existence of a 
problem by setting up, though Presidential Decree 281, a more substantial national “Fund 
of Solidarity and Social Emergency” with a budget of $1.5 million to research and aid 
victims of violence. Although the program was plagued by serious administrative 
problems, it did represent a significant development because for the first time a 
presidential document recognized the existence of a population suffering from violence 
and needing government assistance (Kirk, 1993).  Beginning in 1993, the government 
made an effort, again through the Office of the Presidential Advisor and with 
international assistance, to implement a system to record human rights violations in 
Colombia that included displacement.  The initiative failed to take off and was greatly 
handicapped by a political crisis that was to accompany most of the Samper 
administration (1994-98) (Segura Escobar, 2000). 
The Colombian government did not really begin to formulate a coherent 
institutional policy towards displacement until President Samper (1994-1998) came to 
power.  After Samper’s election, during the summer of 1994, the Colombian government 
invited the newly appointed UN Representative to the Secretary General on Internally 
Displaced Persons (RSG), Francis Deng, to visit Colombia.  During Deng’s visit the 
government organized a workshop for the “Proposal of Integral Policies Related to 
Displacement in Colombia” for which it brought together representatives from various 
international organizations, domestic and international human rights NGOs (including 
IIDH and ICVA), the church, and various IDP organizations and the RSG (Republica de 
Colombia, 1994).  During the discussions Samper’s Human Rights Advisor, Carlos 
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Vicente de Roux, publically signaled a change in course and called upon civil society to 
help him influence the rest of the state apparatus to take on the issue of internal 
displacement.   He recognized that in the past the government had been resistant to 
recognize displacement because: “…like other human rights concerns [it] had been 
traditionally viewed with caution and resistance as a flagship for the guerilla and leftist 
circles…” He suggested that attitudes within the government were slowly changing and 
asked civil society to join him in leading the charge towards developing a responsible 
government policy and to help him with “transforming” and “educating” the state.  He 
concluded by emphasizing that: “If there is a matter in which the state cannot work alone 
it is that of displacement caused by violence” (Republica de Colombia, 1994).  
Subsequently, the Samper administration sought out opportunities to form 
alliances and to discuss with academics and NGOs the prospect of developing a set of 
norms and procedures for internal displacement.  Many NGOs treated these openings 
with trepidation perhaps suspecting an effort to coopt them, and collaborated with the 
government while maintaining a safe distance (Osorio Péres, 2001). In a speech on the 
occasion of Colombia’s National Human Rights Day celebration (September 9, 1994), 
President Samper formally recognized the problem of internal displacement and the 
state’s responsibility to address it (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998).  The following June, 
he convened a Mediation and Follow-up Commission to develop guidelines on 
displacement with the participation of NGOs, the Church, the Ombudsman, Attorney 
General, the National Planning Office, and the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights.  
By September of 1995, the government’s National Planning Department issued a first 
draft of a National Program for the Attention of the Population Displaced by Violence 
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(referred to as CONPES document 2804).105  This document took into account the 
findings of the Catholic Bishop’s Council and incorporated many of the RSG’s and 
CPDIA’s recommendations (including CPDIA’s definition of IDPs). 
CONPES Document 2804 recognized forced displacement as a violation of 
international humanitarian law and situated the government’s program towards IDPs 
within the wider framework of President Samper’s social development project called the 
“Social Jump.”  Although, according to many IDP advocates the program failed to 
incorporate the input from NGOs with grass roots and administrative experience with 
IDPs (Obregón & Stavropolou, 1998), it signaled a first attempt to devise a national 
policy on displacement which involved multiple government entities.  By 1997 many 
structural problems of the program106 became evident and the government was forced to 
draft a second CONPES document (2924). The document was signed by a newly created 
Office of the Presidential Advisor for Displacement, the Presidential Advisor for Human 
Rights and Social Policy and the National Planning Department. 
On July 18, 1997, both CONPES documents were incorporated into Law 387 “..in 
which measures are adopted for the prevention of forced displacement as well as for  the 
attention, protection, stabilization and socioeconomic consolidation of internally 
displaced as a result of violence in Colombia.”   The law did not only mark a significant 
                                                
105 CONPES (the Council on Political and Social Policy) is an advisory body of the executive branch that 
operates similarly to the National Planning Department. 
106 The second CONPES document recognized that different state institutions involved in administering the 
program did not accept responsibility for carrying out the policy or for creating the necessary normative 
structures do so.  The program, as first established, was run by the Interior Ministry’s Special 
Administrative Unit for the Protection of Human Rights, which was created by the Samper Administration.  
The unit, however, was significantly under-funded and under-staffed.  The person in charge of heading the 
program had to rely on the good will of government officials in other institutions for support.  Not only was 
this difficult to obtain but eventually he received death threats and was forced to leave the country.  
Consequently, the new document modified the existing institutional structure to cover all levels of 
government, from the presidency to local institutions in order to broaden the program’s reach (Obregón & 
Stavropolou, 1998).  
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step to integrate a national policy with regards to displacement but also signaled 
Colombia’s acceptance and commitment with the emerging international regime to 
protect IDPs.  The law recognized that violence was the principal cause of displacement 
but most importantly, it committed the government to a set of important principles around 
which the international regime to protect IDPs – and particularly the UN Guiding 
Principles – were being built.107  Law 387 effectively enshrined a set of international 
“soft law” norms with regards to displacement into “hard law” (Vidal López, 2007).  To 
emphasize the seriousness of its commitment, that same year the Colombian government 
invited UNHCR to establish an office in Bogotá dedicated to the protection of IDPs.    
It is difficult to say with much certainty why Samper’s administration broke so 
radically with previous Colombian governments and pursued a pro-IDP agenda.  Part of 
this can be explained by the fact that, as described earlier, the rate of internal 
displacement accelerated significantly Colombia during the latter half of the 1990s 
making it increasingly difficult for the government to ignore.  By the mid-1990s the 
Colombian IDP movement was also beginning to employ, to great effect, a “boomerang 
strategy” of transnational activism coined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) to exert significant 
pressure on the Colombian government both domestically and internationally to take 
action.  Gradually, Colombian human rights organizations and IDP advocacy groups 
succeeded in linking up with international and regional human rights networks.  From 
them they received greatly needed funding, training and symbolic support.  They became 
better organized and learned to reframe the IDP problem in a way that resonated with a 
wider domestic audience.  This, in turn, allowed the IDP coalition to broaden outside of 
                                                
107 These included: (1) the right of IDPs to receive international aid; (2) The right to internationally 
recognized civil rights; (3) The right not to be discriminated against because of one’s status as “displaced”; 
(4) the right to be reunited with family members; (5) the right to find durable solutions to displacement; (6) 
the rights to return to the place of origin; (7) the right not to be displaced; and (7) the obligation of the state 
to promote the conditions that would facilitate coexistence, equality, and social justice among all citizens. 
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traditional leftist circles to include, most importantly, the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church. 
By reframing the displacement crisis as a humanitarian problem that concerned 
Colombia’s commitment to international humanitarian standards and linking with allies 
abroad they also forced resistant sectors of the Colombian government, such as the 
security forces, to view internal displacement as a problem that needed to be addressed 
and gave the more progressive sectors of the government, such as the Presidential Human 
Rights Advisor, much more leverage.  By providing solid documentation of the 
dimensions and social implications of the crisis and diffusing this information 
internationally they also made it almost impossible for Samper to continue to avoid 
action.  
The shift during the Samper administration can also be explained by the fact that 
he was ideologically much more sympathetic than his predecessors to the human rights 
agenda.  When he was faced with a critical legitimacy crisis, as a result of allegations that 
his campaign had accepted moneys form the Cali Cartel, Samper seized the opportunity 
to generate domestic and international support by making important human rights 
concessions.   The following sections will examine in more detail the effect of each of 
these factors in bringing Colombia to commit to the international IDP regime. 
 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
During the 1990s, as the conflict in Colombia intensified and the wars in Central 
America winded down, Colombia became the subject of significant international pressure 
to address its deteriorating human rights and humanitarian crisis.  This pressure came in 
large part from multilateral organizations – particularly within the Inter-American human 
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rights system and the UN.  By 1995 the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights 
(IACHR)108 had issued 11 separate pronouncements and the UN Human Rights 
Committee five pronouncements in which they noted that Colombia was in violation of 
its international human rights obligations (Jaramillo & Novoa, 2008).  According to 
Ozorio, Colombia’s institutional responses, which culminated with Law 387 of 1997, 
were in many ways the result of international pressure and accusations that had real 
political and economic consequences that consistently highlighted internal displacement 
as a human rights problem (Osorio Péres, 2001).  
The IACHR began turning its attention to Colombia in the 1980s when the 
conflict intensified and became particularly concerned with internal displacement in the 
early 1990s.   After a visit to Colombia in 1992 in which commissioners met with 
Colombia’s principal human rights organizations the IACHR issued a special country 
report that expressed “…grave concern with rise of violence and HR violations” and 
called on Colombia to adopt Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions concerning the 
protection of victims of internal armed conflict (IACHR, 1993).  In 1994 Colombia was 
listed for the first time under Chapter 4 of the IACHR’s annual report, which catalogs the 
hemisphere’s most precarious human rights situations, and in which, according to a 
IACHR officials, countries desperately seek to avoid being listed.   
It is clear that from very early on, IACHR took on the issue of internal 
displacement much more seriously than other regional organizations and felt obliged to 
intervene.  One possible explanation for this is that Robert Goldman, one of the members 
of the commission and a renowned American human rights jurist, was also one of the 
                                                
108 Founded in 1959 the IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States with headquarters in 
Washington DC.  Together with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it is one of the bodies that make up the 
inter-American system for the promotion and protection of Human rights.  The commission meets in regular and 
special sessions several times a year to examine allegations of human rights violations in the hemisphere. 
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principal drafters of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.  Within the 
commission, Goldman had served as the commission’s Special Rapporteur for Colombia 
and in 1996 he convinced that body to appointment him as the IACHR’s special 
rapporteur on internal displacement.  His appointment was part of an effort devised by 
the framers of the IDP regime – Deng, Cohen, and Goldman – to promote the regime 
through regional intergovernmental organizations.  Although the RSG and his team had 
approached other regional organizations, the Inter-American System had been the most 
responsive.  By instituting the office of a special rapporteur for the Americas they hoped 
to set up a precedent, which they could use to pressure the African Union and other 
similar bodies.  In 1999, Goldman left that position to become the president of the 
commission, thus ensuring that internal displacement remained at the front and center of 
the commission’s agenda. 
The UN system also became increasingly involved in pressuring Colombia to 
address its human rights situation.  Since 1987, UNDP’s mission in Bogotá had supported 
a number of government projects to promote human rights, including the institution of a 
Special Presidential Advisor for Human Rights, and had generally exhibited a high 
degree of solidarity with Colombia’s human rights movement (Deng, 1994).  Alarmed by 
an increase in violence, the UN conducted two human rights fact-finding missions in 
Colombia during the late 1980s, and another mission to evaluate the Office of the 
Presidential Advisor for Human Rights in 1992.109  The human rights movement 
gradually came to view the UN as a key ally and increasingly exerted pressure to broaden 
the UN’s presence in Colombia.  UNHCR had a very small presence in Colombia.  But it 
                                                
109 See: Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, Consejo Economico y Social. Informe 
de la misión de evaluación del proyecto de apoyo a la Consejería presidencial para la defensa, protección 
y promoción de los derechos humanos de Colombia. (E/CN.4/1993/61/Add.3), 6 de Septiembre 1993. 
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was relatively uninvolved with Colombia’s IDPs because, at the time, the agency 
maintained that internal displacement fell outside of its mandate. 
When the RSG, Francis Deng, visited Colombia for the first time during the 
summer of 1994, a number of NGOs took advantage of his visit to call for the 
appointment of a special UN human rights rapporteur for Colombia.  They were 
convinced that a special rapporteur would help to maintain a high level of international 
pressure, which they understood to have been a catalyst in opening the government to 
their human rights concerns.  According to Deng (1994), at first the Colombian 
government strongly opposed the idea arguing that any increase in international pressure 
would be counterproductive.  However, the government signaled that it would be open to 
some sort of lower-key UN presence.  Although a special rapporteur was never 
appointed, in 1996 the government agreed to invite the UN’s Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to open up a mission in Bogotá: “…to 
monitor the human rights situation and to provide technical cooperation with a view to 
addressing the underlying causes of the human rights problem.”  This office was to 
become the UN’s focal point for internal displacement in Colombia (Deng, 2000). 
Although the UN had had some sort of presence in the country for many years, in 
the eyes of human rights advocates the establishment of a OHCHR mission essentially 
marked “the arrival of the UN to Colombia” and was a significant turning point in the 
fight on behalf of Colombia’s IDPs.  According to several activists interviewed, the 
presence of OHCHR, and later of a UNHCR mission primarily focused on displacement 
proved to be a significant boost to the country’s human rights campaign.  The UN 
missions in Bogotá gave international human rights and humanitarian norms a sort of 
physical presence or “reminder” which caused the Colombian government to attribute a 
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lot more importance to these norms than they previously had.110  In an interview with the 
author, President Samper acknowledged that the arrival of OHCHR had motivated his 
government to treat internal displacement as a priority.111 The UN missions also provided 
the Colombian human rights community with powerful allies that could more effectively 
lobby the Colombian government and afforded them a powerful international voice.  The 
UN gave legitimacy to the claims of Colombia’s NGOs and provided activists with 
desperately needed guarantees of physical security by providing observers that would 
accompany Colombian human rights workers on field missions.112 In return local activist 
groups helped the UN by disseminating their pronouncements in Colombia and 
monitoring in the field the following-up to the UN agencies’ many recommendations.   
During the early years, the UN representatives in Colombia maintained very close 
relations with the NGO community and were very forceful with the Colombian 
government.113  Many of the UN officers who came to Colombia had previously worked 
in Central America, and they brought with them a wealth of experience.  Colombian 
activists credit Leila Lima, a Brazilian national and UNHCR’s first representative to 
Colombia, who had previously been posted in Central America, for successfully pushing 
the Colombian government to adopt a number of protective measures for IDPs including 
the establishment of demilitarized humanitarian zones in areas of conflict.114  
                                                
110 Interview with Catherine Bouley (Christian Aid Colombia).  April 9, 2013.  Bogotá. 
111 Interview with former Colombian President Ernesto Samper Pizano. April 16, 2013. Bogotá. 
112 Interview with Flor Edilma Osorio Pérez.  July 16, 2013.  Bogotá. This was particularly critical during 
the aftermath of Operation Genesis in 1997 in which a group of paramilitaries conducted a massacre in the 
municipality of Cacarica in Chocó resulting in massive displacement. 
113 To the regret of many advocates interviewed, this appears to have changed over time as the Colombian 
government began to make concessions. 
114 Interview with Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli (WOLA; formerly at Brookings’ IDP Project).  March 28, 
2013. Washington, DC. 
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The increased involvement of the international community in Colombia not only 
empowered the more progressive sectors within the state  (i.e. the offices of the 
Ombudsman, the Attorney General and the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights) but 
also facilitated closer relations between these and civil society groups working with IDPs. 
As a result of international pressure, Colombia also took measures to fortify its 
compliance with the rulings of international human rights bodies.  In 1996, for example, 
Colombia instituted Law 288, which, for the first time, established mechanisms to 
compensate victims of human rights violations following rulings by the Inter-American 
Court and UN Human Rights Commission (Jaramillo & Novoa, 2008). 
By the early 1990s these sectors within the Colombian government recognized the 
urgency to respond to the country’s displacement crisis. However, other elements within 
the government – mainly the armed forces – continued to resist the claims of the human 
rights community.  It was not until President Samper took office in 1994, and he soon 
became mired in a legitimacy crisis, that real institutional changes began to occur. 115     
 
SAMPER ADMINISTRATION 
President Samper’s administration marked a significant shift in Colombia’s 
official attitude towards human rights and international humanitarian norms.  Aside from 
instituting for the first time a policy framework to address displacement Samper’s 
                                                
115 The RSG’s 1994 report noted that despite a historically deep-rooted suspicious government attitude 
towards the NGO community: “there seems to have been a serious opening up of the Government to the 
work of the NGOs, which the NGOs themselves recognize.  Some government officials, both at the central 
and local levels, recognized that the NGO community was doing important work, often with no support 
from the State…Some believe that much of this new receptivity has been caused by recent international 
concern with the human rights record of the country, and that it extends only to the progressive elements 
within the Government” (Deng, 1994). (See Ph. 100)   
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government also took a series of measures that human rights activists had been 
advocating for quite some time.   In 1995, for example, Colombia adopted Protocol II of 
the Geneva Convention.  In 1997 the country ratified the Inter-American Convention on 
Torture and the International Land-Mine Convention.  Samper also created a special 
administrative unit for human rights within the Interior Ministry and in 1996 reformed 
the military justice code. 
Observers, however, still debate the extent to which this shift was due to 
Samper’s progressive ideology and personal appreciation for human rights and the extent 
to which this shift reflected a calculated response in the face of a political crisis in which 
he found himself entangled soon after taking office.  After winning an election against 
Andrés Pastrana by a very narrow margin in 1994, Samper’s administration became 
ensnarled in a lengthy investigation of allegations that his campaign had accepted $6 
million in contributions from the Cali drug cartel.   The investigation, know as 
“Procedure 8000” (after the file number assigned to the case by the Attorney General), 
launched the country into an institutional crisis that almost toppled the government.  
Although the investigation established that Samper’s campaign had indeed solicited and 
accepted funds from the Cali drug cartel, it was never able to establish Samper’s 
knowledge of this transaction.  Nevertheless the president continued to be plagued by 
suspicions.116  It is clear, however, that this political crisis and Samper’s desperate search 
for domestic and international legitimacy created a structural opening that benefited the 
agenda of the international trans-national IDP network. 
Compared to many of his predecessors, Samper was certainly a progressive 
president.  A self-proclaimed “social democrat,” Samper launched a number of radical 
                                                
116 President Sampers’ campaign chief, and later minister of defense, Fernando Botero Zea, and his 
campaign’s treasurer, Santiago Medina were tried and imprisoned.  
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social and modernization initiatives as part of his “Social Jump” development plan 
(known in Colombia as the “Salto Social”).  His government invested heavily in social 
programs and measures for poverty alleviation.  In order to protect small farmers from 
agro industrial interests he also created a number of autonomous peasant reservations 
(zonas de reserva campesinas) – an initiative that the FARC was later to propose 
expanding during its negotiations with the Colombian government.  Samper had also 
been a victim of a paramilitary attack that nearly killed him.117  As he outlined in his 
inaugural speech, a significant component of Samper’s Salto Social plan was the 
definition of a human rights policy that would bring Colombia in line with international 
human rights and humanitarian norms and that would humanize Colombia’s internal 
conflict by protecting non-combatants.118    
From the outset of his administration Samper recognized that displacement was a 
major humanitarian problem in Colombia.  He recognized that Colombia was confronting 
a new phenomenon in which “masses of people were migrating to cities” and that this 
was something that the government needed to address.  Although he suspected that 
economic motivations continued to account for much of Colombia’s urban migration he 
admitted that Colombia’s increasingly inhumane conflict was producing a new 
phenomenon in which multitudes, mostly women and children, were being forcefully 
                                                
117 In 1989, as a rising political star, Ernesto Samper survived a paramilitary attack at the El Dorado 
Airport in Bogotá in which José Antequer, a leader of the leftist Union Patriotica was assassinated.  
Although he was not the target of the assassination, he was hit by five bullets that he continues to carry in 
his body. 
118 To this effect Samper outlined a number of policy items in his inauguration speech on August 7, 1994: 
(1) opening the country to international scrutiny; (2) the humanization of the internal armed conflict; (3) the 
fight against impunity; (4) the fight against irregular armed groups; (5) the sensitization of the security 
forces to human rights; (6) programs for those displaced by political violence; and (7) partnership with 
human rights NGOs.  Quoted in Echeverry (2008). 
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displaced.119  In fact, during his inauguration Samper specifically mentioned the need for 
programs to benefit Colombians “displaced as a result of violence.”   
During the first years of Samper’s administration the rate of displacement 
increased significantly and Colombian NGOs were able to document this.  Although 
Samper disputed the estimates provided by NGOs, which he suspected of “living from 
advocacy” he was ready to work with them and admitted to being educated by them 
about displacement.  Samper also admitted that OHCHR’s presence in Colombia was a 
key motivator to finally devise a national policy on internal displacement.120  
One of the principal challenges the Samper administration faced was that by 1994 
there were no clear international guidelines on which to base a policy towards IDPs.  
Samper recalled discussing with UNHCR different ways of applying the 1951 Refugee 
convention to IDPs.  Eventually much of his ensuing legislation became based on the 
1984 Cartagena Convention and the Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which govern 
the treatment of non-combatants in internal conflicts.  On final account, these norms (and 
the recommendations of CPDIA) rather than the RSG’s pronouncements appear to have 
been the real normative basis for Law 387.  
In order to articulate an appropriate institutional response Samper knew that he 
really had to understand the phenomenon of displacement.  Samper admits that the 
government was initially focused on facilitating the return of IDPs to their place of 
origin.  His administration, however, eventually concluded that this approach was bound 
to fail because most IDPs had no intention of returning.  According to Samper “the 
government would practically have to force them to return.”   This was due not only to 
continuing threats but also to the fact that IDPs, on average, encountered significantly 
                                                
119 Interview with former Colombian President Ernesto Samper Pizano. April 16, 2013. Bogotá. 
120 Ibid. 
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better standards of living in the city slums, like Ciudad Bolivar, in the outskirts of 
Bogotá, than in the countryside regardless of high levels of violence in the slums.  The 
administration was forced to look at the challenges in stages (in terms of displacement, 
return and resettlement) and to formulate adequate institutional responses for each stage.  
According to Samper, who liked to utilize the imagery of a wound, the government’s first 
task was to “stop the bleeding” by addressing the humanitarian needs of IDPs; and then 
close the wound by providing IDPs with the means for sustainable living, education, and 
permanent housing for the majority of those who chose to resettle in the cities.  Having 
realized that approximately 90% of IDPs had no intention of returning the government 
focused its attention on developing integration programs like that of “nivelacion 
educativa” (remedial education).121 
Displacement presented a third and final policy challenge to the Samper 
administration in that it involved a tremendous amount of coordination between various 
government entities at the national and municipal levels.  To this end, Samper elicited his 
wife’s help.  The first lady, Jacquin Strauss de Samper, assumed the initiative of 
promoting the issue and later coordinating the various government agencies to implement 
a government policy.  According to Samper, aside from himself, Jacquin was the one 
person within his government best equipped to mobilize so many disparate intuitions (i.e. 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Education, the Procuraduria, and the National Institute for 
Land Reform – INCORA, etc.). The First Lady was also allegedly very moved by the 
plight of Colombia’s IDPs.  In 1997 she published a book titled: The Displaced: That 
Colombia Which We Cannot Ignore (1997).   
                                                
121 Ibid. 
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Without major discussion the Colombian government adopted the “IDP” 
definition approved by the human rights experts at CPDIA and the IIDH. This is 
significant because it demonstrates the level to which the Colombian government was 
willing to accept the authority and welcome the expertise of the international community 
on the issue of displacement.   In contrast, other countries with internal displacement, 
such as Turkey and Nepal, sought to narrow the definition of IDPs to the exclusion of 
particular groups when they finally formulated their own domestic policies on 
displacement.  
The principal debates that emerged in Colombia related instead to the 
“institutional scaffolding” that would have to be erected to certify that IDPs had 
genuinely been displaced.  While the government insisted on setting in place a number of 
bureaucratic procedures so as to ensure that its limited resources would not be wasted on 
people who did not need them desperately, NGOs complained that these procedures were 
unrealistic and made it basically impossible for IDPs to receive assistance in a timely 
manner (Osorio Péres, 2001). 
 
Although the intentions may have been genuine it is likely that the Samper 
administration gave priority to many of these measures in order to appease the 
international community and form alliances within Colombian civil society at a time of 
crisis.  
The “Proceso 8000” scandal, referred to within the administration as “the crisis,” 
diverted a significant portion of the government’s attention and resources preventing 
Samper from governing effectively.  The scandal also led to a significant deterioration of 
bilateral relations with the United States, which was in the midst of intensifying its 
declared “war on drugs.”   The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by Jesse 
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Helms called for a criminal investigation.  The head of the DEA in Colombia began 
referring to Colombia as a “narco-democracy.”  Subsequently, Clinton’s State 
Department decertified Colombia in March of 1996, and in a particularly painful but 
symbolic gesture, in July it announced that it was cancelling President’s Samper’s visa to 
travel to the United States.122  Strained relations with the US Ambassador in Bogotá led 
Samper to accuse him of treating Colombians as “latent criminals” who needed to be 
taught a lesson between right and wrong (Kirk, 2004).   
Samper continues to reject any suggestion that his human rights policy was in any 
way motivated by international pressure resulting from this political scandal.123 
Nevertheless, as Colombia was in danger of becoming a “pariah” state the human rights 
reforms made during the Samper administration prompted significant recognition from 
the international community and attenuated much of the criticism that Colombia was 
receiving from organizations like the IACHR.  Equally as important is the fact that these 
reforms afforded President Samper with powerful international allies during a time when 
some sectors of the military were rumored to be preparing a coup against him.124 
                                                
122 Samper called the cancellation a “despicable weapon.”  This episode was particularly painful since 
Samper’s wife, Jacquin Strauss, is the daughter of an American pilot killed over Cambodia during the 
Vietnam War.    
When Samper later travelled to New York with a special UN document to attend the General Assembly 
meeting, he admitted to keeping in his back pocket a cyanide capsule to take in case the Americans placed 
him under arrest (Kirk, 2004). 
123 Interview with former Colombian President Ernesto Samper Pizano. April 16, 2013. Bogotá. 
124 According to a former Samper advisor, although policies such as accession to Protocol II of the 
Geneva Conventions and inviting UN observers to Colombia were perhaps motivated by the presidents’ 
convictions – and certainly cheered on by a group of committed advisors – they were also part of a sincere 
effort to find international allies with which to keep the Colombian military in check in a time of crisis.  
Interview with Jorge Orlando Melo.  July 18, 2013. Bogotá. 
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FAILED IMPLEMENTATION 
Although Samper succeeded in establishing the institutional scaffolding to 
respond to displacement, the crisis within his administration made the regulation and 
implementation of Law 387 very difficult.  This law was in many ways groundbreaking, 
however, it was plagued by a number of problems and was not properly implemented.  
There are various competing explanations of why 387’s implementation was so 
problematic.  Some observers blame government incompetence and its lack of capacity to 
carry though such a complex piece of legislation in a time of war.  They point to an 
apparent lack of coordination between the different government entities at the national 
and municipal levels; the incompetence of mid-level bureaucrats; lack of training and 
proper funding (particularly at the municipal level which bore most of the responsibility 
for implementing the law); and absence of the state in large swaths of the territory.   The 
political scandal that ensnarled Samper’s administration also became a very big 
distraction, which made it difficult to govern. 
After the law’s passage, Samper and the two presidents who succeeded him failed 
to make displacement a priority despite the fact that the crisis continued to grow at an 
alarming rate. During the last year of his administration Samper was completely 
distracted by the scandal.  Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), who was eager to negotiate a 
peace agreement with the FARC, completely abandoned the issue.  Alvaro Uribe (2002-
2010), who waged an all-out-war to annihilate the guerillas, proved to be very 
antagonistic to human rights concerns.125 
There is no single explanation of why Colombia failed to properly implement its 
model law on displacement.  Perhaps the most glaring reason is that international 
                                                
125 Interview with Jorge Orlando Melo.  July 18, 2013. Bogotá. 
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pressure on Colombia eased temporarily after the passage of Law 387 – at least during 
the Pastrana administration.   In the absence of effective domestic and international 
monitoring mechanisms Colombia appeared to be significantly ahead of other IDP crises 
in terms of compliance with the IDP regime.  As the next chapter will illustrate, the 
reality on the ground, however, was different.   
Faced with a set of empty promises and an indifferent executive the IDP 
movement in Colombia eventually turned to alternative institutional channels of 
contestation, appealing to Colombia’s judiciary to force the government to act.  This 
eventually led Colombia’s Constitutional Court in 2004 to effectively take control of the 
country’s policy on displacement and to rule that the government’s failure to implement 
Law 387 represented an “unconstitutional state of affairs.”  In a ruling of unprecedented 
breadth, the court explicitly committed Colombia’s government to comply with the UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that came into being in 1998, a year after 
Colombia’s law was instituted. 
By the end of the 1990s Colombia had clearly committed, at least rhetorically, to 
complying with the international regime to protect IDPs.  At the time, Law 387 of 1997 
offered perhaps the most comprehensive legislation in the world for addressing 
displacement.  Law 387 affirmed Colombians’ right not to be forcefully displaced and the 
responsibility of the government to formulate policies to prevent displacement.  Without 
debate it adopted the international community’s definition of IDP without seeking to 
discriminate and included a list of important rights and obligations, which were to be 
outlined the following year by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.  The 
law was particularly significant in that, unlike other countries with similar legislation, 
Colombia was still at war and the IDP crisis was growing exponentially.  
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As I have shown above, a number of factors forced the government to commit to 
the regime at that time.  Key among these was the successful mobilization of human 
rights organizations that were able to tap into the regional refugee regime that had 
emerged from the Central American experience and to link up with a dynamic regional 
human rights network.  Also important was the leadership of an executive that was 
sympathetic to the plight of IDPs and who sought the opportunity to gain international 
legitimacy at a time of crisis by committing the country to international norms for 
internal displacement.  The following two chapters will show how the IDP movement 
forced the Colombian government to translate their rhetorical commitment into action. 
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Chapter 4: From Rhetoric to Action:  
Constitutional Court Sentence T-025 
 
In 2004 Colombia’s Constitutional Court, having reviewed the petitions issued by 
hundreds of displaced families and frustrated by the government’s failure to follow up 
with its promises, issued one of the most momentous decisions in its history declaring 
that Colombia’s response to displacement represented an “unconstitutional state of 
affairs.”   This decision, known by its file number T-025, effectively gave the Court 
jurisdiction over Colombia’s public policy towards IDPs at a time when the government 
was unfriendly to human rights claims.  It also initiated a process in which the domestic 
and international human rights networks were able to categorically commit Colombia to 
the emerging IDP regime.  Finally, it helped to establish effective mechanisms with 
which to monitor and challenge the state, effectively forcing Colombia to move beyond 
rhetorical commitment and into action. 
The Court’s innovative intervention has been hailed as a model for judicial 
advocacy on behalf of IDPs around the world.  It was also an essential step in the 
development of Colombia’s increased commitment to the IDP regime.  This section will 
examine the factors that made T-025 possible and what accounted for its success.   
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Table 10: Phase II: Timeline of Events 
Year Event 
1997 Constitutional Court issues decision T-227 on behalf of the IDPs from Hacienda Bellacruz. 
The decision takes note of the GP and RSG’s recommendations.  IDPs identify Court as key 
ally prompting a deluge of “tutelas” 
 
1998 Andres Pastrana Arango elected President of Colombia 
 
 Pastrana’s government engages in a failed round of peace talks with the FARC, granting the 
rebels a safe haven the size of Switzerland that gave them time to regroup and rearm 
 
1999 RSG Francis Deng conducts follow-up visit to Colombia.  His report notes deficiencies in the 
implementation of Law 387 
 
2000 Plan Colombia signed.  Originally designed as a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia.  Over several 
years Colombia receives over $5.4 billion in aid, primarily to combat the narcotics trade, and 
hundreds of civilian advisors.   This quickly makes Colombia the 3rd largest recipient of US 
aid 
 
2001 Organization Víctimas Visibles is founded in Colombia inspired by a successful victims’ 
movement in Spain and begins to push for the institution of a victims’ law in Colombia 
 
2002 Humanitarian situation deteriorates significantly, peaking in 2002, with 442,553 new 
displacements following the breakdown of negotiations with the FARC in the Caguán 
 
 Alvaro Uribe Velez is elected President of Colombia after running with the promise of 
defeating the FARC militarily 
 
 US congress loosens restrictions on Plan Colombia allowing Uribe to finance a robust counter-
insurgency campaign 
 
 Uribe initiates a military buildup and an all-out offensive against the insurgency 
 
2004 Uribe begins demobilization negotiations with Paramilitaries (AUC) until 2006 
 
 Constitutional Court issues decision T-025 declaring Colombia to be in an 
“unconstitutional state of affairs.”  From 2004-2010 the Court subsequently issues 84 
follow-up awards (“autos”) and conducts 14 public hearings to evaluate the Colombian 
government’s response and dictate new orders of protection for IDPs. 
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BACKGROUND TO T-025 
By 1999 it was obvious that the Colombian’s landmark legislation on internal 
displacement was not being properly implemented.  Law 387, together with the two 
CONPES documents, did not constitute an enforceable public policy.  To many observers 
this amounted to little more than a set of empty promises.  According to the Director of 
CODHES, Marco Romero, Colombia’s public policy towards IDPs prior to the 
Constitutional Court’s intervention was “absolutely precarious.”  The Samper 
administration had certainly taken an important step forward by recognizing internal 
displacement as a serious problem, but the government’s policy amounted to little more 
than partial attention to humanitarian assistance.  A member of the National Planning 
Commission charged with internal displacement even recognized that “the issue of 
displacement carried little transcendence” and that “… it was just one more issue for 
National Planning.”  His Commission did not view the CONPES documents that outlined 
the government’s official policy as binding and the government’s inter-agency committee 
charged with implementing them (the CNAIPD) almost never met (Rodríguez Garavito 
& Rodríguez Franco, 2010). 126 
The government’s very own studies, although few and fragmented, recognized 
that Colombia’s policy’s effect on displacement had been dismal.  Studies conducted by 
the government’s social assistance agency (Red de Solidaridad Social - RSS) reported 
that, between January 2000 and June 2001, 61% of the displaced population had not 
received any type of aid from the government and that only 30% of IDPs displaced 
individually or in small groups had received any government assistance. Between 1998 
and 2002, only 43% of displaced families registered by the RSS had received emergency 
                                                
126 The National Council for Integral Attention to the Displaced Population (CNAIPD) was a joint commission 
integrated by the Presidency, Accíon Social, and the various government ministries involved in the protection of IDPs. 
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humanitarian assistance. During that same period the government’s housing program for 
IDPs was able to meet a very small fraction (11.4%) of its intended target (Rodríguez 
Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 2010). 
After conducting a follow-up visit to Colombia in 1999, Francis Deng’s report 
commended the Colombian government for instituting a comprehensive legal framework 
to address its displacement crisis but also noted that the government’s response fell 
seriously short in the area of implementation.  He observed that in practice, the national 
system for responding to forced displacement had been slow to take shape and was 
plagued by problems.  Primarily, the central and local institutional responsibilities had 
not been fully assumed, technical and financial resources were inadequate, and there was 
a notable lack of coordination among government institutions (Deng, 2000).  Deng 
suggested that many of these problems possibly stemmed from the fact that the law had 
not been properly regulated and lacked the necessary specificity.  However, he also 
faulted an “insufficient will or determination on the part of the Government to put its 
laws into practice.” In order to address this problem he called for the development of a 
“comprehensive strategy that would clarify the central role of the State and integrate the 
supplementary work of other actors, non-governmental and intergovernmental alike” 
(Deng, 2000). 
Although the RSG’s follow-up visit to Colombia in 1999 received a significantly 
higher profile than his first visit in 1994, Deng’s report failed to provoke an immediate 
governmental response.  It did, however, succeed in galvanizing domestic advocacy 
organizations to refocus their attention this time around the application of the UN 
Guiding Principles in Colombia and the implementation of the RSG’s specific list of 
recommendations. 
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DETERIORATION OF HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN COLOMBIA 
During the five years following the institution of Law 387, the humanitarian 
situation in Colombia deteriorated significantly with a dramatic increase in displacement, 
resulting from the government’s failed negotiations with the FARC and intensification of 
paramilitary activity.  Samper’s successor, Andrés Pastrana, came to power in 1998 with 
the promise of putting an end to Colombia’s half a century-long war by negotiating a 
peace treaty with the FARC.   The peace process began with the creation of a 
demilitarized zone, which was roughly the size of Switzerland (16,000 square miles), in 
the jungle region of El Caguán, in order to facilitate the dialogue.  The FARC, however, 
took advantage of this safe-haven zone that became known colloquially as “Farclandia” 
and which the FARC ruled as the de facto government, to increase its kidnapping and 
drug trafficking activities.  Although the de-militarized zone was in a sparsely populated 
region of Colombia, the arrival of the FARC, in it self, prompted a mass exodus of 
peasants from the area. 
During the course of the negotiations, in which the agenda did not expressly 
include internal displacement (Deng, 2000), it soon became evident that neither party 
really intended to sign a peace deal. According to several experts interviewed, both 
parties negotiated in bad faith and took advantage of a cessation in hostilities to regroup 
and strengthen their ranks.  In January 2002 Pastrana called off peace negotiations after 
the FARC kidnapped a number of high profile government officials, and launched an 
attack on the de-militarized zone.127  
Following the breakdown of negotiations with the FARC, the rate of internal 
displacement skyrocketed, peaking in 2002, according to both government and NGO 
estimates.  In 2002 alone there were an estimated 412,553 new cases of displacements 
                                                
127 Associated Press.  Colombia’s Pres. Ends Peace Process. 1/13/02. 
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(Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 2010).  The breakdown in negotiations in the 
Caguán, between 2000 and 2002, was accompanied by an increase in guerilla attacks and 
a tremendous expansion by paramilitary groups.  By the time Pastrana left office in 2002, 
85% of Colombia’s municipalities had been affected by displacement as a result of 
conflict.128   
 
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION  
Betrayed by the government’s failure to follow-up on its commitments laid out in 
Law 387, frustrated by a myriad of procedural and bureaucratic obstacles placed before 
them in order to obtain assistance, and faced with a growing humanitarian crisis, 
Colombia’s IDPs became more vocal and coordinated in demanding that the government 
take action.   In the early 2000s, IDPs increasingly began to organize mass 
demonstrations and the occupation of institutional buildings.  They also began to use 
various domestic legal means at their disposal to claim their rights and the fulfillment of 
the governments’ obligations under the 1997 law. 
The mass occupation of government and international agency buildings by IDPs 
were certainly nothing new. In 1996 a group of IDPs displaced by paramilitaries from 
Hacienda Bellacruz, on the Atlantic Coast, occupied the offices of the government’s 
agrarian reform agency (INCORA) and the Ombudsman in Bogotá for seven months.  
This group eventually agreed to be resettled by the government and was granted land in 
another region of the country.  After 1997, however, the number of organized 
occupations increased. In 1998 Bogotá alone saw 12 separate organized occupations of 
                                                
128 See: El Tiempo; “Colombia alcanza tasa record de desplazamiento” April 29, 2003; quoted in 
Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco (2010).  
  173 
government buildings by groups of IDPs lasting anywhere between a day and three 
months.129  Beginning in December 1999, a group of approximately 500 displaced 
families occupied the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in an exclusive and fashionable neighborhood of Bogotá for over a year.  By 
early 2000, the Colombian press reported 26 instances of public protests by IDP groups 
(Osorio Péres, 2001). 
Conscious that Colombia’s new law now recognized certain rights for the 
displaced, IDPs acted both individually and collectively and began making use of a 
Colombian judicial procedure known as “acción de tutela” (writ of protection) to demand 
that courts issue special protective orders to secure their fundamental and constitutional 
rights.  The acción de tutela was one of several constitutional mechanisms put in place by 
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution to ensure the effective exercise of human rights. The tutela 
is essentially a petition procedure, which enables any person whose fundamental 
constitutional rights are being threatened or violated to request judicial protection of their 
fundamental rights.  The process begins when an individual or a group of citizens files an 
informal claim before a judge without the need of an attorney.  That judge is then legally 
bound to give priority attention to the request over other cases.  The judge has a strict 
deadline of ten days to reach a decision and, when appropriate, issue a mandatory and 
immediate order for the adoption of measures to protect threatened fundamental rights.  
All tutela judgments can be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which usually selects 
those it considers necessary to correct or which it considers pertinent for the development 
of constitutional law.  The use of this mechanism became increasingly widespread, 
                                                
129 See GAD Informe sobre desplazamiento Interno en Colombia en 1998.  1998 Publication, Bototá. 
Quoted in Osorio (2001). 
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beginning in the late 1990s, as a strategy by human rights activists and labor leaders 
seeking to protect individuals and communities under imminent threat (Cepeda Espinosa, 
2009).   
It is hard to say what exactly spurred the wave of tutela petitions by IDPs during 
this period.  IDPs and human rights activists, frustrated by an unresponsive government, 
may have concluded that a judicial strategy was perhaps their best option.130  In 1997 a 
well-publicized Constitutional Court decision (T-227) on behalf of a peasant community 
displaced from Hacienda Bellacruz identified the Court as a potentially powerful ally in 
the fight for the rights of IDPs.  This legal victory certainly encouraged IDPs and 
advocates to make liberal use of tutelas. 
In February 1996 a group of heavily armed paramilitaries aided by Colombian 
security forces displaced 2,000 people from lands these peasants had been occupying for 
over a decade in Hacienda Bellacruz, located in the northeastern the Department of 
Cesar.  This agriculturally rich area had long been a hot-bed of guerilla activity and more 
recently had become a base for paramilitaries. An investigation by Colombia’s Attorney 
General’s Office did not result in any actions. In fact, the affected population continued 
to receive threats from the paramilitaries and over thirty of their community leaders were 
murdered.  This case gained much notoriety in part because the disputed land allegedly 
belonged to the family of a friend and political ally of then President Samper, Carlos 
Arturo Marulanda, whom at the time was serving as Colombia’s Ambassador to Belgium 
and Luxembourg.131  
                                                
130 These groups included most notably The Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), GAD, and the José 
Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective. 
131 Amnesty International, Colombia: Hacienda Bellacruz: Land, violence and paramilitary power, 1 
February 1997, AMR 23/006/1997.  (http://www.refworld.org/docid/45b899242.html).  
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That same year (1996) the Colombian government temporarily resettled a group 
of IDPs displaced from Hacienda Bellacruz in the Department of Cundinamarca, in 
central Colombia.  Their resettlement, however, was plagued by difficulties mostly 
because the Governor of Cundinamarca and various municipal authorities opposed the 
influx of IDPs, whom they viewed as a threat to public order and suspected of being 
guerilla sympathizers.  Following a tutela initiated by this group of IDPs the 
Constitutional Court issued a ruling that determined that the IDPs from Hacienda 
Bellacruz had indeed been victims of discrimination by the governor of Cundinamarca 
and 100 mayors who had denied them transitory resettlement and the ability to buy 
property.  The court ordered the municipal authorities to respect the IDP communities’ 
rights to liberty, free transit and human dignity, and forced the governor and mayors to 
complete formal human rights sensitization classes.132  The Court’s sentence T-227 was 
also notable in that it quoted Francis Deng, who during his first visit to Colombia had 
warned that: “refusal to receive IDPs would have grave human rights consequences” (T-
227/1997). 
This victory prompted a large number of individual tutela cases invoking specific 
fundamental rights (i.e. right to non-discrimination, life, access to health and education 
services, and so forth).  By 2004 Colombia’s Constitutional Court had received tutelas 
issued by over one thousand IDP families and had delivered 17 separate decisions 
protecting IDPs (Arango Rivadeneira, 2009; Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 
2010).  The liberal use of this mechanism by the displaced provoked a high regional 
government official to complain that IDPs had essentially become “tutela mercenaries” 
(Celis, 2009). 
                                                
132 See: Republica de Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-227/97; El Tiempo, “Aprendiendo 
Derechos Humanos, Fotonoticia” 06/07/97; Rodríguez Garavito (2010). 
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The Court, in various subsequent rulings, increasingly began to issue more 
general pronouncements noting the government’s failure to implement existing laws and 
sometimes making reference to the newly created UN Guiding Principles.  In August of 
2000, the Court issued a decision in which, aside from ordering a number of specific 
protective measures in favor of the claimants, highlighted a number of grave deficiencies 
in the implementation of Law 387 of 1997.133  The court called on the executive branch 
to comply with its obligations towards IDPs and on the Public Defender’s Office to 
exercise effective oversight on the matter.  It also explicitly urged the government to 
make specific use of the UN Guiding Principles when interpreting existing legislation on 
internal displacement (SU-1150/2000).  In March 2001 (Decision T-327/2001), the Court 
again urged government functionaries to be cognizant of the Guiding Principles.  In 
2003, while issuing protective measures in favor of an elderly displaced woman the court 
urged the state: “to promote affirmative action and to offer differential assistance to 
particularly vulnerable populations,” in accordance with international standards.134  
Finally, in 2004, after reviewing hundreds of tutela petitions made by IDPs during the 
previous year the court issued perhaps its most comprehensive and ambitious ruling. 
 
DECISION T-025 OF 2004 
With Decision T-025/2004 the Colombian Constitutional Court formally declared 
that the fundamental rights of the country’s IDPs were being disregarded in such a 
massive, protracted and repeated manner that an “unconstitutional state of affairs” had 
arisen. The court concluded that this had been the result of fundamental and systemic 
                                                
133 These included a lack of coordination between the various state entities and deficient development of 
state policies in compliance with Law 387 of 1997. See Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco (2010). 
134 Constitutional Court Decision T-602/2003 quoted in Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco (2010).   
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failures by the state.  The responsibility for this situation did not rest only on the actions 
and omissions by a number of individual state agencies and functionaries, but more 
importantly, was a natural consequence of severe structural deficiencies affecting the 
entirety of the country’s internal displacement policy. The court concluded that the two 
principal factors accounting for the state’s incapacity to adequately respond to the needs 
of the displaced were: (1) the precariousness of the institutional capacity to implement 
the policy, and (2) the insufficient allocation of funds. 135 
The court went into great detail in explaining how the policy’s institutional 
capacity had been flawed with regards to its design, its implementation and the absence 
of any follow-up or evaluation mechanisms.136  The court also established that the 
resources appropriated for the policy’s implementation were grossly inadequate to meet 
the state’s obligations according to the existing legislation – even in light of the state’s 
critical fiscal situation at the time.  The court concluded that, as a result of these 
deficiencies, the state had failed to protect Colombia’s IDPs’ fundamental rights.  These 
fundamental rights included the right to personal integrity, equality, petition, work, 
health, social security, education, minimum subsistence income, housing, land protection, 
return and re-settlement, and the right to a dignified life.  The Court pronounced that 
these rights were being continuously violated on account of “an unconstitutional state of 
affairs.”  
                                                
135 Constitutional Court Decision T-025/2004, Section 6; Also see Cepeda Espinosa (2009). 
136 More specifically, the Court concluded that the institutional capacity was hampered by: (1) Its design 
and codification (i.e. the absence of a comprehensive national plan of action, lack of specific goals, a vague 
distribution of functions and responsibilities among different state entities, notorious absence of 
mechanisms for IDP participation, and excessive rigidity of a system designed to provide humanitarian 
aid); (2) Its implementation, (i.e. lack of concrete actions; deficient or inflexible response to the problem at 
hand; the generation of unintended negative impacts by some of the tools utilized); and (3) Its follow-up 
and evaluation mechanisms (i.e. serious problems with the state’s existing information systems and total 
lack of evaluation mechanisms. 
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By several measures T-025 was a true “macro sentence.”  Although the 
Colombian Constitutional Court had previously declared the existence of an 
“unconstitutional state of affairs” on a number of different occasions in unrelated matters, 
the Court had never gone to such lengths to challenge and redefine an issue of public 
policy.  According to Rodríguez and Rodríguez (2010) T-025 was unprecedented because 
of: (1) the large size of the population affected by the decision; (2) the gravity of the 
human rights violations it proposed to address; (3) the large number of state and social 
actors involved; and (4) the sheer ambition and duration of the process of court 
supervised implementation which lasted over a decade.   
Setting the sentence aside, the process that followed the T-025 and the court’s 
efforts to monitor the resolution of the “unconstitutional state of affairs” was arguably, to 
date, the most explicit and systematic attempt ever made to ensure the implementation of 
a court sentence in Latin America (Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 2010).  
As a result of T-025, Colombia’s Constitutional Court was able to effectively 
maintain jurisdiction over Colombia’s policy on internal displacement for almost a 
decade.  In many ways, it came to dictate such policy.  The court succeeded in 
demonstrating exactly how powerful and active it really could be.  Between 2004 and 
2010 the court issued 84 follow-up awards (“autos”), and conducted 14 public hearings to 
evaluate the government’s response and dictate new orders for the protection of IDPs.   
Various state entities were required to submit periodic reports to the Court describing the 
manner in which the Court’s orders were being fulfilled.  At the beginning, the Court’s 
autos focused on protecting the fundamental rights of minorities and the most vulnerable 
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populations (i.e. women, children, persons with disabilities) but eventually the Court’s 
orders began to address more general aspects of the government’s policy.137 
Although Uribe’s administration did not directly question the authority of the 
Court or the legitimacy of its pronouncements, according to several Court attorneys, the 
administration went to great lengths to sabotage the Court’s efforts and to give the 
impression that it was complying with their orders when in fact it was doing very little.138  
At one point, for example, the administration attempted to overwhelm the poorly staffed 
Court by flooding it with tens of thousands of pages of documents in response to follow-
up requests.   The court eventually put an end to this practice by commanding that the 
government provide them with a joint report with strict a page limit.139  
In a daring and innovative move the Court enlisted the help of civil society to 
assist them in monitoring the state’s compliance with its orders and in formulating new 
remedies by creating a civil-society Follow-up Commission for Public Policies on 
Internal Displacement (hereafter “the Follow-up Commission”).  This non-partisan 
Follow-up Commission was composed by academics, IDP leaders, representatives of 
human rights organizations, and the Catholic Church, and was headed by a respected 
Colombian economist, Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca.  Eventually, with the help of 
international funding (from, among others: the IOM, USAID and the governments of the 
Netherlands, Norway and Canada) the Commission began to operate both as a major 
independent think-tank that gathered and published the most up-to-date reports on the 
                                                
137 Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. 
138 Ibid. Interview with Clara Elena Reales (former attorney in Colombia’s Constitutional Court). July 10, 
2013.  Bogotá. 
139 Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. 
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displacement crisis, and as the principal focal point for IDP advocacy.  The commission 
made it increasingly difficult for the government to dismiss the Court’s orders.  It became 
the country’s leading authority on the issue of displacement, thereby assuring that the 
court maintained the upper hand in shaping Colombia’s public policy on this issue.  By 
2009, the Court had effectively reformulated the country’s IDP policy with regards to 
income-generation, housing and victims rights and assured that the Follow-up 
Commission was included in subsequent policy decisions.  
It is difficult to say with much certainty whether the Court’s involvement with the 
issue of displacement that resulted from T-025 had any tangible effect on Colombia’s 
displacement crisis and on the lives of its millions of IDPs.  During the Uribe 
administration, Colombia’s internal conflict intensified and the size of the displaced 
population grew at an alarming rate.  Although, by most accounts, the overall situation of 
IDPs did not improve significantly as a direct result of Court’s actions, T-025 and 
subsequent decisions did have profound symbolic effects. 140  Among other things, T-025 
raised the issue of displacement in the public agenda.  It mobilized civil society and 
public opinion in an unprecedented way in favor of the rights of IDPs.  Finally, T-025 
spurred state institutions to attend to the displaced.  The Court’s involvement assured that 
IDPs were included in the deliberations of governing bodies (particularly the CNAIPD) 
and the court through public hearings.  It encouraged better coordination between the 
different state agencies charged with protecting and assisting IDPs.  The Court also 
mobilized the various state oversight authorities such as the Offices of the Controller, the 
Public Prosecutor, and the Ombudsman and ensured that internal displacement figured in 
                                                
140 See in particular Chapter # 8 in Garavito (2010). 
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their agendas. But perhaps most significantly, it mobilized and empowered civil society 
in a very effective way by creating the Follow-up Commission.    
The Court managed to elevate the issue of internal displacement on the national 
agenda and to maintain its visibility in a way that direct international pressure and activist 
mobilization had failed to do.  This was a significant achievement given that Colombia’s 
public agenda is crowded and that issues pertaining to the most marginal sectors of the 
population tend to be forgotten over time, as recognized by the presiding Judge (Cepeda 
Espinosa, 2009).  By establishing effective accountability mechanisms, the Court also 
tipped the balance of power between the claimants and the state.  Legal observers also 
credit T-025 with having had a sort of “de-blocking” effect on state institutions charged 
with assisting IDPs.  It incentivized the development of basic institutional capacities, 
such as information gathering, resource appropriation, and the opening of communication 
channels between the central state and the departmental and local authorities (Rodríguez 
Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 2010).   
 
INCORPORATION OF THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES INTO T-025 
One of the most significant achievements of T-025 is that it explicitly 
incorporated the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, making its provisions 
legally binding and carrying the same authority as the Colombian Constitution.  The 
Court was able to do this largely because the Colombian Constitution that came into 
effect in 1991 contained several articles that establish a strong relationship between 
international law – particularly international human rights law – and the system of 
domestic law.  Article 93 states that international treaties that have been duly ratified by 
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Colombia and prohibit their limitation during state of emergency, prevail in the domestic 
legal system.141  
Since their creation in 1998, the Guiding Principles, colloquially known in 
Colombia as “Los Principios Deng” after their principal author, had been gaining traction 
within advocacy and government circles.  They were first introduced to the country by 
the RSG, Francis Deng, during his second visit in 1999 when he used them as the focus 
point of his dialogues with government and civil society leaders.  The visit culminated 
with Deng’s participation in a workshop on the “Application of the applicability of the 
Guiding Principles in Colombia” which was organized by the Brookings’ Project on 
Internal Displacement, the US Committee for Refugees and the Colombian NGO 
consortium Grupo de Apoyo a Desplazados (GAD).   Although the RSG’s visit and 
subsequent report in other ways had failed to provoke an immediate governmental 
response, they did manage to galvanize domestic advocacy organizations to focus their 
attention around the application of the Guiding Principles in Colombia.142  Following 
Deng’s visit, NGOs such as GAD and DIAL (Diálogo Inter-Agencial en Colombia), a 
consortium of international humanitarian agencies working in Colombia, began to frame 
the displacement crisis in Colombia in terms of the GP’s standards.  Various agencies 
within the Colombian government also began to incorporate the GP in their discussions 
about the crisis.  The Ombudsman Office, for example, included the Principles in its 
public awareness campaign about internal displacement and the Social Solidarity 
                                                
141  Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991, Quoted in Guzmán Duque (2009). 
142 Following the RSG’s GAD began disseminating a Spanish language “Guide for the Application of the 
Guiding Principles” published by Brookings (Guia Pra la Applicación del los Principios Rectores de los 
Desplazamientos Internos) and DIAL published a first report on the Guiding Principles and Displacement 
in Colombia (DIAL, 1999).  In 2002 the Menonite humanitarian organization MENCOLDES and the 
Commission of Colombian Jurists published a follow-up report to Deng’s recommendations in which it 
noted serious failures, particularly of the Uribe administration, to comply with the both the Guiding 
Principles and the RSG’s specific recommendations (Fundación Mencoldes & CCJ, 2002).  
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Network (RSS), the government agency charged by the Pastrana administration with 
assisting IDPs, included the Principles in its field book titled Attention to the Population 
Displaced by Armed Conflict.  At a meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC), which comprises the heads of the major UN agencies, Colombia’s Ambassador 
to the UN, Alfonso Valdivieso, recognized that the Colombian government had “found 
these principles to be a useful guide” for their work on displacement.143  
While the Guiding Principles themselves did not constitute treaty law, the 
Constitutional Court was able to incorporate them into various decisions.  They 
accomplished this by arguing that the GP were largely a compilation of existing legal 
provisions pertaining to IDP’s basic rights, which were found in a number of 
international treaties and conventions that Colombia had already ratified.  In other words, 
they argued that the Guiding Principles were basically a restatement of pre-existing 
international obligations that had binding force within the Colombian legal system 
because of their nature as conventional and customary international law.  As such, the 
court was able to argue that the Guiding Principles formed part of the  “constitutionality 
block” – a French inspired legal concept – which allows for all provisions included in 
human rights treaties to which Colombia is a party (as well as human rights provisions of 
customary international law) to become mandatory parameters for constitutional review 
in Colombia.  According to Guzman (2009), even though most of the obligations codified 
in the GP were, in and of themselves, already binding within the Colombian legal system, 
their incorporation in decision T-025 granted them additional legal strength, reinforcing 
their significance for the interpretation of the scope of IDP’s rights.   
                                                
143 Statement by Francis Deng presented at the International Seminar on the Evaluation of the Pastrana 
Government’s Policy on Human Rights, Sept 7, 2000. See: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2000/09/07humanrights-deng 
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On previous occasions the court had made reference to certain provisions within 
the GP in a number of specific cases.  However, these judgments had not explicitly 
incorporated the GP as a whole into the national system of IDP rights.144  For emphasis, 
the publication of T-025 included the entire body of the GP as an Annex to the court 
decision.  At a conference in Oslo in November 2008 Judge Cepeda explained the 
usefulness of the Guiding Principles to the Court’s efforts:   
 
“…the international dimensions of Colombia’s humanitarian crisis, and the 
additional legitimacy given by the Guiding Principles to the orders issued by the 
Court, as well as other domestic factors, have been pivotal for generating acceptance 
of our decisions.”  
 
He also added that: 
 
…during the follow up process, the Guiding Principles were a source of 
legitimacy for increased judicial intervention regarding the protection of IDPs.  This 
had been a crucial function of the Guiding Principles that gave sustainability to 
innovative judicial interventions.  It also gave solid basis for the oversight of 
independent governmental agencies when they criticized the government for not 
meeting international benchmarks as applied by the Court.”145  
 
Over the following years, the Guiding Principles were not only to become the 
Court’s key interpretative criteria for establishing the scope of IDP’s rights, but were also 
used as guidelines in determining the scope of State authorities’ duties and obligations 
                                                
144 See in particular SU -1150/ 2000 and T-327/2001 in which the court examined the situation of IDPs 
who had been denied inclusion in the official registration system because of lack of proper documentation 
and urged the State to incorporate the GP in their dealings with IDPs and prompted State authorities to train 
public officials charged with registering IDPs about the content of the GP.  The court again made several 
references to the GP in decision T-098 in 2002 regarding the provision of special assistance to minority 
ethnic groups. 
145 Manuel José Cepeda-Espinosa, Constitutional Court of Colombia, “The Judicial Protection of IDPs in 
Colombia: The Importance of the Guiding Principles,” statement presented at the conference “Ten Years of 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” Oslo, Norway, 16 October 2008. 
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towards IDPs.146  As such the court used the GP to develop a set of concrete indicators to 
measure the “effective enjoyment of IDP’s fundamental rights” to be used by the Follow-
up Commission to monitor the states’ response to T-025 and subsequent orders. The GP 
were subsequently adopted by Colombia’s controlling agencies (notably the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the Ombudsman) as criteria with which to evaluate 
the State’s response to IDPs (Guzmán Duque, 2009).  
The explicit incorporation of the UN Guiding Principles into Colombia’s 
“Constitutionality Block” provided a tremendous boost to the international regime to 
protect IDPs.  It was a major step in the transformation of these soft laws into biding 
customary international law.  Aware of this, Brookings’ Project on Internal 
Displacement, for example, publicized T-025 and the Colombian court’s intervention as a 
model of judicial protection for IDPs. Brookings translated into English and published 
the full text of T-025 and subsequent rulings.  The author of the decision, Judge José 
Manuel Cepeda Espinosa, became a sort of champion in international humanitarian 
circles and was invited to speak in Washington and Oslo.  
Why and how was Colombia’s Constitutional Court able to act so audaciously in 
2004 in challenging a very popular administration?  Why did its pronouncements carry so 
much weight?  How was it able to effectively gain jurisdiction over a significant portion 
of the government’s budget and policy agenda?  After all, the Constitutional Court was a 
relatively new institution in Colombia (having only been in existence for a little over a 
decade) with very limited recourses and few real powers.   
Certainly the 1991 Constitution endowed Colombia with a number of unique 
institutions, which arguable made the country more receptive to international norms – 
                                                
146 Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. 
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and human rights norms in particular.   Among other things, The 1991 Constitution 
created a robust (at least on paper) Constitutional Court; an ombudsman to serve as a UN 
recognized national human rights institution (NHRI); and instituted the tutela petition 
procedure.  The new constitution also reaffirmed the country’s commitment to 
international law by enshrining the principle, in Article 93, that international treaties and 
the pronouncements of international human rights bodies made part of the “constitutional 
block.”  Arguably, Colombia’s domestic institutional make-up placed its judiciary in a 
unique position to push through a human rights agenda and hold the government 
accountable for violations, which to some extent it did since its inception in 1992.  
Nevertheless, it took many years for the Constitutional Court to fully assume these 
powers and to act as forcefully as it did when addressing displacement in the mid-2000s.  
This is not surprising because, as a former Court judge admitted, in practice the 
Constitutional Court had very few tools at its disposal.  The Court derived most of its 
power from its institutional legitimacy and from the tools it could harness 
internationally.147   
While the chain of events that led to the court’s involvement with the issue of 
displacement are largely domestic, the court’s intervention can only be fully understood 
within the context of the “internationalization” of the Colombian conflict during the first 
decade of the 21st Century.  The international attention generated by the conflict’s 
intensification, its humanitarian spillover across borders, and the increased involvement 
of the US through Plan Colombia had important effects on the Court.  These 
developments empowered the Court to infringe upon territory of the other branches of 
government.  The Court essentially dictated public policy.  It increased the resonance of 
                                                
147 Interview with Clara Elena Reales (former attorney in Colombia’s Constitutional Court). July 10, 2013. 
Bogotá. 
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international norms in Colombia and forced the Uribe administration, largely hostile to 
human rights claims, to take the court’s decisions much more seriously. 
 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS 
By the early 2000s Colombia’s conflict began to truly attain international 
dimensions.   This occurred on several fronts.  Following the breakdown of peace 
negotiations between the Pastrana administration (1998-2002) and the FARC, the conflict 
intensified and began to spill over across Colombia’s borders.  A CODHES study 
published in 2000, for example, estimated that approximately 12,000 Colombians had 
crossed the border into Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela to escape violence in 1999 
(CODHES, 2000).  Cross-border incursions by guerillas and Colombian security forces 
also become more frequent as guerillas searched for safehavens in neighboring countries 
and the army pursued them across borders.  Regional actors also began to frame 
Colombia’s conflict as a threat to regional stability and its humanitarian crisis as a grave 
matter of regional concern.  Not surprisingly, the conflict generated increased regional 
attention and subjected Colombia to the intense scrutiny of an Inter-American Human 
Rights System, which became a key ally of the Court.  
With the infusion of economic and military aid through Plan Colombia the crisis 
in Colombia also became a subject of international debate and of intense lobbying efforts 
within foreign governments and inter-governmental intuitions.  The Colombian 
government’s human rights record came under unprecedented international scrutiny, 
particularly in Washington, where the US Congress had to approve the Plan Colombia aid 
package and had begun debating a free trade agreement with Colombia (FTA).  
Opportunities to link human rights issues to foreign assistance and trade galvanized 
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INGOs around the issue of Colombia and spurred a strengthening of the ties between 
Colombian activists and trans-national human rights networks (including friendly 
governments ready to fund their efforts).  
 
International Pressure: Plan Colombia  
Originally conceived as a sort of “Marshall Plan” for Colombia, Plan Colombia 
was proposed by President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a broad aid package with the 
objective of ending the internal armed conflict in Colombia and devising an effective 
anti-narcotics strategy.  The initial plan called for a budget of US$7.5 billion, with most 
of the aid dedicated to institutional and social development and economic revitalization.  
After negotiations with the Clinton Administration the plan morphed into one that heavily 
emphasized the counter-narcotics component.  In 2000, the US Congress authorized a 
$1.2 billion aid package.  The US Congress further extended aid to Colombia to more 
than $5.4 billion in yearly appropriations and committed hundreds of military and civilian 
personnel to train local forces and assist in Colombia’s campaign to eradicate the 
narcotics trade.  At the time, these appropriations made Colombia the third largest 
recipient of foreign aid from the United States, stimulating significant debates in 
Colombia, the US and the region, particularly in bordering countries (Ecuador, Peru and 
Brazil) and in Europe over US intervention in the hemisphere (Osorio Péres, 2001).  
Colombia also sought additional support from the European Union and other countries to 
finance the social component of the plan but this amounted to very little. 
Although Plan Colombia offered a wide number of programs aimed at 
strengthening democracy and governance, most of the aid was designed for drug field 
fumigation efforts and military assistance (Tate, 2009).  Plan Colombia signaled a 
  189 
significant shift in US policy towards Colombia because of its significant size and also 
because it made the Colombian army, rather than the national police, the US’ primary 
operational partner (Crandall, 2002).  As Pastrana abandoned efforts to negotiate a peace 
treaty with the FARC, US funds were increasingly diverted to finance an all-out assault 
on the insurgents.  Not surprisingly, this in turn generated enormous international 
attention to Colombia. 
 
The Shadow of the Civil Wars in Central America 
Fearing a reenactment of American intervention in the civil wars in Central 
America, which resulted in egregious human rights abuses, the international human rights 
community began to mobilize against Plan Colombia.   In fact, the debacle in Central 
America became the lens through which many international observers sought to 
understand the conflict in Colombia and the increased US involvement.  Although there 
were key differences between the Colombian conflict and the wars in Central America 
and the Colombian international solidarity movement never reached the same dimensions 
as the Central American campaigns, the tragedy of the 1980s provided a powerful 
imagery with which to frame the humanitarian situation in Colombia. 
During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration funneled billions of dollars to the 
Salvadorian military and the Nicaraguan Contra-Sandinista forces, despite their appalling 
record of human rights abuses.  This period resulted in the mobilization of thousands of 
Americans around college campuses and in Washington and launched a successful 
campaign in Congress to extricate the US military from Central America.   
According to Tate (2009), the majority of Americans approached the issue of 
human rights in Colombia with the Central American peace movement as their primary 
reference point.  This was not surprising since many of the Latin American human rights 
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lobbying organizations emerged out of the Central American experience.  In many ways, 
the battles over US involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua shaped their identities and 
their repertoire of activist practices.  The Latin American Working Group (LAWG), a 
coalition of faith-based humanitarian and solidarity organizations that led the Colombian 
human rights campaign in Washington, was originally founded in 1983 as the Central 
American Working Group, and until the early 1990s had focused exclusively on 
mobilizing civil activism in opposition to US security policy in Central America.  
At first glance, the debates over US policy in Colombia shared many similarities 
with its policy towards El Salvador in the 1980s.  In both cases the US was strengthening 
an abusive military with a well-publicized history of collusion with paramilitary forces 
and taking sides against a long running Marxist insurgency.  However, as pointed out by 
Tate (2009), there existed a number of key differences with Colombia which made 
mobilizing public support much more difficult.  Public concern with the Latin American 
region and with issues of human rights diminished significantly after the end of the Cold 
War and particularly after 9/11.   The conflict in Colombia was also made infinitely more 
complex because of the anti-narcotics component.  In Congress it was almost impossible 
to criticize US counter-narcotics policy.  Some even described it as a bi-partisan “third 
rail” issue on which no American legislator wanted the appearance of being “soft on 
drugs.”148  Americans also harbored very little sympathy for the FARC – an organization 
involved in drug trafficking, with a terrible human rights record, which had taken 
Americans hostage.  Colombia also had very little historical connection with the US.  
There were very few Colombian refugees living in the US, which meant that 
                                                
148 See Bertram et al. 1996; Boyum and Reuter 2005; Massing 1998 (all quoted by in Tate 2009).  Tate quotes 
Congressman Jim McGovern (D-MA), one of Plan Colombia’s most important critics, recalling the Republican’s 
attitude with regards to this issue: “[Speaker of the House Dennis] Haster’s attitude on the war on drugs was:  ‘give me 
what I want or you are going to face a 30 second campaign ad in your district saying that you are soft on drugs, that you 
don’t want to stop drugs that are coming from Colombia into your district.” 
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Washington-based NGOs were never quite able to replicate the same deep ties they 
enjoyed with Central American groups. 
While most human rights advocates opposed any sort of American involvement in 
Colombia, others activists who recognized that mobilizing public opinion around the case 
of Colombia was going to be more difficult, took a more pragmatic approach.  
Organizations such as Human Rights Watch saw the plan as an opportunity to strengthen 
the rule of law in Colombia, to force the Colombian military to sever links with the 
paramilitaries and to maintain pressure on Colombia by placing stringent human rights 
conditions on the aid package. In their view, working within the framework of the aid 
package was ultimately the best way they could engage in efforts to control the damage 
of an inevitable intensification of the armed conflict.  In a public hearing before the 
House of Representatives’ Western Hemispheric Affairs Committee in 2000 José Miguel 
Vivanco, Director of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch, asserted that his 
organization “Remain[ed] convinced that the most important way that the United States 
[could] contribute to improving human rights protections in Colombia [was] to enforce 
strict conditions on all military aid….” Among other things, these conditions were meant 
to fight impunity by forcing Colombia’s leaders to try cases involving alleged human 
rights abuses by members of the armed forces in civilian rather than in military courts 
and requiring Colombia to combat illegal paramilitary groups—“a goal that would 
greatly fortify democracy.”149  
Concerns with Plan Colombia were amplified when it became clear that 
Pastrana’s successor, Alvaro Uribe, intended to utilize the military aid primarily to 
combat the guerillas, which he accused of participating in narcotics trafficking.  In 2002 
                                                
149 José Miguel Vivanco, Congressional Testimony, September 21, 2000. Serial No. 106-188) 
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the US Congress loosened the restrictions on the aid package “[r]ecognizing that 
terrorism and the illicit narcotics trade in Colombia [were] inextricably linked…” so as to 
allow Uribe to finance a robust anti-insurgency campaign.150 Another major concern of 
human rights groups was that the Plan’s anti-narcotic efforts would directly result in the 
displacement of thousands of Colombian farmers through the aggressive spraying of 
defoliants to destroy illicit crops.  The framers of the plan originally estimated that 
approximately 30,000 would be displaced as a direct result of fumigation.  Human rights 
observers have argued that the actual number is much higher.151 
Organizations such as the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the 
Latin American Working Group (LAWG) took their fight to US Congress and State 
Department and in doing so become key allies of Colombia’s Constitutional Court.  
These progressive human rights INGOs functioned in a loose coalition known as the 
Colombia Steering Committee (CSC).  Founded in 1998 and chaired by the LAWG and 
the US Office on Colombia, the CSC included more than 30 organizations.152  For several 
years the CSC organized teach-ins on college campuses, letter writing campaigns to US 
                                                
150 See US Embassy in Bogotá, Plan Colombia, (http://bogota.usembassy.gov/plancolombia.html) 
151 Interview with Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli (WOLA; formerly at Brookings’ IDP Project).  March 28, 
2013. 
152 The member organizations of the Colombia Steering Committee include: the American Friends Service 
Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, Catholic Relief Services, the Center for Justice and 
International law (CEJIL), the Center for International Policy, Church World Service, the Due Process of 
Law Foundation, the Federation of American Scientists, the Franciscan Washington Office on Latin 
America, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Global Exchange, Institute for Policy Studies, 
International Labor Rights Fund, Jesuit Refugee Services, Latin America Working Group, Lutheran 
Immigration and Refugee Services, Lutheran Office for Government Affairs, Lutheran World Relief, 
Maryknoll Office on Global Concerns, Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Brigades International - 
Colombia Project, RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights, U.S. Committee for Refugees, U.S./Labor 
Education in the Americas Project, Washington Office on Latin America, Witness for Peace, World Vision, 
Amnesty International, Colombia Human Rights Committee/Network DC, Presbyterian Church USA 
Washington Office National Ministries Division, and Christian Aid. (List found at the U.S. Office on 
Colombia website, http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/USOC%20Partners/, accessed April 18, 2008) 
Quoted in (Tate, 2009). 
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legislators, witnessing trips to Colombia, brought Colombian activists to speak in the US, 
and directly lobbied US legislators on Capitol Hill.  
Lobbying efforts in the US eventually succeeded in convincing a small group of 
US legislators to take on their cause.  Among these the most prominent were Sen. Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT); Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT); Rep Sam Farr (D-CA), and Rep. Jim 
McGovern (D-MA). Within the US House of Representatives both Farr and McGovern 
became big champions of Colombia’s human rights movement.  While Farr had served as 
a Peace Corps Volunteer in Colombia during in the 1960s and had a “soft spot” for the 
country, McGovern had experienced firsthand the fiasco in Central America.  As a 
congressional aid in the 1980s McGovern had traveled to El Salvador to investigate the 
impact of US military assistance and worked on the congressional commission that 
investigated the murder of four Jesuit priests and a few other people by an elite squad of 
US trained soldiers in 1989 (Tate, 2009). 
In June 2005 Rep McGovern pushed an amendment to cut $100 million from Plan 
Colombia on the basis that the military aid package was imbalanced and had disastrous 
human rights consequences.  Although the amendment co-sponsored by Representatives 
Betty McCollum (D-MN) and Dennis Moore (D-KS) was eventually defeated, the 
Senate’s subsequent appropriation bill shifted $25 million from anti-narcotic aid to the 
development and human rights protection component of the package.153  When the 
Democrats regained control of Congress in 2008, the development and human rights 
promotion elements of Plan Colombia grew significantly.  
Over time, Colombian human rights lobbying efforts succeeded in beefing up the 
civilian component of the aid package.  Eventually, it included a number of human rights 
                                                
153 See: Latin American Working Group.  “House Votes Down Military Aid Cut to Colombia” 
(http://www.lawg.org/component/content/article/76/212). 
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provisions.  Among these was the Leahy Provision, which specified that the US Congress 
could withhold between 25% and 30% of the aid funds, pending a yearly human rights 
certification process by the US Department of State.154  Although aid was never withheld, 
it was delayed on a couple of occasions. These conditions evolved during the years to 
include issues of accountability (to investigate and prosecute human rights violations), 
the de-linking of the armed forces from the paramilitaries, and the respect for the rights 
and territory of indigenous peoples.  Also written into the law was the requirement that 
the Department of State meet several times (at least twice) a year with human rights 
organizations on these issues.  These meetings, which were usually attended by the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs, gave Colombian and 
international NGOs an opportunity to raise their concerns about the internal displacement 
crisis with the US government and call attention to Colombia’s Constitutional Court’s 
intervention in the matter.  
Military assistance to Colombia also resulted in and became subject to the Leahy 
Law.  This amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which is different from 
the later Leahy Provision to Plan Colombia, passed in 1996 as a result of growing 
congressional preoccupations with counter-narcotics assistance.  The Leahy Law was 
spurred by an investigative press report that showed that a number of Colombian military 
units responsible for well-documented human rights abuses had in the past received US 
assistance.155  Even though, as argued by a number of human rights activists, the law’s 
                                                
154 This should not be confused with the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which 
obligates the US State Department to withhold military assistance from any individual, or unit accused of 
human rights violations and proscribes an elaborate vetting process before aid is disbursed. 
155 The bill was originally intended to apply to counter-narcotics assistance for a year but was later 
expanded to cover all State Department funded assistance to all countries.  See Public Law 104-208, 104th 
Congress (http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/pl104_208.pdf).  According to 
Tate (2009) Amnesty International worked together with Leahy’s staff to draft the original law. 
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provisions were interpreted and applied rather restrictively and that there were a number 
of loopholes, the Leahy Amendment arguably made a difference in Colombia.  Primarily 
it sent a very important message to Colombian and US policy-makers that “human rights 
were important to US Congress,” (Tate, 2009) and provided human rights groups with 
some real leverage with which to pressure both governments. 
When Plan Colombia was approved in 2000, the legislation included a number of 
additional human rights conditions.  Many of these focused principally on severing the 
links between the military and the paramilitary groups.  Some measures required, for 
example, the State Department to certify that Colombian soldiers accused of human 
rights violations were tried in civilian courts and suspended from duty pending the 
investigation, and that the security forces were cooperating with the Colombian judiciary.   
During the first year of the plan’s implementation, the Clinton Administration 
waived the conditions on national security grounds. George W. Bush subsequently 
certified Colombia over the objections of human rights groups.  Despite the failure of the 
conditions to impact the disbursement of aid activists have argued that it achieved several 
key goals.  It kept the debate over issues of human rights in Colombia active.  It added 
legitimacy and visibility to claims made by Colombian human rights organizations.  
Finally, it incentivized the Colombian government to take action on specific cases to 
justify the annual certification (Tate, 2009).  
While it is not entirely clear that human rights lobbying efforts in the US had a 
direct and significant impact on Colombia’s human rights record, it arguably emboldened 
human rights activists in Colombia and arguably provided Colombia’s Constitutional 
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Court and the Inter-American Human Rights Court with more leverage over Colombia’s 
security policy than they otherwise would have had.156  
According to a number of activists and observers interviewed, the Colombian 
government was also very responsive to the increasing international scrutiny into its 
human rights record.  The Colombian government, in fact, was significantly more 
sensitive to international criticism than the governments of Central America, or for that 
matter most countries in Latin America, ever were.  The government of Colombia would 
often mount elaborate responses to allegations of human rights abuses and go to great 
lengths to project at least the appearance of compliance.157   
Country observers and human rights experts have offered a number of 
explanations for why Colombia is so sensitive to international criticism and protective of 
its international image.  Some point to the fact that Colombia has a strong democratic 
tradition.  Despite cycles of great violence, Colombia is one of the oldest, continuous 
democracies in the hemisphere.  Unlike most countries in the region, Colombia has 
succeeded in holding regular elections and has been ruled by civilians, except for a very 
brief period (1953-1957) following La Violencia.  This image, in a way, is deeply 
ingrained in the national psyche and Colombians go to great lengths to set themselves 
apart from other fragile states.  Some observers also point to Colombia’s intense legalistic 
tradition, which has often proven to be an encumbrance to the country’s democracy, and 
                                                
156 Interview with Clara Elena Reales (former attorney in Colombia’s Constitutional Court).  July 10, 2013.  
Bogotá. 
157 Telephone interview with Jeff Drumtra ((Policy Advisor, US Department of State’s Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Policy and Resource Planning). March 8, 2012.  Interview 
with Olivia Franken (Colombia Desk Officer, US Department of State).  June 7, 2013. Washington, DC.  
Interview with Denise Gilman (former Staff Attorney at IACHR).  February 15, 2013. Austin, TX.  
Interview with Ariel Dulitzky (former Assistant Executive Secretary at IACHR). April 27, 2013.  Austin, 
TX.  Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. Interview with Lisa Haugaard 
(Executive Director of the Latin America Working Group on –LAWG).  June 5, 2013.  Washington, DC. 
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to the particularities of the 1991 Constitution, which raised the stature of Colombia’s 
international legal commitments and international law in general. 158  Finally, some point 
to Colombia’s development agenda, which is highly dependent on the prospects of 
greater economic integration with Europe and North America. 
Whereas no single explanation can account for this national trait, it is possible that 
a combination of these factors, over time, has made Colombia more sensitive than its 
neighbors to international criticism.  Although there is little agreement for why this is the 
case, or even whether Colombia’s response reflected genuine political will to improve 
human rights conditions, it is clear that the process of international contestation 
progressively subjected the Colombian government to a sort of rhetorical entrapment on 
the issue of human rights, which made it increasingly difficult to ignore the issue.   
As the moral language of human rights gradually crept into the Colombian 
governments’ official discourse in response to international appeals, the Constitutional 
Court and domestic activists were better able to hold the Colombian government to 
account.  Constructivists see this phenomenon of rhetorical entrapment as a positive and 
necessary step in the life-cycle of international norm diffusion.159  This dynamic took 
place not only through bilateral discussion with the US but also in international forums 
such as the UN Human Rights Commission, the Inter-American Human Commission, 
and the OAS General Assembly. 
                                                
158 See:  The Economist.   “Bello: Legalism vs. Democracy.” March 29, 2014. 
(http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599779-nobody-colombia-comes-out-well-petro-affair-
legalism-v-democracy) 
159 In the introduction to their edited volume (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999) Risse & Sikkink describe the 
process by which governments initially become involved in the moral discourse for instrumental reasons.  
According to Beth Simons, repressive governments tend to engage, rather than evade, human rights naming 
and shaming and become rhetorically entrapped because they miscalculate the effects of doing so or 
because they are offered material inducements, such as foreign aid, to make concessions. (See Beth A. 
Simmons, From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model, in Risse, Ropp & 
Sikkink 2013). 
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Activists also point to a number of concrete victories that resulted from 
international lobbying efforts.  These included the implementation of special protective 
measures for the displaced communities of Curbaradó and Jiguamiandó as ordered by the 
Inter-American Court and the abolition of military practices that lead to the “false-
positives” scandal.160 Organizations in Washington worked, for example, on a resolution 
calling for 2007 to be named the year of IDPs.   In 2010, they campaigned to pass a 
symbolic resolution (1224) in Congress to support Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
IDPs.161 Washington-based NGOs also hosted various delegations of Colombian NGOs 
and facilitated their meeting with US lawmakers.  In this sense, lobbying in Washington 
succeeded in maintaining an international spotlight on the human rights and displacement 
crisis in Colombia, which may have emboldened the Court.   Most significantly, 
however, at the request of Colombian activists (particularly Coordinación Colombia 
Europa Estados Unidos—CCEEU) lobbyists in Washington explicitly insisted on 
publicizing and pushing for the enforcement and follow-up of Constitutional Court 
orders. 
Plan Colombia may have also contributed to a climate that emboldened 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court by fortifying Colombia’s judiciary and human rights 
institutions.  Indeed, as an important counter-weight to the military component of the 
plan, the US developed a civilian component focused on promoting development and 
improving governability in Colombia.  Initially this type of aid was intended to address 
the humanitarian crisis and promote alternative development in coca growing regions.  
                                                
160 The scandal involved thousands of murders committed by members of the Colombian military who 
lured poor or mentally handicapped civilians to remote parts of the country with offers of work, killed 
them, and presented them to authorities as combatants killed in battle, in an effort to inflate body counts 
and receive promotions or other benefits.  (See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8038399.stm) 
161 Interview with Lisa Haugaard (Executive Director of the Latin America Working Group on –LAWG).  
June 5, 2013.  Washington, DC. 
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However, the package soon expanded to include measures to fortify civilian state 
institutions and consolidate the presence of the state in most of the national territory.  
Both of these were seen as key to winning the conflict. At first the US mission in Bogotá 
financed the work of international agencies such as the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the Pan-American Development Fund’s (PADF). Over time, 
however, Plan Colombia’s civilian component grew and deepened to the point where the 
US mission personnel became actively involved in drafting public policies and 
procedures.162   
Plan Colombia led to palpable improvements to Colombia’s governance 
institutions.  In order to combat the problem of impunity the US funded a complete 
overhaul of the country’s judicial system.  This included its transformation from a mixed 
justice system (with elements from both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems), in 
which the courts were involved in investigating the facts of the case, to an exclusively 
adversarial system where the role of the courts is principally that of impartial referees 
between the prosecution and the defense. From 2004 to 2008 Colombia’s Attorney 
General’s office received over $150 million US dollars, as well as technical support and 
assistance.163  Plan Colombia also contributed significantly to efforts of national 
consolidation.  Beginning in 2007 it helped to fund Uribe’s National Consolidation Plan 
(Plan Nacional de Consolidación, PNC), which sought to secure the presence of the state 
in areas pacified by the armed forces.  The objective of the PNC was to establish and 
                                                
162 USAID’s mission in Bogotá, which accounted for about five people prior to Plan Colombia, eventually 
grew to over 100, becoming the largest mission in Latin America after Haiti.  USAID viewed its experience 
in Colombia as such a success that it began using the legal framework as a model for improving 
governability in other countries.  Interview with Angela Suarez & Thea Villate (USAID - Colombia).  July 
9, 2013.  Bogotá. 
163 See: US Office on Colombia. Impunity in Colombia.  August 2012. 
(http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/images-pdfs/Impunity-in-Colombia-web-FINAL.pdf) 
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retain the presence of state institutions in poor rural areas that tended to fall back to 
guerilla control after the military had departed.  This strategy included efforts to improve 
access to social services, strengthen local governing institutions, and promote economic 
development.  While the Colombian and US governments consider the PNC to have been 
a success, some human rights activists have complained that it has led to the 
militarization of certain regions of the country, which in fact has discouraged IDPs from 
returning.  Even if this were true, by improving the capacity of local government 
institutions, US funding addressed one of the key obstacles to the implementation of Law 
387 and the subsequent Constitutional Court orders.  
The civilian component of Plan Colombia also facilitated the intervention of the 
Court in other ways.  For example, the US helped to finance the Ombudsman’s office 
(Defensoria del Pueblo) and funded a program to insert “community defenders” 
(“defenzores comunitarios”) in marginalized and remote communities in frontier regions 
to act as human rights defenders and observers.  Indirectly, Plan Colombia also led to an 
increase in funding and technical assistance from other countries (i.e. the EU, 
Switzerland and Japan) that sought to provide a counter-weight to US military spending 
by supporting Colombia’s human rights, humanitarian and academic institutions that 
were working with IDPs. 
It may be argued that an intensification of US-Colombia bilateral relations, which 
was initiated by Plan Colombia and the countries’ cooperation on the war on drugs, 
opened up international pressure channels that forced Colombia to pay much more 
attention to its human rights record and its displacement crisis than it otherwise would 
have.   
The Colombian-US alliance, in fact, strengthened during the first decade of the 
2000s.  One of the reasons was that the US became increasingly isolated in the region as 
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a wave of left-wing populist and quasi-authoritarian regimes swept the Latin America 
(beginning with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998; Evo Morales in 
Bolivia in 2006; and Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007) under the banner of opposing the 
Washington Consensus and countering American influence.164  
In 2006, the US and Colombia signed a free trade agreement (FTA), which 
entered into force in 2012.  Confirmation of the agreement, however, stalled in Congress 
for several years due to concerns of human rights abuses in Colombia.165   At the time, 
President Bush was quick to remind the US Congress of the strategic significance of the 
US-Colombian alliance.  In his January 28, 2008 State of the Union speech, President 
Bush urged Congress to approve the agreement that year warning them that failure to 
approve the FTA would “embolden the purveyors of false populism in our 
hemisphere.”166  
It is clear that the debates in the US surrounding Plan Colombia, the FTA and US’ 
friendly relations with Uribe were marred by the specter of America’s disastrous 
involvement in Central America during the 1980s.  Within the US Congress, the State 
Department, and the NGO community it became evident that Americans wanted to avoid 
the types of abuses that occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala and were willing to use 
the levers of Plan Colombia and the pending FTA to gently press the Colombian 
                                                
164  The Chávez’ revolution also inspired a number of new leaders in Latin America: Daniel Ortega 
(2007–) in Nicaragua; Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2006–2009) and even President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner in Argentina (2007–) to adopt a “soft-authoritarian” style of governance.  See  (Castañeda, 2006; 
Weyland, 2013). 
165 These regarded particularly the murder of a number of labor union leaders and alleged connections 
between US based multinational corporations, such as Dole, Chiquita, Coca-Cola, and Drummond Coal 
Company and paramilitary forces. 
166 See Daniel Griswold and Juan Carlos Hidalgo, A US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Strengthening 
Democracy and Progress in Latin America.  Free Trade Bulletin No. 32, CATO Institute (February 6, 
2008). (http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/uscolombia-free-trade-agreement-
strengthening-democracy-progress-latin-america#1a)  
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government into improving its human rights record.  In this effort, the US Mission in 
Bogotá installed a Human Rights Officer to serve as liaison between the US government 
and the Colombian government’s human rights entities and at times as an intermediary 
between the Colombian government and domestic human rights NGOs.167  
Although US-Colombian ties were never really strained over the issue of human 
rights or displacement, the US government did maintain sustained pressure on Colombia 
to demonstrate improvements on its record.  Because the US relied on information 
provided by trans-national activists, Colombia’s Constitutional Court, the Follow-up 
Commission and the various government human rights entities, the US raised the profile 
of these entities and indirectly provided them with greater leverage. 
As the US Congress began debating the FTA in 2007 and was tasked with 
certifying the country in accordance with the Leahy Provision of Plan Colombia, a 
number of INGOs and Colombian IDP groups began to gain significant visibility abroad 
and greater legitimacy in Colombia.  These groups successfully employed a “boomerang” 
strategy that used international leverage to push through its human rights agenda (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998).    Although there is some disagreement on whether US involvement, on 
final account, contributed to an improvement of human rights in Colombia, it is clear that 
it helped put the issue front and center of Colombia’s government’s agenda, and at the 
very least, forced Colombia to give the impression that it was taking its human rights 
record seriously. During the first decade of the 2000s, US involvement also contributed 
to a number of concrete achievements.  It may be argued that the Leahy Provision helped 
to accelerate the demobilization of Colombia’s paramilitaries.   
                                                
167 Interview with Adam Lenert (Human Rights Officer - US Embassy in Bogotá).  July 9, 2013.  Bogotá. 
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Bilateral relations with the US perhaps reached their apex in 2010 when the 
Obama Administration initiated a series of bilateral summits, which became known as the 
“High-Level Partnership Dialogues.”  This forum, first convened in Bogotá in October 
2010, brought together Colombia’s Foreign Minister, Maria Angela Holguin and U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. A second round of dialogues was held in Washington 
in May 2011 and a third one in Bogotá in July 2012.  This forum was publicized as a 
means to facilitate collaboration between the two countries on a broad range of issues 
(i.e. energy, technology, environmental protection, social opportunities, good 
governance, and human rights).  However, according to a number of US government 
officers interviewed, the real impetus for this initiative was to engage Colombia more 
closely on the issue of human rights.  To this effect, during the first round of dialogues 
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Colombian Vice President Angelino 
Grazón agreed to track on a monthly basis the progress of important human rights cases 
in Colombia.  
It is important to note that the “internationalization” of the Colombian conflict 
and the strengthening of US-Colombian bilateral relations took place at a time when the 
US government began to take the general issue of internal displacement much more 
seriously than ever before.  During the early 2000s US foreign policy began to focus on 
IDPs in a more systematic way.  The US started to take the issue seriously as a result of 
its experience confronting the challenges posed by internal displacement in the Balkans 
and Sudan.168  The RSG and the Brookings’ Project on Internal Displacement (PID) also 
                                                
168 By the end of 1996 there were an estimated 4 million Sudanese, mostly southerners, internally 
displaced as a result of two Sudanese civil wars (1955-1972 & 1983-2005), which claimed the lives of 
more than 1.5 million people (Ruiz, 1998).  It is estimated that an additional 2.5 million Sudanese were 
later displaced as a result of the ethnic cleansing campaign conducted in Darfur beginning in 2003. (See: 
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm) 
The wars that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) generated approximately one 
million IDPs (See Weiss & Pasic 1997).   
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lobbied the US Department of State to recognize the GP and articulate a formal policy on 
displacement.  These experiences lead the US to view the forced displacement of 
civilians within their own territory not only as a human rights and humanitarian problem 
but also as a political and security concern.169   
Although the US government came short of officially endorsing the UN Guiding 
Principles when these were first introduced, a number of US officials, most notably 
Richard Holbrooke, recognized their importance and contributed to the creation of an 
international regime to protect IDPs.170  During the early 2000s the US Department of 
State also began to institute official rules and procedures for IDPs and to fund 
international efforts to address internal displacement around the globe.171  In 2004, 
USAID adopted an official Policy Manual for the Assistance of IDPs.  This was the first 
of its kind for a major donor nation and was noteworthy in that it specifically referenced 
the UN Guiding Principles as “a useful framework for addressing displacement” 
(USAID, 2004).  
                                                
169 The US’ 2002 National Security Strategy makes specific reference to internal displacement in arguing 
that foreign assistance is a fundamental element of US national security: “There is a growing concern that 
the failure to respond adequately to the needs of failed states and large displaced populations can become 
a catalyst for regional instability and, in some circumstances, can produce disaffected individuals who 
become vulnerable to exploitation by international extremists.”  It further adds that: “In the interests of 
stability, as well as for humanitarian reasons, the United States has an interest in helping IDPs and other 
vulnerable populations integrate into the economic and social fabric of their communities.” (USAID, 2004) 
170 As US Ambassador to the UN, Holbrook played a leading role in promoting UN reforms and making 
UNHCR the lead agency for internal displacement.  While at the time many people at State and USAID 
disagreed with Holbrook’s ideas, he set in motion a “re-thinking” of US government policy and procedures 
towards displacement.    Telephone interview with Jeff Drumtra ((Policy Advisor, US Department of 
State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Policy and Resource Planning). March 8, 
2012.   
171 The US government divided the responsibility for addressing foreign IDPs crises between USAID’s 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the State Department’s Bureau of Population Refugees 
and Migration (PRM).   While OFDA took the lead in coordinating the US Government’s response to 
displacement crises around the globe PRM became the primary funder and implementer of IDP emergency 
programs in a number of countries. 
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Around this time the US also began to actively promote effective regional and 
international institutional arrangements to assist IDPs and became a major financial 
supporter of these institutions.172  More significantly, at least in the case of Colombia, 
internal displacement began to figure more regularly in the State Department’s yearly 
human rights reports.  While in 1999 the US Department of State Human Rights report 
for Colombia mentioned the words “displaced” or “displacement” only eight times, by 
2000 those words figured in 72 occasions, in 2001 they were mentioned 80 times and in 
2002, 60 times.  From 2005 onward, State Department Reports regularly included a 
subsection on “Internally Displaced Persons.”173   
 
International Pressure: Regional Influences 
Another aspect of the internationalization of Colombia’s conflict relates to the 
increased scrutiny that the country received from the Inter-American human rights 
system as the conflict intensified in the early 2000s and military aid from the US began to 
pour in.  As Colombia’s Constitutional Court began to assert itself and to challenge the 
Colombian state on the issue of displacement, both the Inter-American Commission for 
                                                
172 In 2011 USAID contributed around $900,000 to IDMC, covering 25% of their budget and making it 
the second largest donor after the Norwegian government. Telephone interview with Anita Malley 
(USAID/OFDA Advisor on Internal Displacement and Protection). March 9, 2012. 
173 Number of times “displaced” or “displacement” mentioned in US Department of State Human Rights 
Report for Colombia: 1999, 8 times (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/380.htm); 2000, 72 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/741.htm); 2001, 80 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm); 2002, 69 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18325.htm); 2003, 45 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htm); 2004, 39 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm); 2005, 40 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm); 2006 50 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm_); 2007 47 times 
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100633.htm);  
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Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights became key 
allies of the Court. 
Admittedly, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has historically maintained a very 
close relationship with the Inter-American human rights system.  According to a legal 
expert and former official of the Inter-American System, this dynamic reflects a sort of 
strategic trans-national alliance between the two bodies.  At times the Inter-American 
system and the Colombian Court used each other’s decisions to pursue their agendas.  
There is also some evidence of a deeper process of socialization, which produced a 
generation of Colombian jurists and lawyers who became agents of human rights 
change.174 
Historically, Colombia has taken the Inter-American human rights system very 
seriously.  The pronouncements of both the court and the commission have received 
significantly more press in Colombia than elsewhere in the region.  Unlike many of its 
neighbors – most notably Peru under Fujimori, Venezuela under Chávez, and Ecuador 
under Correa – Colombia also appeared to have made a strategic decision early on to 
work with the system rather than to fight it.175  In this regard, Colombia took an important 
step by passing Law 288 in 1996.  This law, which originated with a dispute in the early 
1990s between the government of Colombia and the Inter-American Court, established 
domestic institutional mechanisms to repair victims of human rights violations in 
compliance with the rulings of international bodies.176  According to Ariel Dulizky, 
former Assistant Executive Secretary at the IACHR, this is the only law of its kind in 
                                                
174 Interview with Ariel Dulitzky (former Assistant Executive Secretary at IACHR). April 27, 2013.  
Austin, TX.   
175 Ibid. 
176 Law 288 originated with the Inter-American Court case of Caballero Delgado and Santana vs. 
Colombia (See: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_22_esp.pdf) 
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Latin America.  Instead of fighting the court’s rulings or the legitimacy of the court, 
Colombia has spent most of its efforts working to minimize the monetary costs incurred 
by the Court’s rulings.  Consequently, Colombia’s responses before the IACHR and the 
Inter-American Court have tended to be more sophisticated and informed than those of 
most other Latin American counties. 
While many Latin American legal and diplomatic experts acknowledge that 
Colombia, on average, has taken the Inter-American human rights system more seriously 
than other countries they disagree on why this is.  Part of it may be by design.  In some 
ways Colombia’s receptivity can be attributed the provisions in its 1991 Constitution 
(particularly Article 93) which gives significant weight to the pronouncements of 
international human rights bodies.  Many also recognize that Colombia has been 
endowed with a relatively strong legalistic tradition.  Many point to some sort of 
Colombian cultural exceptionalism which bestowed the country with a strong need to be 
accepted by the international community as a democratic and law-abiding nation.   
Over the years, Colombia’s attitude of engagement towards the Inter-American 
human rights system has resulted in the socialization of a generation of Colombian jurists 
who became well versed in the language of human rights.  In order to better respond to 
these and other international human rights bodies, Colombia trained a whole generation 
of human rights lawyers, often with the support of the state.   According to a number of 
international legal experts I interviewed, Colombian legal minds, on average, show a 
level of fluency in the area of human rights that is rare in the hemisphere.  This has 
certainly turned the Colombian government into a formidable adversary for human rights 
activists who are forced to be well prepared and informed when confronting Colombia in 
the international arena.  On the other hand, this has also been an agent of change by 
turning these jurists into powerful agents of human rights socialization within their own 
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government.  Colombia’s legal sophistication has also led to a more intimate relationship 
between Colombia’s state human rights bodies and the Inter-American system.   It is not 
uncommon, for example, for Colombian lawyers to bounce between working for the two 
systems. 177    
Over the years, a particularly close relationship developed between Colombia’s 
Constitutional Court and the Inter-American human rights system, both of which worked 
as a sort of “tag team” to reinforce each other’s decisions and build up jurisprudence to 
protect IDPs.  When formulating an Inter-American legal framework for IDPs, for 
example, Robert Goldman (one of the authors of the UN Guiding Principles and a 
Commissioner at the IACHR) relied heavily on the jurisprudence set in Colombia by Law 
387 and the Constitutional Courts’ decisions.178   The Constitutional Court relied on 
jurisprudence set by the Inter-American Court when it tackled the issue of displacement 
and, according to one of T-025 principal authors, owed much of its success to the support 
it received from the Inter-American system.179  When arguing the binding nature of the 
Guiding Principles, Colombia’s Constitutional Court took note that the IACHR had 
officially endorsed them (T-025, paragraph 5.1.).  After 2004, the Inter-American Court 
made repeated reference to T-025 on a number of decisions – sometimes with regards to 
                                                
177 Interview with Ariel Dulitzky (former Assistant Executive Secretary at IACHR). April 27, 2013.  
Austin, TX.  A few examples include: Marcela Briceño-Donn (formerly at the IACHR and then in 
Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Relations); Maria Claudia Pulido (formerly at for the Colombian’ Attorney 
General’s Office now works at the IACHR; Alvaro Tirado Mejia (former Presidential Council for Human 
Rights and was a member of the Commission); Catalina Botero Marino (former attorney with the 
Colombian Constitutional Court and Ombudsman is currently the Commission’s Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression).  Federico Guzmán Duque (formerly with the Constitutional Court the moved to 
the IACHR). 
178 Telephone interview with Professor Robert Goldman (former Chairman of the IACHR). April 18, 
2012. 
179 Interview with Clara Elena Reales (former attorney in Colombia’s Constitutional Court). July 10, 2013.  
Bogotá. 
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displacement crises in other countries.180  According to Rincón (2009), the Inter-
American Court established a more forceful normative framework and legitimized the 
intervention of the Colombian court by recognizing the standards it established as true 
international standards.  
As illustrated above, T-025 was in many ways a product of the 
internationalization of Colombia’s conflict.  It is difficult to imagine that the Court would 
have acted as boldly as it did, or that its decisions would have carried much weight if the 
Court had not benefitted from the support of the international community.  After 2004, T-
025 turned into a rallying point for domestic and international efforts to address the 
problem of displacement in Colombia.  The Court and its Follow-up Commission, in turn, 
also became a sort of “national panopticon” on the issue of displacement.181   
While the Court centralized and publicized the observations and reports from the 
various governmental monitoring bodies, NGOs, and international agencies in Colombia, 
activists coordinated their efforts to support the Court’s decisions.  UNHCR, for example, 
served as “amicus curiae” to the court and supported the various state entities (i.e. Acción 
Social, Controlloría, Procuraduría, and municipal authorities) that the court had charged 
with instituting and monitoring the state’s response.  UNHCR played a particularly 
crucial role in providing technical assistance to a team of Community Defenders 
(“Defensores Communitarios”) who were charged with accompanying IDPs and 
communities in risk of displacement.182  
                                                
180 Some examples include Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (2005); Moiwana Village v. Suriname 
(2005); Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (2006); and Ituango Massacres v. Colombia (2006). See 
Rincon (2009). 
181 Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. 
182 Interview with Andrés Celis (Protection Unit Coordinator, UNHCR - Colombia).  July 19, 2013. 
Bogotá. 
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STATE RESISTANCE AND PROBLEMATIC IMPLEMENTATION  
Although the momentum initiated by T-025 and the Court’s jurisdiction over 
Colombia’s displacement policy certainly put significant pressure on the state, this 
pressure did not always translate into concrete action.  Many observers and legal experts 
remain divided on whether it ultimately made a real difference in the lives of most IDPs.  
Some describe the government’s response to displacement as a soufflé: “hard on the 
outside and hollow in the middle.”183 According to a former attorney in the Constitutional 
Court, the Colombian government over the years perfected the art of appearing to comply 
with the Courts’ orders while doing very little.  Ultimately, the situation of most IDPs 
remained critical despite the fact that, at least on paper, Colombia had one of the most 
developed responses to internal displacement in the world. 
There are a number of reasons why implementation of this advanced legal 
framework continued to be so problematic.  Much of this problem could be traced to the 
fact that, despite significant internationally funded efforts, the government institutions 
charged with implementing government’s policy remained plagued by incompetence and 
lack of capacity.  It is important to remember that Colombia also continued to be at war.  
In fact, Colombia’s internal conflict intensified significantly during the eight years of 
Uribe’s tenure (2002-2010) and, in many ways, Colombia continued to operate as a 
fractured and decentralized state.  For this reason, changes in policy and attitude in 
Bogotá did not always translate into changes at the regional level where most of the 
displacement was happening.   Human rights activists maintain that many zones of 
expulsion were captured by the interests of local socio-economic elites who, for the most 
                                                
183 Interview with Federico Guzmán Duque (Human Rights Specialist at the IACHR and former attorney 
with Colombia’s Constitutional Court). May 14, 2010.  Washington, DC. 
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part, were not interested in protecting IDPs and were sympathetic to the paramilitaries.  
These elites, in turn, constituted a significant part of President Uribe’s political base.184   
Uribe himself showed much disdain for the victims of the conflict.  During most 
of his administration Uribe’s government was marred by allegations that at best he was 
sympathetic to the paramilitaries, and at worst actively supported them.  The President 
was suspected of holding a deep-seeded personal hatred of the guerillas as a result of his 
father’s murder by the FARC in 1983 during a failed kidnapping attempt.  As governor of 
Antioquia during the 1990s Uribe also was one of the first proponents and promoters of 
peasant self-defense groups organized under CONVIVIR.  These self-defense groups 
later morphed into formidable paramilitary armies and were responsible for causing much 
of the displacement (IACHR, 1999).  Although between 2003 and 2006 Uribe formally 
negotiated the demobilization of the AUC – Colombia’s largest and most notorious 
paramilitary organization – this process was heavily criticized by national and 
international human rights organizations (including OHCHR and IACHR) because it 
granted significant impunity to human rights violators and ignored the rights of victims to 
seek justice and reparation.185  An investigation initiated by the Colombian Supreme 
Court, which became know as the “parapolitics” scandal, revealed that many of Uribe’s 
closest allies had links with AUC paramilitaries.186  Although Uribe himself was never 
investigated, his administration was accused of repeatedly seeking to undermine the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court in order to assure impunity. Several magistrates 
                                                
184 Ibid. & Interview with Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli (WOLA; formerly at Brookings’ IDP Project).  March 
28, 2013. Washington, DC. 
185 See: http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/impunity 
186 By 2010 the Supreme Court had charged 93 Colombian congressmen with having illicit ties to 
paramilitary organizations, and sentenced 22 of them. The Court also launched investigations into twelve 
governors, 166 mayors, 58 city councilmen, as well as thirteen other government officials. (See: 
http://colombiareports.co/un-reports-on-colombian-parapolitics/). 
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investigating the case, in fact, were threatened, placed under surveillance and had their 
communications intercepted by state institutions.187 
Uribe’s antagonism towards human rights efforts in Colombia explains in part 
why Colombia’s Constitutional Court decided to intervene so forcefully but also why 
implementation of the courts’ orders was so problematic.  In many ways, Uribe’s arrival 
in power represented a “complete game changer” for the human rights community.188  
Unlike his predecessors, Uribe acted like a real hard-liner from the start.  He showed 
disdain for the international humanitarian organizations and human rights activists whom 
he saw as an obstacle to his military campaign to defeat the insurgency once and for all.  
A pointed critic of Pastrana’s failed peace plan, Uribe promised during his campaign to 
double the size of Colombia’s military and enlist a million civilians in an effort to block 
the advance of the FARC.  Although his “Democratic Security Policy” claimed to protect 
the civilian population and respect the rule of law, his policy reverted to many of the 
practices employed by previous national security schemes that had led to human rights 
abuses in the past (Mason, 2003).  For example, Uribe reintroduced the controversial 
“state of siege” legislation that was first invoked in 1965 to repress dissent.  He also 
ordered his generals to recruit civilians to spy on suspected guerillas and help the army to 
catch and kill them (Kirk, 2004).   
As Uribe’s “get tough” attitude became a target of attacks by human rights 
campaigners the President took a number of measures to intimidate and marginalize the 
human rights community.  Following a series of military successes against the guerillas, 
Uribe declared prematurely that the internal war had ended in Colombia.  He claimed that 
                                                
187 See: Amnesty International.  Colombia: Impunity. (http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/countries/americas/colombia/impunity). 
188 Interview with Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli (WOLA; formerly at Brookings’ IDP Project).  March 28, 
2013. Washington, DC. 
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the violence that remained constituted only sporadic acts of terrorism.  He also repeatedly 
denied there was any sort of humanitarian crisis in the country.189  This strategy was 
certainly aimed at freeing Colombia from intense international scrutiny.  It may have also 
been an effort to send a signal to the international community that Colombia had in fact 
turned a page on its violent history with the aim of attracting international investment 
back to the country.   
Uribe, however, faced the problem that he could not claim to have won 
Colombia’s internal war as long as there was a humanitarian crisis in the country that was 
being documented by international actors.  According to Gimena Sánchez-Grazoli of the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Uribe went to great lengths to sabotage 
the efforts of the international organizations and INGOs working with IDPs.”190  The 
government’s consultations with IDP groups became a charade, or as another 
international human rights advocate described: “an over-bureaucratized academic 
exercise.”191  In an effort to diminish the autonomy of INGOs in Colombia, Uribe also 
forced all international assistance to be channeled through Colombian government 
entities.  Sánchez-Garzoli claimed that by 2005, Uribe had succeeded in significantly 
reducing the presence of the international community in Colombia by making the conflict 
more invisible.  A number of Colombian activists also felt that UN humanitarian agencies 
in Colombia became significantly less outspoken during the Uribe years perhaps because 
they were afraid of losing access to communities in need.   Some organizations such 
                                                
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Interview with Catherine Bouley (Christian Aid Colombia).  April 9, 2013.  Bogotá. 
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UNHCR, however, continued to publicly contest Uribe’s claims that the conflict had 
ended.192   
Arguably, the Constitutional Court’s appropriation of IDP policy after 2004 made 
it increasingly difficult for the Uribe administration to ignore Colombia’s humanitarian 
crisis and claim that the conflict had ended.  As I have argued above, the court succeeded 
in mobilizing international and domestic human rights advocates, international donors, 
academics and conscientious government functionaries to elevate and maintain the issue 
of displacement at the forefront of the policy agenda and through innovative procedures 
such as the creation of the Follow-up Commission creating a robust monitoring and 
accountability apparatus.  
In the face of an authoritarian administration T-025 and the court’s subsequent 
intervention on the issue of internal displacement was a significant accomplishment.  By 
several accounts T-025 represented a real watershed moment, not only for Colombia’s 
IDP normative framework but also for the international IDP regime as a whole.  By 
making the UN Guiding Principles legally binding under domestic law, the court’s 
decision enabled the Principles to harden into customary international law.  The level of 
pressure and oversight exercised by the Court and its allies led to the development, 
during the next administration, of an even more comprehensive law for the reparation and 
land restitution of victims of the conflict (Law 1448 of 2011), which is explained in more 
detail in the following chapter.  
                                                
192 Interview with Andrés Celis (Protection Unit Coordinator, UNCHCR - Colombia).  July 19, 2013. 
Bogotá. 
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CONCLUSION 
The story of T-025 and the development of subsequent efforts to implement 
Colombia’s commitment to IDPs show that international factors mattered greatly.  At 
first glance, the story of this important judicial intervention may suggest a purely 
domestic phenomenon that resulted from Colombia’s legal and institutional 
particularities.  Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, the court’s unprecedented audacity, the 
resonance of its rulings, and the executive’s responsiveness to these can only be fully 
understood by taking into account the increasing internationalization of Colombia’s 
conflict during the 2000s. 
The drive to T-025 and its aftermath also reveal evidence of a classic boomerang 
strategy at work (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  Activists frustrated with the state’s failure to 
follow up with its commitments and properly implement law 387 took advantage of the 
links to transnational human rights networks they had developed during the past decade.   
Colombian activists benefited from the assistance of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court and Commission to assist in monitoring the implementation of the law.  They 
worked closely with UN bodies based in Colombia.  They successfully lobbied in the 
United States Congress and State Department to link issues of great strategic importance 
to Colombia, namely military assistance and trade negotiations, to Colombia’s human 
rights record.  They ensured that foreign aid was diverted to fortify Colombia’s human 
rights institutions.  They also deepened strategic alliances with trans-national 
sympathizers to gain funding, visibility and obtain greater legitimacy at home – this last 
one being key to ensuring the physical security of IDP leaders and human rights activists. 
Another dynamic that also explains the story of T-025 but which was independent 
from the “boomerang strategy” was the gradual socialization of Colombian governing 
elites within regional and international human rights institutions.  It is evident that 
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through long-term and repeated interaction with regional institutions, such as the Inter-
American Human Rights Court and Commission during the 1980s and 1990s, a new 
generation of Colombian jurists and policymakers came to internalize a new set of roles 
and interests.  While it is difficult to determine exactly how influential this process may 
have been in the case of Colombia’s policy towards IDPs, it has undeniably played a role 
in supplying Colombian lawyers and policymakers with the motivation and expertize 
necessary to gradually institute and implement regional human rights standards in 
Colombia.193 
  
                                                
193  Borrowing from the discipline of sociology, international relations and international law literature has 
increasingly come to recognize the power of socialization within international organizations.  See, for 
example Goodman & Jinks (2004), Johnston (2008), and International Organization special edition 
(October 2005) (Vol 59, Issue 4). 
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Chapter 5: Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011 (Law 1448) 
By the time President Uribe left office, Colombia had in place one of the most 
advanced and sophisticated legal and institutional frameworks in the world to protect 
IDPs.   After all, Colombia had been one of the first countries in the world to 
acknowledge the phenomenon of internal displacement and to recognize the states’ 
responsibility to address the crisis.  In 1997 Colombia instituted one of the first and most 
comprehensive laws on displacement and in 2004 officially recognized the UN Guiding 
Principles as binding international law.  
Despite initial failures to implement the law and concerted efforts by a hard-liner 
administration to disaffirm many of Colombia’s human rights commitments, coordinated 
international and domestic efforts kept the state accountable.  Colombia grudgingly 
moved towards implementation of its laws and greater compliance with the international 
regime.  During the succeeding administration, Colombia took a momentous step to 
address the crux of the displacement crisis and effectively moved into a much deeper 
phase of compliance with the IDP regime. 
On June 10th, 2011, less than a year after taking office, President Juan Manuel 
Santos signed Colombia’s Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (also known as Law 1448 
of 2011).  This law was unveiled in a very public ceremony held in the courtyard of the 
presidential palace in the presence of UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, the 
diplomatic core, representatives of Colombian and international human rights 
organizations, and hundreds of victims from different ethnicities and all walks of life.  
Santos had arranged for the law’s signing to coincide with a visit by Ban-Ki Moon in 
order to send an unequivocal message to the international community that Colombia was 
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coming to terms with half a century of internal conflict and would respect international 
norms as they related to the rights of victims. 
In an emotional speech Santos recognized the historic nature of this law, which 
was arguably “the most ambitious project the country had embarked on in the last 
decades” (Cristo, 2012):  
 
“Today, as we all know, is a historical day.  Today is a day of national hope in 
which, not only us Colombians but the entire world is a witness of the state and 
society’s intention to pay a long overdue moral debt to the victims of a violence that 
must end… which we must end!  Victims do not have political color and this law has 
become, as it should be, the purpose of Colombian society as a whole.”194   
 
This ambitious and complex piece of legislation, which became the centerpiece of 
Santos’ first administration, symbolized the crystallization of Colombia’s commitment to 
comply with international norms to protect IDPs and other victims of the conflict.  The 
law explicitly recognized, for the first time, the existence of an internal armed conflict in 
Colombia and the state’s responsibility to protect and compensate its millions of victims 
– most of whom had been forcefully displaced.  
The law demonstrated that, as a result of more than two decades of coordinated 
international and domestic efforts, Colombia had reached a tipping point in terms of 
compliance with international human rights and humanitarian norms.  The proverbial 
genie was “out of the bottle.”  Despite significant efforts by Uribe and his allies to turn 
back the clock, by 2011 Colombia was showing signs of robust compliance with the IDP 
regime.  
  
                                                
194 Quoted in Cristo (2012).  My translation. 
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Table 11: Phase III: Timeline of Events 
Year Event 
2005 Portions of Plan Colombia aid begin to be allocated to finance human rights protection 
measures and judicial reforms.  From 2005 to 2008 Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office 
receives $150 million and technical support and assistance 
 
 Justice and Peace Law signed by Uribe to facilitate the demobilization of paramilitaries.  Law 
comes under heavy domestic and international criticism 
 
2006 ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice) opens an office in Bogota with the mission 
of strengthening national mechanisms of protection of victims’ rights to truth and reparation 
 
2007 Victims’ Law bill first introduced in the Colombian Congress by the Liberal Party.  Congress 
commemorates first Day of Solidarity with the Victims 
 
 UNDP organizes and finances public hearings around the country promoting the Victims’ Law 
project 
 
2008 The UN High Commissioner for HR, Navi Pillay, visits Colombia and expresses support for 
the Victim’s Law project 
 
2009 FARC forces are estimated to have shrunk to 9,000 from their peak of 17,000 during the 
1990s.  (2005-2009) FARC is severely debilitated having lost much of its leadership and 
popular support. 
 
2010 Uribe is barred from running for a 3rd time in office.  Juan Manuel Santos, his Secretary of 
Defense and hand-picked successor is elected President  
 
 First round of “High-Level Partnership Dialogues” held between Colombia and the US is held 
in Bogota.  Human rights figure prominently in the discussions 
 
2011 Victims’ and Land Restitution Law signed by Santos 
 
 (October) After more than six years of debate US Congress finally approves the FTA with 
Colombia.  The treaty goes into effect on May 15, 2012 
 
2012 Government Peace talks with the FARC are launched in Oslo and move to Havana in 
November 2012 
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LAW 1448  
Law 1448 “which dictates measures of attention, assistance and integral 
reparation to victims of the internal armed conflict and other procedures,” better known 
as the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law, had been debated in the Colombian Congress 
since 2007. The law allows for damages to be paid to over four million victims of 
Colombia’s armed conflict and seeks to restore millions of hectares of stolen land to its 
rightful owners.  At that time, the compensation component of the law alone was 
projected to cost the state approximately $20 billion and the land restitution process was 
estimated to take over a decade to complete.195  
The law sets forth a series of specific measures to repair the damage done to 
victims of Colombia’s internal conflict.  It officially recognizes that there is a universe of 
victims who have suffered individually and/or collectively from human rights violations 
and violations of international humanitarian law as a direct result of a conflict that has 
affected the country since at least 1985.196   
The law contains a number of reparation measures that includes the restitution of 
lost or stolen lands, and when this is not possible, monetary indemnification given on 
condition that the victims not sue the state.  The law also seeks to address victims’ rights 
to “truth,” by ordering the implementation of a number of extrajudicial measures to shed 
light on the events that victimized Colombians.  This includes the creation of a National 
Center for Historical Memory to act as a combination of historical repository and think-
tank to collect and diffuse information on Colombia’s conflict and history of human 
                                                
195 See: BBC News.  “Historic” Colombian victims’ compensation law signed. June 10, 2011. 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-13736523) 
196 The law explicitly excluded the thousands of victims of violence that had been the result of common 
crime or the drug war in general. 
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rights violations.  The law also orders the state to provide all necessary protective 
measures for victims, witnesses and public functionaries who intervene in the 
administrative and judicial procedures of reparation and, in particular, land restitution. 
In order to administer its reparation provisions the law created a new government 
bureaucracy that includes The Administrative Victims Unit (“Unidad Administrative de 
Atención y Reparación”), headed by Paola Gaviria Betencur (an outspoken victims’ 
rights advocate and the granddaughter of a former president Belisario Betancur) and a 
separate administrative unit to deal with land restitution.  In practical terms, the law 
transferred responsibility for the protection of IDPs from Acción Social (where it resided 
during the Pastrana and Uribe administrations) to the Victims Unit.   
Although the law significantly reshuffled the government agencies that addressed 
displacement and created a plethora of new ones, prior government’s commitments 
towards IDPs were not really affected. Rather, according to the IDP point person in the 
Department of the Interior, the law merely broadened the definition of the population of 
concern while continuing to recognize the Colombian government’s responsibilities for 
preventing displacement, facilitating humanitarian attention and stabilizing the socio-
economic situation of IDPs.197  Because 90% of Colombians recognized by the law as 
victims and identified as such in the government’s own database (the RUPD system) 
were in fact IDPs, the population of concern remained practically the same.  The 
principal change was that the law also included IDPs’ right to land restitution, which the 
previous Law 387 had not, and took into account many of the lessons learned from the 
                                                
197  Law 1448 in fact gave the President the authority to reform the government institutions by decree.  
The responsibilities formerly held by Accion Social is now divided into: (1) The Department for National 
Prosperity (Departamento para La Prosperidad Social or DPS ); (2) The Administrative Unit for Territorial 
Consolidation (Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial); and (3) the Victims Unit.  It also 
created a new sector “For National Inclusion (Sector Para la Inclusión Social) whose function is a bit 
unclear and a National Center for Historical Memory to be administered by DPS. 
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government’s prior failures in tackling displacement (i.e. the time of RSS, etc.).198  
Another major difference was that Law 1448 addressed displacement within the context 
of transitional justice.   
This law is significant in several respects.  Given the complexities involved in 
restituting nearly seven million hectares (17 million acres) 199 to its rightful owners and 
the large number of victims, Law 1448 is without a doubt one of the most ambitious laws 
of its type in the world.  The law is also much more comprehensive than comparable laws 
in that it adopts an integral approach to the reparation of victims.  It provides them with 
indemnification, satisfaction, rehabilitation, restitution, and guarantees of non-repetition, 
which makes the law compliant with all major international transitional justice norms 
(Cristo, 2012).  Most importantly, the law is also unique in that, unlike most transitional 
justice measures of its type, 1448 was to be implemented at a time when the country was 
still very much in the midst of an internal armed conflict.   
The new law was also tremendously significant because its text contained the first 
official recognition by the state that there was, in fact, an internal armed conflict in 
Colombia.  Previous administrations, particularly Uribe’s, had refused to acknowledge 
this obvious fact for fear that recognizing an internal state of war would provide the 
illegal armed groups with some sort of political legitimacy internationally and would 
demoralize the armed forces by subjecting them to the unnecessary scrutiny and 
limitations inherent in international humanitarian law.    
                                                
198 Interview with Viviana Ferro Buítrago (Colombian Interior Ministry).  April 18, 2013.  Bogotá. 
199 According to the Colombian publication Semana by 2011, approximately 2 million hectares had been 
stolen through violent means and an additional 4 million hectares were abandoned by families fleeing 
conflict. See: Semana. Ley de Víctimas: un paso histórico. May 28, 2011. 
(http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ley-victimas-paso-historico/240497-3) 
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Finally, the law was truly historical in that, by making land restitution the center 
of its reparation policy, the state recognized what academics and left wing activists had 
argued for a long time – namely that land ownership was “the center of gravity” of 
Colombia’s five-decades-long armed conflict.200  Law 1448 for the first time committed 
Colombia to return all stolen and abandoned lands to their legitimate owners and to 
indemnify them in cases where restitution was not possible (Cristo, 2012). 
The international community received Colombia’s new law with cautious 
optimism. The implementation of many of 1448’s provisions would present difficult and 
complex challenges.  Colombia, admittedly, had a record of drafting laws that looked 
great on paper but which it later failed to implement properly.   As Ban-Ki Moon 
cautioned during the signing ceremony: “the proper and timely implementation of this 
law [would] determine whether expectations [were] met.”201  However, the fact that 
Santos seemed ready to make a “historic gamble” by making the Victims’ Law the 
centerpiece of his administration suggested that there was something very different about 
1448.  It somehow signaled that Colombia had taken a significant leap in terms of 
compliance with international IDP norms and was finally willing to bear the costs of 
protecting the rights of over four million IDPs.  
 
1448 MARKS A SHIFT IN FRAME 
The advent of Law 1448 marked an important shift in the way that Colombia’s 
humanitarian crisis was framed. Rather than addressing specifically the problem of 
                                                
200 See: Semana. Ley de Víctimas: un paso histórico. May 28, 2011. 
(http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ley-victimas-paso-historico/240497-3) 
201 See: Colombia Reports. UN’s Ban Ki-moon commends Victims’ Law. June 13, 2011.  
(http://colombiareports.co/uns-ban-ki-moon-commends-victims-law/) 
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displacement, the Colombian government purported to deal more broadly with the 
concept of “victimhood.” 
As argued above, the population targeted by these policies was essentially the 
same.  IDPs, after all, constituted the vast majority of the victimized population in 
Colombia, which at the time was estimated to surpass four million.  Moreover, by 
tackling the issue of land ownership the government was finally addressing the crux of 
the displacement crisis.   The law’s reparation provisions would also affect IDPs, most of 
whom, individually or collectively, have been the victims of multiple human rights 
violations (including: threats, sexual violence, mutilation, enslavement, the murder and 
forced recruitment of loved ones, the destruction of their homes, communities and 
livelihoods).  This law is undoubtedly about them. 
The conceptual shift form “IDP” to “victim” broadened the government’s focus 
beyond the practical challenges of forced migration to include the root causes and 
consequences of displacement.   In a way, it forced the government to look at IDPs in a 
more holistic manner, as human beings who had been wronged and deserved protection 
and reparation, and not only as migrants who in a manner of speaking: “were 
geographically in the wrong place.” 
This shift in frame was only made possible by the increased recognition of the 
existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia.  The law was precipitated by an 
ensuing national debate what transitional justice should look like in Colombia.  
Moreover, 1448 was in many ways the result of a conscious decision by Colombian 
human rights activists to reframe their discourse away from forced migration to include 
the wider issue of victims’ rights.   What explains this change in frame? 
Arguably during the 21st Century it became easier for Colombians to identify with 
IDPs as fellow victims rather than as forced migrants.  Prior to the 1980s the concept of 
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“victimhood” had been highly politicized and treated with suspicion by the majority of 
Colombians.   Those claiming to be victims were often seen as peasant agitators – and 
possibly guerrilla sympathizers – who had somehow brought their fate upon themselves.  
As the spread of violence began increasingly to affect urban middle and upper class 
Colombians, during the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of “victimhood” became more 
inclusive and less political.  Members of Colombia’s political and economic elites were 
increasingly the victims of kidnapping, murder, and terrorist attacks – including the 
infamous car bomb attack in 2003 of Bogotá’s exclusive country club El Nogál.202  
Colombian politicians across the political spectrum were victims of violence.  To list just 
a few examples, President Samper was seriously injured during the assassination of the 
Union Patriotica Party secretary, José Amquera in 1989. The fathers of President Uribe, 
Senator Cristo and Representative Cepeda (a leader of the left wing opposition party Polo 
Democratico Alternativo) were murdered.    
As one IDP activist explained to me, this shift could also be partly explained by 
the fact that, simultaneously, the concept of internal displacement might have suffered 
some “natural wear” (or “desgate” in Spanish) as a result of decades of campaigning.203 
As the Colombian campaign for the rights of IDPs succeeded in securing political 
victories and obtained important government concessions, the Colombian population 
ironically may have become gradually desensitized to the concept of forced displacement.  
                                                
202 On February 7, 2003, a car containing 200 kg of explosives that was parked in a garage on the third 
floor of El Nogal club, exploded, killing 36 people and wounding more than 200. There were 
approximately 600 people in the building at the time of the explosion. The attack by the FARC was the 
worst in Colombia for more than a decade prompting the UN Security Council to issue a resolution (1465) 
condemning the attack. See: CNN.  “At least 23 killed in Colombia club blast.” February 8, 2003. 
(http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/02/08/colombia.explosion/index.html) 
203 Interview with Flor Edilma Osorio Pérez.  July 16, 2013.  Bogotá.  
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Part of the reason may be that, over time, the concept has lost the power inherent in its 
novelty.  The concept of displacement had been over-used and sometimes abused.  
Many Colombians, for example, became suspicious of people claiming to be 
internally displaced because of well-publicized instances of “cheating.” It was not 
uncommon to encounter panhandlers at stoplights in Bogotá flashing what appeared to be 
IDP registration cards but which in many cases were forgeries.  Some mid-level 
government functionaries, including public defenders (“personeros municipales”) 
charged with protecting IDPs even became convinced that the greatest challenge facing 
Colombia’s displacement crisis were “false IDPs” who took advantage of the relief and 
compensation system.204 
This did not imply that Colombia’s evolution with regards to the recognition of 
IDP rights had suffered any sort of significant setback.  It only signified that the IDP 
campaign was increasingly affected by a common form of compassion fatigue or apathy, 
which tends to affect audiences saturated with images of misery and bad news and affect 
the latter stages of activist campaigns (S. Cohen, 2013; Moeller, 1999). 
As the national discourse shifted to issues of transitional justice during the 2000s 
it also became trendier to talk about victims.  Undoubtedly, this allowed the IDP 
movement to broaden its coalition. A major IDP advocacy organization in Colombia even 
debated changing its name to replace the word “displacement.”205  Some activists 
expressed some discomfort with the shift in discourse/conceptualization claiming that  “it 
is dangerous and perverse to play around with categories” while others recognized that 
                                                
204 Ibid.  
205 Interview with Flor Edilma Osorio Pérez.  July 16, 2013.  Bogotá.  
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the shift may have its advantages.206  Ultimately Colombian IDPs understood that the law 
that culminated from the campaign on behalf of victims’ rights was about the displaced.  
How then did this law come about? 
 
GENESIS OF THE LAW  
The idea of a comprehensive victims’ law came out of Uribe’s botched efforts to 
demobilize Colombia’s paramilitary forces.  Although president Uribe had allegedly been 
an early champion of peasant self-defense forces, by the early 2000s he decided to purge 
Colombia of all irregular armed groups.  Undoubtedly he was under heavy international 
and domestic pressure to dismantle Colombia’s paramilitary groups.  In 2001 the US 
State Department added the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) to its list of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the European Union and Canada soon followed 
suit.207 Over the years, paramilitary organizations like the AUC had come to control a 
large portion of Colombia’s drug trade in search of financing and the US was calling for 
the extradition of many of its leaders.  Colombia’s paramilitaries were responsible for the 
majority of the displacements and reported human rights violations and had been the 
authors of a series of massacres that captured the popular imagination for their 
gruesomeness and cruelty.208  
                                                
206 In Colombia it is legally easier to organize victims groups than it is to organize IDP groups.  According 
to one of CODHES founders, victims groups are not required to register as legal entities (obtain “personeria 
juridica”) but IDP organizations are. (Interview with FEO) 
207 See: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
208 This included the Mapirapán massacre in the department of Meta where an estimated 30 people were 
tortured and killed – decapitated with chainsaws, hung from meat hooks, hacked with machetes and their 
corpses thrown into the Guaviare River -- between July 14 and 20, 1997; The Alto Naya massacre in Cauca 
in which approximately 40 to 130 civilians were killed and thousands displaced in April 2, 2001 by 
approximately 100 paramilitaries; and the Betoyes massacres of the indigenous Guahibo community in 
Arauca in early 2003 where, aside from murdering a number of people, paramilitary forces systematically 
raped a number of teenage girls and gruesomely mutilated their bodies before disposing of them into a 
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In 2003 the Uribe administration signed a peace agreement with the AUC and 
initiated the demobilization of approximately thirty-one thousand paramilitary troops.  
The legal framework under which the demobilization took place soon came under strong 
criticism from IDP and human rights groups.  The AUC agreed to lay down its arms in 
exchange for a government promise to restrict legal actions that could be taken against its 
members.  The original law submitted by Uribe to the Colombian Congress did not come 
close to meeting international humanitarian standards.  Yet after a lengthy congressional 
debate, the Justice and Peace Law  (also known as Law 975) was passed in 2005.  
Among other things, the law blocked extraditions of demobilized paramilitaries to the US 
and set limits on sentences. The law also created a system to repair victims by making the 
paramilitaries responsible for compensating their victims in exchange for reduced 
sentences.  
This law soon came under heavy criticism from abroad.  Although the US 
Ambassador to Colombia, William Wood, enthusiastically backed the new law, Amnesty 
International suggested that the law amounted to little more than de facto amnesties for 
human rights abusers.209 A New York Times editorial suggested that the law be called the 
“Impunity for Mass Murderers, Terrorists and Major Cocaine Traffickers Law.”210   The 
law was also controversial in Colombia where, according to a survey conducted by the 
International Center on Transitional Justice, 75% of Colombians believed that the 
government should prosecute members of the paramilitaries (ICTJ, 2006).   
                                                                                                                                            
river.  (See: Hiristov, Jasimin 2009, The Paramilitarization of Colombia; 
http://colombiajournal.org/colombia64.htm; ¡YA BASTA!; Wikipedia, “Paramilitarism in Colombia”) 
209 See: Amnesty International World Report 2009: Colombia. 
(http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/americas/colombia) 
210 See: New York Times Editorial, “Colombia’s Capitulation.” July 4, 2005. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/04/opinion/04mon3.html?_r=0) 
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In May 2006, Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck down many of the law’s 
controversial provisions and amended the law to allow victims to participate in all stages 
of legal proceedings and to require demobilized paramilitaries to offer full confessions.  
According to José Miguel Vivanco, Americas’ Director at Human Rights Watch, these 
provisions finally gave the law “some teeth” and alleviated many of the concerns of the 
international human rights community.211  Paradoxically, the law’s passage also provoked 
in Colombia a very public debate about the nature of transitional justice victims’ rights.212   
While a negotiated solution to Colombia’s conflict seemed remote under Uribe, 
significant military advances and improvements in the country’s security situation 
suggested that an end to the conflict was on the horizon.  Colombia’s paramilitaries were 
laying down their arms and the FARC had been greatly debilitated after suffering a 
number of critical blows.  Within this context, many Colombians began expressing a fear 
that the conflict’s countless victims were being forgotten while the victimizers were 
receiving all of the benefits of the demobilization process (Sánchez, 2009).  This 
sentiment was amplified by the fact that the Justice and Peace Law was being poorly 
implemented and victims were finding it extremely difficult to find redress. 
Among other things, the law’s established means of reparation involved lengthy 
and onerous civil judicial processes that required the establishment of culpability.  By the 
end of 2008 only 130,000 of the millions of victims eligible had applied to have their 
cases considered by the new mechanisms of reparation.  The special tribunals created to 
judge these cases had only issued a single sentence, which was being appealed before the 
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the law was seriously flawed in that it did not really 
                                                
211 See: Human Rights Watch.  Court Fixes Flaws in Demobilization Law: Constitutional Court Rulling 
Orders Paramilitaries to Confess. May 19, 2006. (http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/05/18/court-fixes-flaws-
demobilization-law) 
212 See in particular: Díaz Gómez, Sánchez & Uprimny (2009) 
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recognize the existence of an internal armed conflict and consequently did not 
acknowledge human rights violations perpetrated by state agents (Sánchez, 2009). 
Outrage over Colombia’s Peace and Justice law led to the mobilization of victims’ 
groups, comprised mainly of IDPs, many of whom challenged the government’s 
reparation mechanisms though the courts, ultimately resulting in various Constitutional 
Court pronouncements to reform the law.213  A number of Colombian human rights 
organizations and legal thinktanks such as DeJusticia and Indepaz campaigned to bring 
Colombia’s Peace and Justice process closer in line with international standards of 
transitional justice and to make Colombia’s victims of conflict a lot more visible. 
One campaign that gained significant prominence was spearheaded by an 
organization called  “Víctimas Visibles” (Visible Victims), which was founded in 2001 
by Diana Sofia Giraldo de Melo, a popular Colombian TV journalist and university 
professor of communications.  Víctimas Visibles was inspired by a similar movement 
that had taken hold in Spain.  The Spanish movement had successfully campaigned for 
the rights of victims of terrorism (from Basque separatists and later Al Quaeda) and had 
led to the institution of a victims’ reparations law in Spain (Law 32 of 1999).  Víctimas 
Visibles began its campaign by compiling and diffusing, through popular media, the 
testimonies of many of Colombia’s victims of violence.  They also liaised with a Catholic 
university in Spain and organized a series of international conferences on victims of 
terrorism.  In Colombia they approached the leaders of the major political parties in an 
effort to promote a national “Day of Solidarity with the Victims” and suggest a victims 
reparation law project similar to the one passed in Spain.  
                                                
213 See for example: C-1199 of 2008; Auto 08 of 2009; T-1001, and T-444 of 2009 (Sánchez, 2009). 
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Although Víctimas Visibles approached policy makers from across political lines 
with the idea of a victims’ law they caught the attention of Juan Fernando Cristo, a 
Liberal senator from the city of Cúcuta whose father (also a senator) had been 
assassinated by ELN guerillas in 1997.  The law project got a significant boost when the 
opposition Liberal party headed by former Colombian president Cesar Gaviria, whose 
sister had been gunned down the previous year, decided to add the issue of victims’ rights 
to its political platform.   On July 24, 2007 the Colombian Congress commemorated the 
first Day of Solidarity in which over 40 victims presented their testimony before congress 
during a session that lasted over eight hours.  The poorly attended event soon became a 
symbol of the plight of Colombia’s victims because it clearly showed that legislators 
were a lot more interested in testimonies of demobilized paramilitary leaders, who had 
come before the Congress only a few years before, than those of victims.214  The virtually 
empty chamber that greeted the victims who came to give their testimony at the capitol in 
Bogotá became a very visible reminder that the Colombian government cared more about 
the perpetrators of the conflict than its victims.   Senator Cristo and his colleagues in the 
Liberal party used this embarrassing episode to great effect to launch a victims’ law 
project in the Colombian legislature.  
It is likely that the Liberal Party, as suggested by Sánchez (2009), may have 
initially acted out of political opportunism when they agreed to take on the issue of 
“victims rights.”  This issue provided the opposition with an opportunity to confront an 
enormously popular president with an issue that resonated with a majority of 
Colombians.  In 2007, Uribe was serving a second term in office thanks to a 
                                                
214 See: New York Times.  “At Colombia’s Congress, Paramilitary Chiefs Talk Peace. July 29, 2004. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/29/world/at-colombia-s-congress-paramilitary-chiefs-talk-
peace.html?pagewanted=print) 
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constitutional amendment.  At the time he was widely credited with bringing about an 
unprecedented era of peace and prosperity to Colombia.  His human rights record and 
denial of the continuing violence, however, had made him increasingly the target of 
criticism in Colombia and abroad.  The prospect of a victims’ law also generated 
significant enthusiasm within domestic and international human rights circles (Uprimny 
Yepes & Saffon, 2008 ). 
 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
UN Agencies based in Colombia soon rallied around the law project. The 
Resident Coordinator of the UN and Representative of UNDP in Colombia, Bruno Moro, 
became one of the most outspoken early champions of the victims’ law.  After a first 
draft of the bill was approved in the Colombian Senate and moved to the House of 
Representatives, UNDP financed and helped organize a series of public hearings around 
the country to promote the law and elicit feedback from more than 5,000 victims.215  
According to Senator Cristo (2012), this may have represented the most ambitious 
exercise of citizen participation in Colombia since the constitutional reforms of 1991.  
On at least one occasion, representatives from the OHCHR’s mission in Bogotá 
also acted as facilitators in closed doors discussions between legislators and provided 
ongoing technical support to the drafters of the bill.  During her first visit to Colombia in 
October 2008 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, allegedly also 
expressed to President Uribe her support for a victims’ law (Cristo, 2012).  She followed 
her visit with a public letter to the president of the Colombian Senate urging for the 
                                                
215 A total of nine hearings were held in the cities of: Medellín, Vilavicencio, Pitalito, Sincelejo, 
Valledupar, Pasto, Quibdó, Barrancabermeja and Cúcuta (Cristo 2012). 
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approval of a law that would not discriminate against victims of the state.  Aside from the 
UN, the IACHR, and a number of human rights INGOs, most notably the New York-
based International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) provided technical assistance 
and support to the law’s proponents.  ICTJ, perhaps the leading international NGO on 
issues of transitional justice, had established an office in Bogotá in 2006 with the mission 
of strengthening national mechanisms for the protection of victims’ rights to truth, 
justice, and reparation.  When the law was being debated in Congress they approached 
Colombian legislators and educated them on a number of international principles and past 
experiences of transitional justice around the hemisphere and in countries such as Iraq 
and South Africa. Their office in Bogotá, in fact, became its largest after their 
headquarters in New York.216  Senator Cristo also received the support of Washington-
based WOLA and CEJIL (Center for International Justice and Law) who invited him to 
speak in the US.    
The momentum generated by the law project illustrated how the collaboration 
between international and domestic advocacy groups remained a critical mechanism in 
deepening Colombia’s level of compliance with international human rights and 
humanitarian norms. 
 
RESISTANCE FORM THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION 
From the moment of the bill’s inception, President Uribe presented the biggest 
obstacle to the victims’ law project.  Even though many legislators within his party 
supported it in principle, Uribe vehemently opposed the law on the grounds that it 
presented a real threat to his policy of democratic security.  The law, he claimed, 
                                                
216 See: ICTJ Program Report: Colombia. (http://ictj.org/news/ictj-program-report-colombia) 
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essentially put agents of the state on equal footing with terrorists by recognizing victims 
of the state.  He argued that Colombia already had in place judicial mechanisms to try 
alleged crimes by state security forces and to compensate their victims, the majority of 
whom were IDPs.  He refused in any way to officially recognize that there was an 
internal conflict in Colombia, perhaps because doing so would subject Colombia to 
increased international humanitarian scrutiny and would provide a demoralizing blow to 
Colombia’s armed forces.  The administration’s most public objections were centered on 
the law’s alleged prohibitively high financial cost.  He called the law’s sponsors 
irresponsible and estimated that the approximately 80 trillion Colombian pesos in 
reparations would provide an irreparable trauma to the state’s finances.217  
The significant international attention generated by the law, however, made it 
difficult for Uribe to halt its momentum in Congress.  This even surprised some 
Colombian observers.  According to Sánchez: 
 
“The influence exercised by the international community on issues of human 
rights reduced the margin of manoeuver of local interest groups.  Consequently, once 
the initiative was presented it became very difficult to reject it, since the political 
costs were simply too high.218 
 
Sánchez claims that during the debate over the bill in Congress, international 
organizations reacted to developments in Colombia practically in “real time,” which was 
uncommon for entities of this type that tended to exercise what he refers to as an ex post 
facto control of the issue (Sanchez 2009). 
                                                
217 See: Presidencia de la Republica, Comunicado No. 305, June 18, 2009 
(http://web.presidencia.gov.co/comunicados/2009/junio/305.html) 
218 See Sánchez (2009). My translation. 
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Uribe first attempted to kill the new bill in congress by upgrading the existing 
victims’ reparations mechanisms through presidential decree (Decree 1290 of 2008).  
When this failed, he finally sunk the bill after almost two years of debate, during the 
conciliation process in congress, by convening a meeting at the ministry of interior where 
he asked his party to shelve the law.  Although Uribe asked legislators to kill the bill on 
fiscal grounds, many understood that the President’s real concern was the bill’s 
recognition of victims of the state.  According to Senator Cristo (2012), the fight over the 
bill essentially was one between two competing visions of the conflict in Colombia.  The 
official line was that there was no internal armed conflict in Colombia.  The country was 
only experiencing a “terrorist threat” and problems of common criminality.219  
Uribe’s vision of the conflict in Colombia, although increasingly untenable, was 
in fact the same position the government had maintained since the period of La Violencia.  
Despite the great human cost and length of the conflict, Colombia’s governing elites had 
been able to deny the existence of war in Colombia because the fighting had been of 
relatively low intensity, it had been mostly confined to the countryside, and the 
government was never really in danger of falling to the insurgents.  It was relatively easy 
to dismiss the guerrillas as criminal gangs because they had become increasingly 
involved in criminal activities like kidnapping and the drug trade.   By the 2000s, the left-
wing guerillas had also lost their ideological footing.  During most of this period, 
according to a number of international observers interviewed, as long as Colombians 
continued to hold regular elections and the economy continued to grow, the international 
community was more than willing to accept the government’s version of the situation.  In 
practical terms, the denial of the existence of an internal conflict shielded Colombia from 
                                                
219 See: Semana. “Gobierno deja a las víctimas sin su Ley.” June 18, 2009. 
(http://www.semana.com/nacion/conflicto-armado/articulo/gobierno-deja-victimas-su-ley/104260-3) 
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much international scrutiny.  It also absolved the government from addressing the needs 
and claims of the victims of the conflict, most of whom were IDPs, in any sort of 
systematic way.  In fact, it made the victims, who were mostly rural and poor peasants, 
virtually invisible to most of Colombian society.  After all, how could there be victims of 
a conflict that did not exist? 
In a way Uribe had consistently tried to “put the genie back in the bottle” by attempting 
to reverse the achievements of the human rights campaign in Colombia, and reverting to 
the traditional official discourse about the conflict.  However, by this time a robust 
network of domestic and international players that had been growing in support of human 
rights and the rights of IDPs made this increasingly impossible despite Uribe’s significant 
popularity.  In my view, this presents strong evidence that by the end of 2000s Colombia 
had in fact achieved a robust level of compliance. 
Increased attention and involvement by the international community in 
Colombia’s conflict, in the form of monitoring and international lobbying by IOs and 
INGOs and a visible US military presence in Colombia, made the government’s denial of 
an internal conflict increasingly preposterous.  Moreover, the fact that Colombia had – as 
its own government had finally come to recognize – a sizable IDP population, which 
surpassed in number that of most countries at war, made the government’s position 
untenable.  Uribe’s departure from office in 2010 finally created an opening for the 
Colombian government to recognize the internal conflict and to pass a robust Victims’ 
Law. 
Although Uribe remained tremendously popular in Colombia, he was barred by a 
Constitutional Court ruling from running for office for a third term, which he would 
certainly have won. By all accounts, his hand-picked successor and Minister of Defense 
Juan Manuel Santos appeared destined to continue Uribe’s hard line policy of democratic 
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security.  To the surprise of many, Santos initiated a radical shift in Colombia’s security 
and human rights policy and breathed new life into the victims law project that had been 
shelved in congress. 
 
SANTOS ADMINISTRATION 
Within the first few months of his administration (during the fall of 2011) Santos 
made it clear that he would follow his own agenda.  Although he openly lauded his 
predecessor for preventing Colombia from becoming a failed state and laying the 
foundations for an economic boom, he took a number of steps that were strongly 
repudiated by Uribe.  He undid many of the institutional reforms initiated by Uribe and 
formed a “National Unity” coalition government that embraced some members of the 
opposition including the Liberal Party.220 He reestablished relations with Hugo Chavez’ 
Venezuela, which Uribe had accused of harboring FARC camps and leaders.  Most 
significantly, he signaled his openness to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC. 
Soon after his election, Santos met with the leaders of the Liberal Party to discuss 
the terms of that party’s inclusion into the National Unity coalition and agreed on the spot 
to push through the Victims’ Law.  Only days after taking office, Santos publically 
declared that the expedited passage of this law was his administration’s first priority.  In 
fact, he went even further by expanding the law by appending to it an ambitious land 
restitution initiative that had been previously proposed by the Conservative Party (Cristo, 
2012).   
                                                
220 The Economist. “Colombian Politics: Santos vs. Uribe.” April 7, 2012. 
(http://www.economist.com/node/21552204) 
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According to Cristo (2012), by making the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law his 
biggest priority Santos took a historic gamble that was to set the tone for the rest of his 
administration.  Santos made this clear at the time of the laws’ unveiling when he 
declared before an assembly of legislators, victims’ groups, and international observers 
that: “If at the very least we manage to pass this law and to apply it successfully then it 
will have been worth the while for me to be the president of all Colombians.”  What 
accounted for such an abrupt shift in policy?  Few have been able to successfully explain 
why Santos revived the Victims’ Law and broke ties so publically and so decisively with 
his former mentor.221   
 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR 1448 
There are several explanations that might account for such a radical shift in policy 
and for the revival of the Victims’ Law project during the Santos administration.  First, 
President Santos was a very different type of leader from Uribe.  He personally believed 
that Colombia was ready to turn the page and bring an end to its internal armed conflict.  
Moreover, unlike his predecessor, he was not afraid of negotiating with the FARC.  
Second, Santos also understood that in order to bring a lasting peace to Colombia the 
issue of abandoned and stolen lands had to be resolved and the that the rights of the 
conflicts’ victims, most of whom were IDPs, had to be recognized.  Finally, Colombia 
                                                
221 With more than 900,000 followers, Uribe made prolific use of his Twitter account, as well as a number 
of television appearances, to attack Santos and the new law.  He questioned the law in general, and in 
particular the feasibility of restituting abandoned and stolen lands.  He insisted that by officially 
recognizing the existence of an internal armed conflict and victims of the state Santos was essentially 
equating the actions of the state’s security forces with those of the terrorists.  He implied that the law put in 
peril the very survival of the “democratic security” his administration had worked so hard to put in place 
(Cristo, 2012).   Uribe’s very public break with Santos led to an internal fight for control of their political 
party, which Santos eventually won. 
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would have to make some significant human rights concessions in order to come out from 
a state of international isolation in which it found itself after eight years of heavy handed 
policies.  The following section will examine each of these factors in more detail. 
 
Presidential Leadership 
One of the reasons explaining Santos’ radical break from his mentor and former 
boss was that Santos came from a very different background and had a different 
governing style.  Uribe had originated from the landed class of the populous province of 
Antioquia in the country’s periphery.  In contrast, Santos came from the capital’s urban 
bourgeoisie.  He was a member of a very established, wealthy, and influential family 
from Bogotá, which was the majority shareholder of El Tiempo, Colombia’s most 
important newspaper.  While Uribe’s style was described as intense and folksy, Santos 
was seen as more cerebral and urbane.222  According to a highly placed foreign diplomat 
in Colombia this made a big difference.  Santos represented a Colombian elite class that 
had, over time, fundamentally shifted its attitude with regards to the country’s internal 
conflict.  
Having been somewhat sheltered from the conflict, which was mostly confined to 
the periphery of the country, these elites did not share the same level of animosity 
towards the guerrillas.  But most importantly, having witnessed the peace processes in 
Central America, these elites had come to believe that they had little to fear from 
negotiating an end to Colombia’s conflict.  While a negotiated peace would most likely 
boost the country’s economic development, it was also likely to leave Colombia’s 
                                                
222 The Economist. “Colombian Politics: Santos vs. Uribe.” April 7, 2012. 
(http://www.economist.com/node/21552204) 
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traditional power structures intact as it had in Central America.  These elites viewed the 
end of the conflict as a necessary first step to attract urgently needed foreign direct 
investment, to access new markets and to finally begin exploiting Colombia’s extensive 
untapped natural resources.  This shift in attitude was not necessarily shared by its 
regional elites, many of whom, like Uribe, harbored intense personal hatred towards the 
insurgency.   
Unlike Uribe, Santos understood that peace could only be achieved through a 
negotiated solution to the conflict.  Although previous attempts to negotiate with the 
FARC had faltered on various occasions, Colombians increasingly accepted the fact that 
the FARC could never be entirely defeated militarily – particularly as long as the group 
enjoyed the covert support of neighboring Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as a constant 
flow of cash from the illicit narcotics trade fueled by America’s insatiable appetite for 
drugs.  Moreover, the conflict was tremendously costly and until it was finally resolved it 
would remain Colombia’s principal obstacle to growth.   
By the time he took office, Santos saw that the time was right for negotiating with 
the FARC. After a pounding military offensive that had lasted over a decade, the guerilla 
group was debilitated, demoralized, and fragmented enough to agree to sit at the 
negotiating table.  By 2010, the balance of power had clearly shifted in favor of the state.  
The guerillas had been driven out of many areas they had traditionally controlled and 
their military capability had been weakened by the resurgence of state security forces 
funded by Plan Colombia (DeShazo, Primiani, & McLean, 2007).   These had decimated 
the ranks of the FARC, hobbled communication between their units and left them 
vulnerable to infiltration.  By 2009 the FARC forces, which at its peak in the 1990s had 
  241 
been estimated to number 17,000, were thought to have shrunk down to 9,000.223  Its 
leadership was reported to have lost its grip on its foot soldiers, which operated across 
jungle, plain and mountain ranges hundreds of miles apart.224  Between 2005 and 2010 
Colombian security forces also dealt the FARC a series of significant blows by killing a 
significant number of field commanders and key members of their central command 
structure.  As a result some second-tier commanders were beginning to turn themselves in 
to the authorities for fear of being killed by areal attacks or by their subordinates. 225 
The FARC had also lost significant popular support during the previous two 
decades.  Their increasing use of kidnapping and involvement in the drug trade as a 
means of financing, the forced recruitment of child soldiers, widespread use of land 
mines and their responsibility for an increasing number of massacres and human rights 
violations had made the FARC tremendously unpopular with the majority of Colombians.  
On February 4, 2002, in a movement dubbed “A Million Voices Against the FARC,” 
                                                
223 See: New York Times. “Colombia Explores Talks with FARC.” August 28, 2012. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/americas/colombia-in-exploratory-talks-with-farc.html).  
Global.Security.ogr. FARC. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/farc.htm). 
224 See: Reuters.  “FARC ready for peace or war, says French reporter.” May 31, 2012. 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/colombia-farc-idUSL1E8GVHWX20120531). 
225 In an air raid on March 1, 2008, of a FARC camp inside of Ecuador, the Colombian military killed 
second in command Raúl Reyes together with 17 other guerillas.  Later that month Manuel Marulanda 
Velez (known as “Shure Shot”) the FARC’s founder and commander in chief since the 1960s, was reported 
to have died of a heart attack in the jungle.   
In March 3, 2008, Iván Ríos (José Juvenal Velandia), the head of the FARC’s Central Block and a member 
of the guerilla’s Central High Command, was killed by his security chief, who had turned government 
informant, on 3 March 2008 in a mountainous area of Caldas.  
The FARC’s top military commander Mono Jojoy (Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas) was killed on September 23, 
2010, during the areal bombardment of a guerilla camp in the department of Meta, 120 miles south of the 
capital Bogotá. 
On November 4th 2010, Alfonso Cano (Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas), the leader of the FARC who 
replaced Manuel Marulanda Velez as the organization’s Commander-in-Chief, was killed in a helicopter 
attack in the southwestern department of Cauca. 
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millions of Colombians dressed in white staged separate marches in 27 cities calling for 
an end to the guerilla group.226 
 
1448 As a Key to Securing a Lasting Peace 
The Santos administration understood that addressing Colombia’s IDP problem 
and the claims of its many victims was a necessary first step to finally securing a peace 
agreement with the guerillas.227  For too long Colombia’s perpetual violence had been fed 
by a cycle of unresolved grievances and the country’s failure to address the question of 
land ownership.  The institution of the Victims’ Law provided Santos with an opportunity 
to jumpstart the negotiations and guaranteed him a strong position at the negotiating 
table.  
Santos took a number of additional steps that would help pave the way for an end 
to the conflict.  These included reforming the military justice system, instituting 
additional reforms to the Justice and Peace law, initiating a rural reform program and 
defining the legal framework for negotiations.  Negotiations with the FARC finally began 
in Oslo in September 2012 and later moved to Havana.  
Preceding the negotiations Santos openly admitted that the Victims’ and Land 
restitution law would undermine the rebels by taking away one of their crucial initiatives.  
When the FARC’s lead negotiator referred to the law as a “trap” Santos responded during 
a radio interview by saying that: “[w]hen these gentlemen from the FARC say that this 
law is a lie it’s because…they know full well that this is something that takes away from 
                                                
226 See: Bloomberg. “Colombia Stages ‘Million Voices’ March Against FARC.” February 4, 2008.  
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFXKi88tH.VE&refer=latin_america).  
227 Interview with key UN official in Bogotá.  July 23, 2013. 
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one of their propaganda banners.”228  In a way, the law turned the state into the allies of 
the dispossessed.  After all, it was the state and not the FARC that would most easily 
permit the return of stolen lands to their owners.  Not surprisingly, the law caused peasant 
organizations eager to enforce the law to gradually distance themselves from the guerilla 
group and to begin talking with the government (Cristo, 2012). 
Prior to the negotiations, the FARC argued vehemently that the law was a trick, 
and returning land to peasants who lacked the means to make it productive would likely 
encourage them to sell it cheaply to international corporations.229  This, however, only 
amounted to little more than political posturing. During his Christmas address in 
December 2010, the FARC’s leader Alfonso Cano eventually expressed cautious 
approval of the law, recognizing that its land restitution component could have a positive 
effect on the conflict (Cristo, 2012).  By May of 2013 both sides negotiating in Havana 
finally reached a deal on rural development and land reform.  Given that the agrarian 
issue laid at the center of Colombia’s conflict, this was a truly historic development.   
According to a Colombian Senator and member of the governing coalition, the agreement 
was perhaps:  “…the most important thing that had happened in the last 100 years in the 
country,” recognizing that the issue of land easily represented “60 percent of the peace 
agreement.”230  
  
                                                
228 See: Reuters. “Colombia’s Santos: Land restitution law undermines rebels.” October 19, 2012. 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/colombia-rebels-idUSL1E8LJ68T20121019) 
229 Ibid. 
230 Christian Science Monitor. “Colombia, FARC rebels make peace progress with land deal.” May 28, 
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1448 as a Means of Addressing Colombia’s International Isolation 
Santos’ endorsement of the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law was also a 
decisive effort aimed at repairing Colombia’s image in the world and improving the 
country’s international standing.  After eight years of an authoritarian government 
Colombia found itself more isolated internationally than ever before.  The country had 
come under significant international criticism for a myriad of human rights scandals 
during the Uribe administration and, at the time, was facing a serious international image 
problem.   By the time Uribe left office, a number of well-publicized human rights 
scandals had severely tarnished Colombia’s international image.231  These scandals had 
created problems for Colombia during trade negotiations with the US and the EU, which 
by that time had essentially stalled.  The Obama administration was in no rush to 
accelerate debate in Congress and for some time had gently pressured Colombia to show 
progress on the human rights front.   
According to Senator Cristo, Colombia also suffered from “almost total isolation 
in the hemisphere.”232  Plan Colombia, and the presence of American bases in the 
territory aggravated Colombia’s neighbors, many of whom feared that it would broaden 
the military reach of the United States in the Andes and the Caribbean at a time when 
they were still wary of American influence in the region.  
In March 2008, the Colombian areal bombing of a FARC camp in neighboring 
Ecuador that killed Raúl Reyes (FARC’s second-in-command) degenerated into the worst 
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diplomatic crisis the region had seen in years.233   Although the crisis, mediated by the 
Dominican Republic, eventually ended in handshakes, the result was that Colombia and 
the US emerged more isolated than ever in the region.  Relations with neighboring 
Venezuela continued to degenerate after Uribe claimed to have obtained hard evidence, 
from Raúl Reyes’ recovered laptop, that proved that Venezuela had been harboring 
FARC and ELN rebels.  By the time Santos was elected, there was talk of a possible war 
with Venezuela.  Only days after taking office, in August of 2010, in a defining break 
with Uribe’s contentious style, Santos insisted on “turning the page” with its neighbor 
and personally met with Chavez to reestablish diplomatic ties with Venezuela.234 
By signing the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law, Santos sent a powerful signal 
to the international community that Colombia was also “turning the page “ on its own 
history of violence and human rights abuses.  According to Senator Cristo, Santos 
committed himself completely to the project because: “it provided him with an instrument 
of international and domestic legitimacy.”235  Santos’ attitude on the issue of justice and 
reparation was markedly different from that of his former boss and according to Cristo: 
“…sounded like celestial music to the ears of the international community.”  Eventually, 
even the harsh criticisms received as a result of the “false positives” scandal begun to 
attenuate slowly (Cristo, 2012).   
The law essentially became, as a major Colombian newspaper recognized: the 
“key to launching Colombia’s international relations,” and “evidence of the country’s 
                                                
233 Venezuela and Ecuador immediately assailed Colombia for having violated Ecuador’s sovereignty, cut 
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shifting policy on matters of human rights… the determining factor in de-freezing the 
process over the FTA with the United States.”236  
It is evident that Santos understood the international symbolic power of the law.  
At a meeting with legislators, Santos recounted how the Colombian Ambassador to the 
US, Gabriel Silva, had told him that the perception of Colombia in the US had changed 
radically.  As a result of the law’s passage, Colombia was now being perceived as a 
“civilized and democratic society.”  The Ambassador assured the President that the law 
would enormously improve the chances of the FTA’s passage.  According to Cristo 
(2012), there really could not be a better issue with which to reestablish Colombia’s 
leadership position in the region and to situate the country as a privileged interlocutor 
with the United States and the European Union.  The US Congress passed the trade 
agreement with Colombia on October 12, 2011 and it went into effect on May 15, 
2012.237  A free trade agreement with the EU went into effect a year later. 
 
1448 AS A STEP BACKWARDS? 
A number of human rights experts have received Colombia’s new Victims’ Law 
with guarded skepticism.  Although, in principle, they have welcomed Colombia’s 
official recognition of the internal armed conflict and the robust measures of transitional 
justice embodied in the law, they fear that, in some respects, the new initiative could 
produce some backsliding with regards to IDP rights. 
                                                
236 El Espectador. “Juan Fernando Cristo: ‘La ley es fruto del consenso.’” May 1, 2011. 
(http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/juan-fernando-cristo-ley-fruto-del-consenso-articulo-
266577) 
237 See: BBC News.  “Colombia-US free trade agreement comes into force.” May 15, 2012. 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18069469) 
  247 
These activists recognize that in some ways the Victims’ and Land Restitution 
Law stole much of the momentum generated by the Constitutional Court’s crusade to 
secure the rights of IDPs.  It arguably returned the initiative over Colombia’s policy on 
human rights to the executive.   They also recognized that the law, as laudable as it was, 
remained largely a promise, which would be difficult to implement – particularly given 
the limited capacity of the state and the continuation of the conflict.    
The law indeed diffused much attention from some real progress that was being 
made by the Constitutional Court and its Follow-up Commission.  By reorganizing a 
number of state bureaucracies and redefining the government’s measures of attention to 
IDPs, the law also invalidated many of the courts’ orders that had proven to be a real 
headache to the Uribe administration.238  Some observers, such as Colombia’s legal 
scholar Roberto Carlos Vidal Lopez, have gone so far as to suggest that, in part, Law 
1448 may have been an attempt by the executive branch to wrestle back control of its IDP 
policy from a powerful independent court. 239  As previously discussed, the state had 
come under a lot of stress as a result of T-025.  The executive branch had lost much of its 
autonomy with regards to Colombia’s internal displacement policy, and by default, had 
lost control over a significant part of the state budget to the Court.    
The Constitutional Court itself recognized the possibility that it was being 
relegated to the sidelines as a result of Law 1448.  After all, the executive branch had 
retaken the initiative and halted much of the momentum generated by the Court.  Indeed, 
many of the Court’s orders were invalidated when 1448 effectively re-shuffled the whole 
government bureaucracy that was attending to the rights of IDPs.240  While the bill was 
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still being debated in Congress, the Court issued a ruling (Auto 219 of 2011), which 
reiterated the “unconstitutional state of affairs” with regards to displacement, reminded 
the government that it would continue to be bound by the Court’s previous orders, and 
warned the state that it could not derogate its responsibilities towards IDPs by creating a 
new category of “victims.”  
Human rights activists have expressed a number of additional frustrations with the 
law.  Among other things, they fear that the law essentially killed the possibility of 
reintegrating IDPs in areas of reception where they continue to live in very poor 
conditions.  They point to the fact that most IDPs in fact do not wish to return to their 
places of origin particularly because, in many cases, the threats that drove them away in 
the first place have not dissipated.  According to a Senior Associate at WOLA, this 
essentially made a mockery of the international humanitarian principle of non-
refoulement, and more significantly, has been responsible for additional bloodshed.241 242  
As long as the conflict is ongoing and the armed groups remain present in the 
countryside, people seeking restitution of their lands have been put in very risky 
situations.  In fact, many IDPs who returned to the sights of displacement to reclaim their 
land were again threatened and even killed. In the first two years following the law’s 
implementation at least 20 IDP leaders were assassinated.243  In the absence of effective 
protection mechanisms, the implementation of this law is bound to create more 
bloodshed.    
                                                                                                                                            
 
241 Non-refoulement refers to the principle of not forcibly returning or expelling refugees or IDPs to places 
where their lives or freedoms could be threatened. 
242 Interview with Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli (WOLA; formerly at Brookings’ IDP Project).  March 28, 
2013. Washington, DC. 
243 See: US Office on Colombia, Against All Odds: The Deadly Struggle of Land Rights Leaders in 
Colombia.  October 2011 (http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/uploads/application-
pdf/againstalloddsfinal.pdf) 
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These advocates also claim that, several years after the law’s passage, the 
Colombian government has already been ignoring many of the Constitutional Court’s 
previous orders and decisions.  They claim, for example, that the state failed to follow 
through with mechanisms to engage IDPs in ongoing consultations (known in Colombia 
as “consulta previa”) during the process of the law’s implementation.  Consequently, the 
state has steamrolled over collective land rights of IDPs in traditional indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities (for example in Afro-Colombian communities of 
Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó, in the department of Chocó).244   
Arguably, Law 1448 represented a step back with respect to a number of IDP 
rights such as the rights to resettlement and consultation.  The absence of appropriate 
security guarantees is of particular concern here.  It is also true that the law has relegated 
the Constitutional Court to a lesser role.  However, that was to be expected because the 
Court institutionally was not in a position to dictate public policy indefinitely.  Eventually 
the state had to be allowed to take ownership over such an important issue.   The critical 
fact is that the government’s new legal framework of IDP protections incorporated most 
of the advances and concessions fought for by the Court and the Follow-Up Commission.  
Most importantly the law effectively put land restitution and the protection of victims’ 
rights at the forefront of the government’s agenda for the first time.   Law 1448 also 
allocated significantly more resources to addressing the problem of displacement than 
Law 387 ever did.  Moreover, by officially recognizing Colombia’s internal conflict, the 
law effectively committed the country to international humanitarian law.  
It is not surprising to hear some quibbling on this matter within the human rights 
community.  Close to a decade of fierce battles with the Uribe administration left them 
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skeptical at best, and cynical at worst, of any government initiative.  As a veteran human 
rights worker explained to me, in general, human rights advocates tend to call attention to 
the deficiencies of a governments’ policy.  In many ways, it is their job to do so, with the 
hope that somehow their stance will result in the improvement of such policies.   
Many of the deficiencies to which human rights activists point can be traced to 
Colombia’s shift in frame from addressing the rights of IDPs to more broadly addressing 
the rights of victims.  Although the population affected was largely the same, the new 
frame emphasized rights of transitional justice (i.e. to truth, reparation, and restitution) 
over some of the peculiar needs and rights that IDPs had by virtue of being displaced.  
This did not necessarily mean that the state would ignore these.  The international IDP 
principles outlined in Law 387 of 1997, T-025 of 2004, and the many subsequent 
Constitutional Court orders remained very much in place, and in some instances were 
incorporated into the text of the new law.  The shift in frame did, however, imply a less 
focused approach towards displacement.  Ultimately, Law 1448 and Colombia’s 
deepening commitment to international human rights, which the law symbolized, were a 
significant victory for Colombia’s IDPs.  The vast majority of country observers and 
human rights activists interviewed agreed that, despite some problems, Colombia’s 
Victims’ Law overall represented a tremendous step forward in addressing the rights of 
IDPs. 
 
1448 AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD 
Despite these problems, very few human rights advocates would go as far as to 
suggest that 1448 was a bad law, or to question Santos’ ultimate motivations.  Most 
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recognize, however, that the law has put human rights and IDP defenders in a bind.245  
While they acknowledge the law offers a great legal and institutional framework to 
promote the rights of IDPs they also recognize that the law was far from perfect.  It 
certainly could be improved if it followed international standards a little closer and fine-
tuned its mechanisms for IDP participation.  However, by most accounts, it is without a 
doubt the best law of its kind ever produced internationally and it represents a decisive 
step for Colombia (UNDP & Fundación Social, 2011).  
Many observers also recognize that the law presents challenges that are going to 
be very difficult to overcome.  It is very unlikely that Colombia could successfully repair 
all victims and return all stolen lands within the intended timeframe of ten years.  The 
situation with land titles is certainly messy and the Ministry of Agriculture, which has the 
responsibility for coordinating the bulk of the restitution effort, may be in a difficult 
position to do so, since it has historically been one of the most impoverished and 
marginalized entities in the Colombian government.246   
This said, no one I interviewed considered the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law 
to be an exercise in “window dressing.”  Given the high levels of international 
expectations elicited by the Law as well as the fact that so many international entities and 
donors are heavily invested in its implementation, this law is unlikely to meet the same 
fate as Law 387, which was essentially forgotten for a number of years.  Colombia is 
arguably in a very different situation than it had been a decade earlier. 
One of the interesting aspects of Law 1448 is that it incorporates a number of 
international soft law instruments and norms in addition to the UN Guiding Principles on 
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Internal Displacement.  According to Representative Guillermo Rivera, who sponsored 
the law in the House of Representatives, the drafters of the law conducted a thorough 
review of international norms regarding the transitional justice and victim reparation with 
the help of the UN representative in Colombia.247  The law incorporates more broadly 
international norms regarding transitional justice and victims’ rights to truth, justice and 
reparation.  It takes into account for example the “UN Principles on Housing and 
Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons” also known as the “The 
Pinheiro Principles.”  It also takes into account another soft law instrument known as the 
Joinet Principles to Combat Impunity, which were ignored during the drafting of 
Colombia Peace and Justice Law.248   
 
LAW 1448: CONCLUSIONS 
The Victims’ and Land Restitution Law of 2011 has arguably made Colombia 
into the country with the most advanced institutional responses to internal displacement 
in the world.  Like the two previous achievements (Law 387 and T-025) Law 1448 was 
the product of coordinated domestic and international efforts suggestive of a 
“boomerang” strategy of activism.  There were several mechanisms at play. 
First of all, the victims’ rights movement in Colombia had its origins in the 
success of a similar movement in Spain.  It flourished and gained prominence in 
Colombia through a process of learning and trans-national networking that was led by 
Spanish activists.  This dynamic, in fact, was reminiscent of a similar process that took 
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place during the 1990s where Colombia’s IDP movement was engendered from the 
Central American experience. 
Secondly, the network of international organizations (i.e. UN agencies, the Inter-
American Human Rights Court and Commission) and INGOs that had set up a presence 
in Colombia since the late 1990s became instrumental in drafting, promoting and fighting 
for the integrity of Colombia’s Victims’ Law.  By the late 2000s these organizations had 
a sizable presence in the country and were clearly pushing their weight around. 
A third component of this strategy was the exercise of international instrumental 
pressure, most notably through trade negotiations whose outcome was implicitly linked to 
Colombia’s human rights record.  In this respect, the United States continued to play an 
important role as an agent of change.  To a perhaps lesser extent, the country’s regional 
isolation was again a motivator for Colombia to reassert its commitment to international 
human rights norms.  On the flip side, the promise of international support in the form of 
funding and technical assistance from the US and other western countries may have 
facilitated Colombia’s commitment to the process of transitional justice. 
A number of structural domestic factors were critical in facilitating Colombia’s 
deepening commitment to the IDP and more generally with the human rights regime in 
2011.  The first of these is presidential leadership.  As with Law 387 of 1997 it is difficult 
to imagine that Colombia’s Victims’ Law would have become a reality without the 
backing of the presidency.  After all, Uribe had managed to arrest human rights progress 
during his two terms in office.  Despite the outspoken opposition by Uribe, his 
enormously popular predecessor and former mentor, Santos took a significant gamble, 
and managed to rally the rank and file of his party behind the law project, reconstitute a 
governing coalition, and mobilize the resources necessary to implement such an 
ambitious and complex policy. 
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It is difficult to ascertain to what extent Santos, like Samper before him, was 
motivated by genuine ideological beliefs, and to what extent he was guided by a 
pragmatic sense of opportunism in pushing though the Victims’ Law.  The most likely 
scenario is that he was motivated by a little bit of both.  Ultimately his decisions, like that 
of Samper before him, ended up benefiting the international standing of both the country 
and his administration.  Santos’ turn in favor of human rights clearly paid off by 
accelerating the passage of Colombia’s free trade agreements with the US and Europe. 
A second critical structural factor that facilitated the institution of this law was the 
prospect of an end to the conflict.  The shift in the balance of the conflict that was made 
possible by Plan Colombia and Uribe’s heavy-handed assault on the guerrillas made 
addressing the IDP crisis from the vantage point of transitional justice both much more 
feasible and necessary. 
It is much easier to address the needs of IDPs once a conflict has ended, or in the 
case of Colombia, subsided significantly.  Among other things, when the conflict 
subsides the flow of IDPs decreases, displaced persons are more willing and likely to 
return to their place of origin, the state is in greater control of the territory and is more 
willing to divert resources away from the war effort and to address the needs of its 
victims. The state is also more willing to seek reconciliation and less likely to treat 
victims and IDPs with suspicion.  
In order to achieve a final end to Colombia’s half-century-long conflict it was 
necessary to implement some sort of transitional justice process, and in particular, to 
resolve the issue of abandoned and stolen lands.  Without this type of resolution the cycle 
of grievances would eventually lead to greater political instability and a perpetuation of 
the high level of violence which had characterized most of Colombia’s history.  Law 
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1448 was necessary to promote social cohesion, foster trust in the state, and reestablish 
the rule of law. 
The story of Law 1448 and the shift in frame that it implicated suggests another 
important lesson, namely that local actors play a much more central and autonomous role 
than expected in the process of international norm diffusion.  Much of the literature on 
norm diffusion tends to portray countries as passive recipients of international norms.  
Countries either accept or reject foreign norms.  At best local agents reconstruct foreign 
norms, or “localize” them to better fit their countries’ cognitive prior identities (Acharya, 
2004) or engage in boomerang politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  In either case the 
initiative of norm diffusion lies mostly in the hands of foreign norm entrepreneurs who 
pressure and socialize states into compliance.   
What the Colombian story illustrates is that local activists play a much more 
central role than previously believed.  They pick and choose among international norms 
that best fit their agenda, in turn enlisting the help of transnational networks to pressure 
the state to comply with these.  When a norm outlives its usefulness, local agents may 
choose to champion a new norm, changing their discourse and forging new international 
alliances.  In the case of Colombia’s displacement crisis in the late 2000s, activists 
gradually reframed the issue of the crisis within the frame of transitional justice and 
increasingly less as an issue of forced migration, in order to better fit the historical 
moment and tag onto a powerful new foreign norm. 
 
SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY 
The last three chapters told the story of how Colombia, over the span of over two 
decades, gradually developed into a case of deep compliance with the international IDP 
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regime.  As these chapters suggest, Colombia’s evolving compliance with the 
international regime to protect IDP took place in three major phases.   
During a first phase Colombia became rhetorically committed to protecting its 
IDP population.  More specifically, by the late 1990’s the Colombian government took a 
series of important steps.  The state acknowledged the existence of an important 
humanitarian crisis in Colombia.  It began to differentiate internal forced displacement 
from other forms of economically-driven internal migration.  It recognized the its 
responsibility for protecting this vulnerable population.  Most importantly, however, the 
state recognized its obligation to comply with a number of emerging international norms 
on internal displacement.  This phase culminated in one of the earliest and most 
comprehensive national legislations on internal displacement in the world – Law 387 of 
1998. 
In a second phase, detailed in Chapter 4, Colombia moved from rhetoric into 
action finally implementing its new law.  During this phase Colombia also recognized the 
UN Guiding Principles as constituting binding international law.  Despite a heavy-handed 
attempt by a popular administration to rollback Colombia’s commitment towards its 
displaced population and with these principles, a powerful judiciary succeeded in forcing 
the state to implement its IDP Law.  Colombia’s Constitutional Court also established 
some of the most advanced and elaborate institutional frameworks to protect IDPs and 
monitor compliance with the Guiding Principles thus ensuring that the genie could not be 
put back in the bottle.  This experience would suggest that, in the absence of international 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, a powerful and independent judiciary is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for implementation. 
During a third phase, and in a context of transitional justice, the Colombian 
government redoubled its commitment to protecting the rights of its IDP population by 
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putting in place an ambitious and unprecedented program of reparation and land 
restitution.  Although it is still too early to determine the success of Colombia’s Victims’ 
Law’s implementation, Law 1448 had arguably made Colombia into a case of robust 
compliance with international IDP norms. 
In attempting to understand the events that led to these three historical 
benchmarks for the protection of IDPs—Law 387 (1997), the Constitutional Courts’ 
decision T-025 (2004), and Colombia’s Victims’ and Land Restitution Law – the last 
three chapters have identified a number of critical factors that were responsible for 
Colombia’s deepening level of compliance.  To one extent or another, these events seem 
to have resulted from the coordinated efforts of domestic and international activists. 
Activists’ efforts benefitted from the existence of relatively strong domestic 
institutions in Colombia that allowed for successful domestic mobilization.  These 
included a vibrant Colombian civil society with a relatively free press, a socially 
committed Catholic Church, sophisticated academic institutions and a courageous 
generation of human rights activists and IDP leaders often willing to put their lives in 
danger.  Colombia also benefitted from comparatively strong democratic institutions, 
particularly an independent and powerful Constitutional Court, which was able to 
forcefully challenge the executive when necessary and a political constitution in place 
that recognized the primacy of international law. 
International and, in particular, regional pressure appears to have been a key 
factor in pushing Colombia to address its displacement crisis and to protect the rights of 
its IDP population.  The efforts of the office of the RSG and of the various UN entities 
that set up a presence in Colombia in during the 1990s served as important catalysts for 
the promotion of IDP norms.  It was, however, regional factors that played the most 
critical role.  Specifically these factors included the preexistence of important regional 
  258 
norms such as the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, which facilitated the adoption of the 
Guiding Principles.  It also included the existence of a well-developed regional human 
rights activist network, which emerged out of the hemisphere’s experience with the wars 
in Central America and the wave of democratization in the 1980s, that was able to turn its 
attention to Colombia when the crisis deteriorated in the 1990s.  It included powerful 
regional human rights institutions such as the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court in San Jose, which served both as agents of change 
and forums of socialization.  Finally, it included a powerful regional hegemon, in the 
form of the United States that used both normative and instrumental means of pressure to 
compel Colombia into improving its human rights record.  
 
During the 1990s, while the international regime to protect IDPs was still in a 
phase of early development, the Guiding Principles were still being drafted, and UNHCR 
had yet to included internal displacement in its mandate, Latin America was ahead of the 
game having engendered a number of important regional norms and initiatives on force 
internal migration.  By the mid 1990s Latin America also had in place one of the most 
advanced and sophisticated regional human rights regimes and human rights activist 
networks in the world.  The region’s human rights and refugee regime greatly 
strengthened and matured during the fight for democracy, particularly in the Southern 
Cone in the 1970s and 1980s, and during the civil wars in Central America during 1980s 
and 1990s.  The peace processes in Central America, in particular, ensured that the region 
already had some significant experience in recognizing and addressing the problem of 
internal forced displacement.  
This regional history and the institutions it engendered explains, in great part, why 
countries in Latin America, together with countries in Europe and Central Asia, were 
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some of the first to comply with international norms for the protection of IDPs, as was 
suggested in the statistical study (Chapter Two).   
The last three chapters presented a number of illustrations of how and why 
regional factors mattered.   Following the third wave of democratization in Latin America 
and the end of the conflicts in Central America, the regional human rights apparatus 
turned its attention to the war in Colombia, which at the time represented the most 
pressing humanitarian situation in the hemisphere, and in the process internationalized 
the conflict.  During the drive up to the institution of Law 387 in the late 1990s and 
before the UN Guiding Principles were in place, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees provided the basis for Colombia’s legislation.  During this time Central 
American human rights experts assisted the Colombian government to begin to 
conceptualize the problem and draft its initial policy on internal displacement.  The 
Permanent Consultation for Displacement in the Americas (CPEDIA) even provided the 
first working definition of internal displacement.  A number of INGOs that had 
previously worked in Central America – most notably The International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) – 
also played a critical role in organizing, funding, and training of Colombia’s NGOs so 
that these became more legitimate and more effective advocates for IDP rights.  During 
the late 2000s, the push for a victims’ rights law was once again inspired by 
developments in another Spanish-speaking country.  Spanish norm entrepreneurs both 
motivated and supported Colombia’s victims’ movement to such an extent that Former 
Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar was elected Honorary President of the 
Colombian NGO Víctimas Visibles.249  
                                                
249 See: Fundacion Víctimas Visibles (http://fundacionvictimasvisibles.org/fundadores). 
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The regional human rights network, particularly through the work of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, was responsible for raising international awareness on 
the Colombian crisis, which made it very difficult for the government to continue to 
ignore the problem.  When the Colombian government failed to properly implement its 
policy on internal displacement or even tried to roll back its commitment towards IDPs 
during the Uribe administration, Latin American human rights organizations based in 
Washington effectively lobbied the US government to apply its significant material 
leverage to hold the Colombian government accountable. 
In this regard, it may be argued that the US’ history in the region had a subtle yet 
powerful influence on Colombia.  As the US became increasingly ensnarled in 
Colombia’s conflict following the implementation of Plan Colombia during the 2000s, 
the specter of the US’s problematic past involvement motivated the US to make the 
promotion of human rights a priority in Colombia.  In many ways the regional human 
rights network had sensitized US policymakers enough for them to attempt to avoid the 
types of gross human rights abuses that had resulted from former US interventions in the 
region.  
The case of Colombia illustrates how regional factors influence norm diffusion 
via a number of channels that combine both normative and instrumental means of 
pressure.  The following final chapter will analyze more closely this study’s findings 
while suggesting a number of additional cases of internal displacement around the world 
that may be included in a future research agenda. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Why and when do states chose to commit to the international regime to protect 
IDPs and implement international rules that are essentially non-binding and can be 
politically costly?  Aside from some scattered anecdotal evidence, until now there has 
been little empirical proof that “soft laws,” such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (GP), have really made a difference.  Nevertheless, many norm 
entrepreneurs continue to push for “soft law” solutions to address a number of 
international governance challenges, both within and outside of the world of forced 
migration (Betts, 2010b). 
This study was driven simultaneously by theoretical and policy concerns.  
Theoretically, the dominant neo-liberal and neo-realist theories of international relations 
have had difficulty explaining why countries would comply with a regime based on 
“privately generated soft law” (Abbott, 2007) in the absence of coercion from stronger 
states or when transactional costs are high.   From a policy perspective, as the recent IDP 
crisis in Syria has demonstrated, internal forced displacement represents an urgent and 
growing challenge to the international community, not only because of the enormity of 
human suffering it entails, but also because internal displacement can have significant 
spillover effects into areas of international security, economic development, and 
international migration.  
In this chapter I will briefly review some of this study’s most significant findings, 
suggest further countries in which to conduct structured comparative case studies, and 
discuss some policy implications and recommendations from my research. 
  262 
REVIEW OF ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS 
This study has found that two decades after the UN began to address the plight of 
internally displaced people and fifteen years after the elaboration of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement the IDP regime is indeed making a difference.  
Despite its unusual origins and “soft law” nature, the international regime to protect IDPs 
has compelled a number of countries to institute and implement a number of measures to 
protect and assist IDPs in various stages of displacement. 
International commitment to the GP grew steadily during the period of under 
review (1990-2010).  During this time, an increasing number of countries with IDP crises 
as a result of conflict and violence instituted domestic legislation in line with the GP. 
Commitment to the regime increased even among counties that, at least in theory, should 
have been most disinclined to protect their displaced populations.  These included 
countries with protracted displacement, countries where the state was primarily 
responsible for displacing its own population, countries in which the conflict was drawn 
along ethnic lines, countries still at war, and countries with limited or low capacity to 
comply with the Guiding Principles.  
As a particularly encouraging sign, this study found that, on average, countries 
that signaled a commitment with the IDP regime saw the magnitude of their displacement 
crisis decrease.250  Although this study did not examine in more depth the effectiveness of 
domestic laws, this finding suggests reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the Guiding 
Principles are having a positive effect on displacement. The case study on Colombia 
illustrated that institution of domestic protections for IDPs in line with the GP generally 
benefited the displaced population by guarantying their basic political rights, providing 
                                                
250 While on average countries with domestic legislation on displacement saw the proportion of IDPs drop 
over time in a few cases, such as Colombia, displacement continued to grow despite the implementation of 
domestic protections.   
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them with needed humanitarian aid and access to basic services and eventually 
facilitating the return or reparation of their abandoned or stolen land.  
The statistical study suggested that norm entrepreneurs have been largely 
responsible for driving commitment and compliance with the Guiding Principles.  This is 
perhaps not surprising for a regime that was largely created by non-state actors with very 
limited involvement of states.   In particular, the study found that countries’ engagement 
by the UN special representative on internal displacement (RSG) and the UN’s refugee 
agency (UNHCR) were significant predictors of commitment. Regional human rights 
organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) played 
an instrumental role in the norms’ diffusion.  On the other hand, the use of international 
instrumental leverage by sovereign states, such as economic sanctions or the use of 
military force, did not have a clear influence on commitment.   This does not preclude the 
possibility that in some cases, such as Iraq, coercion or international material pressure 
may be effective.  It only indicates that, in general, compliance with the regime is driven 
by normative pressure, particularly at the regional level.  
Many factors we would have expected to influence countries’ likelihood to 
commit to the regime did not have a clear and significant statistical effect.   These 
included measures of state fragility, the continuation of hostilities, the size of the 
displacement crisis, countries’ level of embeddedness to the existing international human 
rights regime, and whether the state was primarily responsible for displacing its own 
people.  This, of course, does not allow us to dismiss these variables all together.  In 
some cases, qualitative evidence suggests that many of these variables did matter.  
However, the quantitative analysis does suggest that these factors alone cannot tell the 
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story of commitment and compliance with the regime.251  By far the biggest predictor of a 
country’s propensity to institute domestic legislation in accordance with the GP during 
the last two decades was its geographical location.  This suggests that regional politics 
plays a much more central role in the diffusion of IDP norms than originally expected. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL EFFECTS 
The statistical analysis, summarized in Chapter 2, highlights the centrality of 
regional isomorphism in predicting commitment to the IDP regime. Specifically, the 
analysis suggests that a country’s regional location is a bigger predictor of commitment 
than any other factor highlighted in the literature.  Countries in Europe/Central Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean are significantly more likely to institute laws on 
displacement than countries in South Asia, East Asia/Pacific and the Middle East & 
North Africa.  The norm appears to have diffused along regional lines at different times 
and at different rates.  This finding suggests that there is something about the regional 
variable that can not necessarily be captured by measures of development, democracy, 
state capacity, and embeddedness, which exerts tremendous influence on countries’ 
likelihood to comply with international norms.  
Other studies of norm diffusion have also alluded to this phenomenon.  Simmons 
& Elkins (2004), for example, found clustering in the diffusion of economic liberalization 
policies, which they explained as the result of a combination of growing competition and 
                                                
251 Although a large-n longitudinal examination of all documented cases of displacement is a good place to 
begin to analyze patterns of commitment with the international IDP regime, there are admittedly important 
limitations to studying this issue using purely quantitative methods, which were outlined in Chapter 2.  In 
conducting this study I repeatedly ran into the old perennial dilemma of quantitative analysis that: “Not 
everything that can be measured is important, and not everything that is important can be measured” 
(attributed to Einstein).  This is particularly true of a very complex phenomenon of forced migration where 
data is often scarce and flawed, and where available proxy variables are often imperfect. 
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processes of social learning at a regional level.  Simmons (2009) suspected that the 
clustering in her study of commitment with international human rights instruments was 
primarily due to peer-pressure or countries’ attempts to avoid being singled out in regions 
in which most of their peers had committed to an instrument.  To my knowledge, 
however, no one has examined much in depth or offered a satisfactory explanation of 
why regional clustering happens.  With regards to displacement, it is unlikely that 
regional clustering can be simply reduced to issues of peer pressure, spillover effects, or 
reputational costs.  
Colombia’s growing commitment and compliance with the international IDP 
regime corroborated the statistical findings, detailed in Chapter Two, and suggested 
various ways in which regional factors play a central role in the diffusion of IDP norms.  
Regional clustering appears to occur for a variety reasons.  It can happen accidentally, for 
example, when norms originate out a particular regional experience or event, or when 
they have their genesis within a particular regional organization in which norm 
entrepreneurs have privileged access.   In the case of Colombia, the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement gained significant traction because: (1) they resonated with pre-
existing regional norms on forced migration; (2) Latin America was blessed with a 
mature and concentrated regional network of trans-national activism which served as a 
catalyst of norm diffusion; (3) Latin-America’s relatively powerful regional human rights 
institutions intervened on behalf of IDPs; and (4) the regional hegemon, driven largely by 
regional concerns, pressured Colombia to address its displacement crisis and contributed 
to capacity building.  Below I elaborate on each of these factors in more detail.  
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Regional Cultural Match 
In general, international norms have different levels of “cultural match” at the 
regional level as well as at the national level.  International norms may or may not 
resonate with preexisting regional norms and institutions.  This study found that the 
Guiding Principles had a comparatively strong resonance in Latin America primarily 
because their emergence coincided with the culmination of a regional peace process in 
Central America, where the issue of internal displacement was addressed at the interstate 
level. 
A decade prior to the elaboration of the GP, Latin America already had in place 
an elaborate refugee regime that recognized internal displacement as an issue of regional 
concern and set in place a number of measures to address displacement. The clearest 
example of this was the non-binding 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which 
was adopted by the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama) and 
countries in Central America to address the refugee crisis resulting from the civil wars in 
Central America.  Partly because of this, the international IDP regime had perhaps a 
much easier reception in the region.  Colombia, for example, based much of Law 387 on 
regional norms while the GP were still being drafted. 
More generally, Latin America has historically stood in stark contrast to other 
regions of the world in its acceptance of human rights norms.  In East Asia, for example, 
tightly-held traditional conceptions of national sovereignty has led countries to eschew 
any sort of international intervention in domestic matters.  Not surprisingly, human rights 
norms have had a difficult time taking hold in that region (Acharya, 2004; Katzenstein, 
2005).  
  267 
Regional Concentration of Transnational Activism 
Transnational human rights activism can take place simultaneously at the 
international and regional levels.  At the regional level, transnational activist networks 
(TANs) benefit from a number of factors, absent in the larger international context, that 
greatly facilitate the exchange of ideas and expertise.  This includes a more concentrated 
flow of people and information, geographical proximity, a shared language, cultural and 
historical similarities, as well as the existence of regional governance institutions.   
The development of Colombia’s internal displacement laws and policies 
illustrates the importance of regional activist networks in promoting commitment and 
compliance with international human rights norms.  During the early 1990s, as shown in 
Chapter Three, Colombia’s IDPs benefited from NGOs and regional initiatives that 
emerged as a result of the peace processes in Central America (Cohen & Sanchez-
Grazoli, 2001).   One of these, The Permanent Consultation on Internal Displacement in 
the Americas (CPDIA), was instrumental in helping the Colombian government draft 
Law 387 in 1997.  Colombia’s new law even adopted CPDIA’s definition of IDPs, 
without discussion.   
During the early 1990s, Colombia’s IDP and human rights organizations also 
received significant funding, training, and symbolic support from human rights 
organizations form Central America and Peru (i.e. ICVA).  The intervention of these 
Latin American NGOs allowed Colombian activism to gain legitimacy and become much 
more effective in challenging the government. 
Two decades later, Colombia’s victims’ movement (headed by Víctimas Visibles) 
imported the idea of a Victims’ Law from a similar movement in Spain.  In calling for the 
institution of a Victims’ Law in Colombia, domestic activists also benefited from the 
symbolic support and expertise of the Spanish government (Cristo, 2012).   Even though 
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Spain is technically situated in another region, its cultural, economic, political and 
historical links to Colombia were instrumental in facilitating the transplantation of this 
idea.  Not surprisingly, given its geopolitical interests and historical connection to Latin 
America, Spain has played the role of “norm entrepreneur” in the region on a number of 
other issues including, for example, helping to promote the rights of the LGBT 
community (Friedman, 2012). 
 
Regional Institutions   
Historically, regional intergovernmental bodies – and particularly human rights 
institutions – have been engines of norm diffusion.  They can exert normative pressure 
from above by issuing binding legal decisions, cease and desist orders, and more 
generally through a strategy of “naming and shaming” states with poor human rights 
records.  They can empower and provide greater legitimacy to marginalized domestic 
movements by giving them a voice and access to international forums through which to 
push forward these movements’ agendas and challenge their governments.  Regional 
judicial bodies can also support the decisions of domestic courts and human rights 
institutions.  More generally, like other international organizations, regional institutions 
can also be the engines of socialization of political elites through persuasion, mimicry 
and peer pressure (Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2001). 
In the case of Colombia, it is clear that the OAS and in particular its human rights 
system embodied by the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, 
played a pivotal role as both structures and agents of norm diffusion.  For more than two 
decades, both bodies applied constant pressure on the Colombian government to assist 
and protect IDPs by conducting country visits, holding public hearings, publishing 
  269 
scathing reports, and issuing a number of court rulings and precautionary measures for 
IDPs.  During the 1990s ,they called international attention to the crisis in Colombia, and 
provided Colombian human rights activists with a forum in which to challenge the 
Colombian government.  A decade later, the Inter-American System supported the efforts 
of Colombia’s Constitutional Court to hold the Colombian government accountable for 
its commitments on internal displacement. 
As a structure, the Inter-American Human Rights System was also the site of 
norm socialization of governing elites.  Over time, repeated interactions with Colombian 
government officials forced to respond to concerns and criticism inevitably sensitized the 
Colombian government to the language of human rights.  The system also contributed to 
the formation of an important number of Colombian jurists, who, at one time or another 
worked at the court or the commission before returning home to become agents of 
change.   
 
Neighboring Hegemon   
The actions of the United States, arguably the most important international 
hegemon in the region, played a key role in pushing Colombia to comply with the IDP 
regime.  Although the US has historically acted as both a global and regional hegemon, 
its posture towards Colombia’s displacement crisis can only be understood within the 
context of regional dynamics. 
The US’ international promotion of IDP norms, and human rights in general, has 
been very selective.  Whereas the US has been known to vigorously push for human 
rights advances in certain countries and regions of the world (i.e. Cuba, South Africa, and 
Iran), it has also ignored other crises altogether (i.e. Saudi Arabia, and most of Sub-
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Saharan Africa).  Although the US, in principle, supports the IDP regime and includes 
internal displacement as an item of concern in its 2002 National Security Strategy report 
(Bush, 2002), it has been selective in advancing the IDP agenda.252  
During the 1990s and 2000s, the US became increasingly concerned with the state 
of human rights and internal displacement in Colombia.  This preoccupation was in many 
ways the result of the US’ prior experience in the hemisphere and in particular its 
involvement in the conflicts in Central America during the 1980s.  Well-publicized 
atrocities in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador shaped the imagination and 
sensibilities of a generation of US activists and policy-makers who wanted to avoid 
involving the US in human rights violations.  These Americans sought to balance military 
assistance for its war on drugs with measures to promote human rights protections.   This 
became particularly urgent during a time when the US was increasingly vilified and 
isolated in the hemisphere as a wave of left-wing populism took hold of the region. 
As a result of this stance, US military assistance and later trade relations became, 
to a certain extent, conditional on advancements in human rights arena.  The US 
maintained the issue of Colombia’s internal displacement crisis on its bilateral relations 
agenda.  As described in Chapter Four, through Plan Colombia, the US financed a 
number of capacity building measures and facilitated institutional reform that made it 
easier for Colombia to comply with IDP norms.  Among other things, US assistance 
helped to fortify social institutions and elements within the Colombian government that 
championed the rights of IDPs.  
Overall, the case of Colombia illustrates well the need to take into account the 
regional context in order to understand the diffusion of human rights norms.  The various 
                                                
252 Telephone interview with Jeff Drumtra ((Policy Advisor, US Department of State’s Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Policy and Resource Planning). March 8, 2012.   
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normative and instrumental mechanisms of norm diffusion identified in the case of 
Colombia’s deepening compliance with the IDP regime are admittedly universal.  To one 
extent or another, they have been applied to other cases of displacement in other regions 
of the world with mixed success.  These mechanisms and the structural factors described 
are necessary but not sufficient engines of compliance.  It is not until the regional context 
is added that the full picture materializes.  Ultimately, the big lesson of this study is that 
we need to pay attention to the broader regional context.   
 
REGIONAL ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE 
As with many insights in international relations theory, this is not necessarily 
news to international human rights practitioners and norm entrepreneurs.  From the 
inception of the regime in the early 1990s, norm entrepreneurs at The Brookings 
Institution and the United Nations intuitively understood the importance played by 
regional factors.    
In a book published the same year that the GP were introduced, its principal 
authors, Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng, argued that in the presence of an often 
unwilling and ineffective UN system, regional institutions were “likely candidates to 
become the first line of defense” in preventing situations of internal displacement and 
protecting its victims (1998b).  An entire chapter of their book Masses in Flight, in fact, 
was dedicated to analyzing and suggesting possible regional responses.  
One of the results of this insight is that norm entrepreneurs have allocated their 
limited resources to focus their attention on Sub-Saharan Africa, where the internal 
displacement has historically been most prevalent, by pushing for binding regional 
conventions on internal displacement.  This explains, in great part, the efforts that went 
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into creating the Kampala Convention, the Great Lakes Protocol, choosing an well-
respected African diplomat as the first RSG and a promising young African jourist as the 
third and current RSG. 
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the study’s findings regarding the regional 
dynamics of the IDP regime are generalizable to other international regimes.  Evidence of 
similar regional clustering phenomena with regards to other international normative 
regimes would suggest that, in general, regional factors are important for the process of 
norm diffusion.  This study’s findings, however, are more likely to be generalizable to the 
diffusion of other types of human rights norms.  These types of norms are particular in 
the sense that they are motivated by moral principles, they are essentially non-economic, 
they relate exclusively to the internal affairs of countries and do not really seek to resolve 
problems of a collective action.  
 
COMMITMENT VS. IMPLEMENTATION  
As discussed in Chapter One, commitment to and implementation of international 
norms are two distinct concepts.  Commitment refers to a state’s signaling mechanism 
that it intends to comply with a given norm.  In the case of “hard law” instruments, such 
as international human rights treaties or conventions, countries’ signal their commitment 
by formally adopting and ratifying a legal document.  For countries to signal meaningful 
commitment to a “soft law” regime, like the IDP regime, they must at a minimum 
institute domestic legislation that effectively makes these principles the “law of the land.” 
In principle, countries can commit to and then fail to implement an international norm. 
Implementation, on the other hand, refers to the process of putting international 
norms or obligations into practice by incorporating them into domestic law and then 
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enforcing these laws (Shelton, 2000).  It is a critical step towards compliance (Shelton 
2009).   At the very minimum, implementation of the GP involves the codification of 
laws and policies on displacement, the allocation of the necessary budgetary and 
institutional resources, the monitoring and enforcement of these laws, and the continuous 
collection of data on the displacement situation. 
As has been often the case with other human rights norms, this study confirmed 
that commitment to the IDP regime is not necessary followed by implementation or, for 
that matter, compliance with these norms.   Several studies have shown that there is often 
a decoupling between the ratification of human rights agreements and countries’ human 
rights practices (E. M. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; E. M. Hafner-Burton et al., 2008).  
Although they have found that human rights treaties exert independent global civil 
society effects that improve states’ actual human rights practices in general, repressive 
regimes often commit to these instruments as a matter of window dressing (E. M. Hafner-
Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). 
Because commitment with Soft laws, such as the Guiding Principles, involves 
much higher transactional costs than treaties, soft laws would arguably present countries 
with less of an opportunity to use commitment as window dressing.  After all, countries 
must go to greater lengths to signal credible commitment with the IDP regime by 
instituting domestic legislation on displacement.    
The Colombia case study demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case.  
Although Colombia’s Law 397 of 1997 represented at the time arguably the most 
promising and comprehensive legal framework on displacement, the Colombian 
government did not begin to properly implement it until many years later, when 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court intervened forcefully in 2004.   
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In the absence of any sort of international enforcement or monitoring 
mechanisms, compliance depends largely on the ability of domestic actors to mobilize, 
monitor and hold the state accountable. These actors may include IDP groups, human 
rights activists and an independent judiciary.   These can certainly take advantage, as was 
the case in Colombia, of the support of international allies who can exercise instrumental 
and normative pressure on the state from abroad.  In the absence of these domestic factors 
the prospects of implementation and compliance of IDP laws would appear to be bleak.  
 
Transnational Activist Links are Essential 
Commitment with the IDP regime depends in great part on the existence of 
transnational activist links.  In the case of Colombia, a country with a comparatively 
vibrant civil society, domestic activists initiated the call to address the displacement 
crisis.  It was not, however, until they linked up with international and regional networks 
of norm entrepreneurs that their movement developed any traction.   The efforts of 
various regional human rights NGOs and UN entities, many of which set up a presence in 
the country during the 1990s, served as important catalysts for the government to 
recognize the internal displacement crisis and its responsibility to address it in accordance 
with international norms.  
Before international human rights organizations began to focus on Colombia’s 
displacement crisis, Colombia’s domestic activists were fractured, marginalized and often 
intimidated by the government’s security apparatus and paramilitary agents.  It is unlikely 
that they would have achieved much traction on their own.  As illustrated in chapters 4 
and 5, Colombia’s deepening compliance with these norms was also greatly dependent on 
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the cooperation between sympathetic domestic state agencies and advocacy groups with 
international activists, donors and intergovernmental organizations. 
 
UNHCR  
The large-n statistical analysis showed that, after initial reluctance to move 
beyond their original mandate, UNHCR’s presence in host countries was significantly 
correlated with: (1) an attenuation of displacement crises, and (2) an increasing likelihood 
that host countries will commit to the IDP regime by enacting domestic legislation.   
Because UNHCR operates in countries with displacement at the behest of their 
governments it is probable that these correlations may not indicate causation but rather 
may both be the result of other external factors.  The case study on Colombia, however, 
indicated that UNHCR did play an important role in the drive to institute and implement 
policies on displacement in accordance with the GP.  This should be encouraging news to 
an international humanitarian community which has been at times frustrated with what 
they perceive to be a lack of commitment on the part of UNHCR to spearhead the 
promotion of IDP rights. 
The Colombian case also illustrated how other UN agencies, and in particular 
UNDP, played a critical role in promoting the regime.  As illustrated in Chapter 5, UNPD 
in fact played a much more central role in the institution of Colombia’s Victims and Land 
Restitution Law than any other international entity. 
Domestic Institutions 
There are a number of explanatory factors embedded in domestic institutions that 
enabled the implementation of IDP norms in Colombia.  These included the existence of 
a vibrant civil society with an independent press, sophisticated academic institutions and 
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activist organizations.  It included an independent and strong judiciary willing to 
challenge the government and to keep it accountable to its promises.  Finally, it included 
presidential leadership.   
A head of state may decide to champion international IDP norms for ideological 
reasons, for purely instrumental reasons, or most likely, as a result of a combination of 
theses two factors.  Commitment to human rights advances can instill an administration 
with international and domestic legitimacy in a time of crisis.  In the face of transnational 
mobilization on behalf of a country’s IDPs, strategic concessions may help nations’ 
leaders deflect criticism, foment important alliances, and solidify their hold on power.  It 
is clear that, in the case of Colombia, both presidents Samper (1994-1998) and Santos 
(2010 -  ) benefited from a boost of international legitimacy when they instituted 
important IDP reforms during a time when Colombia suffered from international 
isolation.  Both presidents were also arguably more politically progressive than their 
predecessors, which would suggest that they were particularly receptive to human rights 
claims.      
In my view, strong domestic institutions are a necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for implementation.  These domestic institutional factors, after all, have been 
present for most of Colombian modern history.  They alone could not explain the 
country’s process of deepening compliance.  It was only by considering international 
normative and instrumental pressure that the story of Law 387 of 1997, Decision T-025 
of 2004, and Law 1448 of 2011 can be fully explained.  On the other hand, it is unlikely 
that in the absence of these domestic factors Colombia, or any other country could move 
beyond commitment. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
Although the story of Colombia’s road to compliance with the international IDP 
regime is in many ways enlightening, it is admittedly difficult to generalize from a single 
case study.  Conclusions drawn exclusively from a single case pose a problem of external 
validity.  I have attempted to address this problem by including in my study a large-n 
statistical analysis, which includes all documented cases of displacement for the past two 
decades.  While the quantitative analysis supports the case study’s findings regarding the 
importance of regional factors, without further in depth structured comparative case 
studies it is difficult to say for certain how regional factors operate outside of Latin 
America. 
Additional comparative structured case studies of countries in other regions of the 
world would be necessary to confirm this study’s findings.  I would suggest choosing to 
study countries that are in some ways comparable to Colombia.  Specifically, it would be 
useful to examine mid-sized and middle-income countries that have similar displacement 
crises.  These would be crises characterized by a large number of IDPs (over one 
million), displaced over several decades and as a result of protracted low-intensity 
insurgencies.  Two cases that suggest themselves are Turkey and the Philippines.253   
Below I elaborate in more detail on the appropriateness of each of these cases and I 
suggest a third, more puzzling cases (Sudan), which could shed further light on the 
decoupling of commitment and implementation.  I also present a brief overview of each 
of these crises and suggest several interesting lines of inquiry. 
                                                
253 Colombia, Turkey and the Philippines exhibit similar patterns of IDP settlement, outside of refugee camps, among 
the urban poor, which makes IDPs significantly less visible. Although currently Colombia has a much larger total 
estimated IDP population than both the Philippines and Turkey its rate of displacement historically has been slow 
(characterized as “gota a gota” or “drop by drop”) and relatively invisible given the fact that, as in Turkey and the 
Philippines, IDPs in Colombia have tended to blend among the urban poor rather than concentrate in highly visible 
refugee camps. 
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Turkey  
Turkey represents a very interesting case to examine in its own right and in 
comparison to Colombia.  Like Colombia, Turkey has a significant IDP population as a 
result of a protracted, low intensity insurgency.  Turkey has also instituted a number of 
laws and policy reforms that signal some commitment to the international IDP regime 
even though their protection framework is not nearly as comprehensive as Colombia’s. 
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that there were 
between 954,000 and 1.2 million IDPs in Turkey as of the end of 2013 (representing until 
recently the largest IDP population in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia) (IDMC, 
2014a).  Most of Turkey’s displaced fled their homes between 1986 and 1995 as a result 
of a 30 year-long armed conflict between state security forces and Kurdish separatists in 
the southeast of the country.  Significant displacement has also been attributed to village 
raids and forced evacuations by state authorities in Kurdish areas. 
Like Colombia, Turkey has been negotiating with insurgents, particularly after the 
capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 and the announcement of a 
subsequent ceasefire.  Currently peace talks appear to have stalled despite some 
concessions made by state officials and institutions on Kurdish issues. 
Like Colombia, most IDPs have been left to fend for themselves.  Around half 
live in cities close to their places of origin such as Batman, Diyarbakir, Hakkari and Van. 
The rest live mainly in urban areas of western and northern Turkey. Many live in 
substandard, illegally built housing and are at risk of eviction. 
Located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey represents a 
particularly interesting case with which to evaluate the influence of regional effects on 
norm diffusion.  Over several decades the country’s political leadership has fluctuated 
between periods of closeness and distancing from the West.  At times Turkey has 
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seemingly embraced western values and sought greater integration with its European 
neighbors.  At other times, it has distanced itself from the West, asserting its sovereignty.   
These regional swings have arguably affected the country’s attitude towards international 
human rights and, in particular, its approach to the Kurdish question.  
During the 2000s Turkey also exhibited a number of necessary conditions for 
implementation as identified in this study.  This included a democratic opening initiated 
by the election in 2003 of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.   It also included a shift 
in balance of the conflict with the PKK marked by the capture Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 
and the PKK’s subsequent renunciation of violent methods of struggle.    
Because Turkey falls arguably close to the European/Western “sphere of 
influence,” I would expect it to represent a “most likely” case of commitment.  Turkey is 
a founding member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  It has been a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) for several decades and is in the process of applying for membership to the EU.   
In the eyes of norm entrepreneurs this has presented important institutional opportunities 
for European powers and human rights activist networks to pressure the government to 
comply with the IDP regime (Cohen, 1999).  Some observers believe that the EU was a 
particularly strong motivator for Turkey to recognize the problem of internal 
displacement in the first place.254  IDMC for example has been seeking, with some 
success, to include the issue of internal displacement in to the European accession 
                                                
254 Telephone interview with Simon Bagshaw (OCHA, Protectioon and Diaplacement Officer, Policy 
Development Branch).  May 9, 2012. 
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program.255  They credit this process with providing a strong driver for countries in the 
Balkans to address internal displacement.256  
It would be interesting to learn what role the European Union played, if any, in 
pressuring Turkey to address displacement as a condition for membership in the early 
2000s.  How influential was the European Human Rights System (including the 
European Court of Human Rights and European Commission on Human Rights) in 
affecting the country’s IDP policy?  To what extent was Turkey’s policy influenced by 
advances in other countries in the region (Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia) such as 
in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia?  How much of it was due to purely domestic 
factors? 
In 1997, the EU excluded Turkey from membership and the European Parliament 
blocked development aid citing human rights concerns.  This encouraged norm 
entrepreneurs to utilize early on these institutions as avenues for action (Cohen, 1999).  It 
would be important to establish what effect, if any, this had on Turkish policy.   Several 
years later, during the late 2000s, country experts noted that Turkey underwent an alleged 
“Eastward Shift,” distancing itself from Europe (Flanagan & Brannen, 2008).  A 
comparative study could determine if this shift had any significant effect on the country’s 
approach to Kurdish IDPs as some international activists feared.  A study on Turkey 
would also seek to trace the events that led Turkey to institute a number of important 
laws and policies on internal displacement during the mid 2000s, such as Law 5233 On 
                                                
255 Telephone interview with Nadine Walicki (IDMC, Country Analyst).  April 19, 2012. 
 
256 Ibid. 
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the Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against 
Terrorism (July 2004) using a similar methodology as the Colombian case study.257 
 
The Philippines  
IDMC (2014a) estimates that The Philippines is currently home to at least 
115,800 IDPs.  At its peak in 2008, the country’s IDP population was estimated to have 
reached approximately 600,000 (IDMC, 2014a).  Most of the displacement occurred in 
the southern region of Mindanao, one of the country’s poorest regions, where the 
government has fought a secessionist Moro (Muslim) insurgency for over 40 years.  It is 
estimated that at least 3.5 million people have, at one point or another, been displaced in 
the Philippines since 2000, but many returned home after violent episodes subsided.  
While most of displacement has been episodic, some groups have remained displaced for 
years where insecurity has continued (IDMC, 2009).  Over the years, millions more have 
been displaced because of natural disaster. The latest, Typhoon Bopha, alone is estimated 
to have displaced close to a million people.258  
Because of its geographical location the Philippines represents a least likely case 
of compliance with the IDP regime.  As a region East Asia and the Pacific Rim has 
historically been the most resistant to the diffusion of IDP norms. Although the region 
has been the site of significant displacement crises in the past two decades (i.e Indonesia, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Philippines, East Timor, among others), to date not a single country 
                                                
257 A study on Turkey should also look at this law’s subsequent amendments, as well as the institution of 
Regulation No. 7955 on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Measures Taken 
against Terrorism, (October 2004), the Integrated IDP Strategy Document (August 2005), and the Van 
Provincial Action Plan for Responding to IDP Needs (2006). 
 
258 “Philippines passes historic bill to protect internally displaced.” UNHCR.  (February 8, 2013). 
(http://www.unhcr.org/5114dd5c9.html) 
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in the region has committed to the international IDP regime by instituting domestic 
legislation on displacement.   Given the importance of regional factors in predicting 
commitment and compliance with the IDP regime, countries in East Asia/Pacific 
represent, on average, the “least likely” cases of compliance and should thus be included 
in future research. 
There are several possible explanations of why international displacement norms 
and human rights in general have made such limited inroads in East Asia and the Pacific 
Rim.  Although it is the largest and most populous region in the world, Asia lacks any 
sort of overarching regional structure similar to ones in Africa, Europe, and the Americas.  
According to Cohen and Deng (1998b), widely divergent political, economic and social 
systems as well as ideological differences have made it impossible for countries in the 
region to agree on such a body.  The matter is further complicated by the fact that China, 
the region’s largest and potentially most powerful state, has continuously opposed the 
importation of human rights models from other regions. 
The only working regional grouping in Asia is the sub-regional organization, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), headquartered in Jakarta.  Its principal 
purpose has been the promotion of regional stability and economic cooperation.  
Although refugee issues have at times been discussed when they have spillover effects 
(i.e. mass exoduses from Indochina), ASEAN has not featured internal displacement in 
its agenda.  ASEAN, in fact, has traditionally and scrupulously avoided taking positions 
on what it considers to be “internal” conditions within its member states (Cohen & Deng, 
1998b).  ASEAN, in principle, does not engage in the resolution of internal conflicts. 
A second explanation concerns the so-called “Asian values” debate.  Since their 
emergence as an area of international concern there has been a longstanding debate about 
the universality of human rights.  The debate has revolved around nonwestern 
  283 
conceptions of human rights, and in particular the question of Asia’s cultural differences.   
A number of Asian leaders and (often well connected) intellectuals have in the past 
asserted claims of legitimate, culturally-based differences that justified substantial 
deviations from standard international interpretations of human rights (Donnelly, 2003). 
During the 1990s, both former Prime Ministers of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew and 
Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad famously used the “Asian values” argument to justify 
authoritarian government over democracy by claiming that “Asian values” were 
significantly different from Western values and included a sense of loyalty and foregoing 
personal freedoms for the sake of social stability and prosperity (Zakaria, 1994). 
Although the merits of the “Asian values” arguments are dubious on many fronts 
(Donnelly, 2003), the fact that it has had such resonance illustrates the fact that internal 
displacement norms, and more generally human rights norms, arguably have had a 
limited reach in the region because of a weak “cultural match” (Acharya, 2004; Checkel, 
1999).  In her efforts to promote the Guiding Principles, Roberta Cohen, one of its main 
drafters, found it particularly hard to make any headway in the region.   In her words, 
East Asia was a special case because countries continued to maintain that IDPs were a 
purely domestic responsibility.259  She noted, for example, that India, a country with over 
500,000 IDPs and 200,000 refugees, had not even ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention 
or its 1967 Protocol.  
Within Asia, The Philippines would present a particularly interesting case study.  
Because The Philippines is a relatively democratic, middle-income country with 
historically strong ties to the West (i.e. strongly influenced by US interests) we would 
have expected the country to have been a relatively “easy target” for commitment with 
                                                
259 Interview with Roberta Cohen, (Co-founder and former Director of the Brookings Project on Internal 
Displacement).  March 28, 2013. Washington, DC. 
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the IDP regime (Brands, 1992; Karnow, 2010).  To date, however, the Philippines has yet 
to institute a domestic legal framework on internal displacement.  International 
advancements by norm entrepreneurs have been slow.  According to Elizabeth Ferris, the 
Co-Director of Brookings’ Internal Displacement Project, by 2012 The Philippines was 
the only country to have ever refused to grant the RSG an invitation.260  Nevertheless, in 
the very near future The Philippines could become the first country in the region to 
institute a comprehensive domestic legal framework for the protection of IDPs.  
Compared to other countries in the region, the Philippines satisfies many 
conditions that would predict compliance with the GP and human rights in general.  The 
Philippines is a democracy with a fairly progressive constitution and enjoys a 
comparatively vibrant civil society and an independent judiciary.  Historically, the 
country has maintained close relations with the US.  For the first half of the 20th century 
The Philippines was an American colony.  Today the country is considered by the US to 
be a key economic and strategic partner in the region.  The US currently operates over 20 
military bases in the country.  Between 2001 and 2010 it is estimated that the US 
provided The Philippines with more than $507 million in military aid.261  In the past the 
US has shown some willingness to exercise this leverage to pressure The Philippine 
government to improve its human rights record.  However, to the frustration of human 
rights activists, the US has appeared to be more interested in fighting terrorism and 
countering Chinese threats in the region than in seriously pushing for human rights 
                                                
260 Telephone interview with Elizabeth Ferris (Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal 
Displacement).  February 23, 2012. 
 
261 See: “US has given Philippines over $507M in military aid, says Thomas.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 
(November 1, 2011).  
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improvements in the country.262  Overall, it is not really clear why, unlike the case of 
Colombia, the US has not played a greater role in supporting the development of 
domestic legislation on displacement in the Philippines.   This may be due partly to the 
existence of very different regional dynamics and to the absence of vigorous regional 
human rights networks. 
During the past decade negotiations have taken place between insurgents and The 
Philippines’ government.  This culminated with the signing of a peace accord in Kuala 
Lumpur in January 2014, which paved the road for the creation of a Muslim autonomous 
entity named “Bangsamoro” and called for self-rule in some parts of the southern 
Philippines in exchange for the demobilization of separatist armed groups. 
During the past decade there has also been a push to formally commit to the GP 
by instituting domestic legislation to protect the rights of the IDPs.  In 2013, The 
Philippine’s Congress finally passed a comprehensive bill on internal displacement.  This 
law project, which was hailed by UNHCR as a model example for other countries, would 
make The Philippines the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to have comprehensive 
legislation that protects people against arbitrary displacement and guarantees the rights of 
the internally displaced in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles.263  
The bill sought to prevent displacement and outlined the rights of IDPs during and 
after displacement.  Among other things, it imposed heavy penalties against arbitrary 
internal displacement of any person and provided for monetary compensation for lost or 
damaged property or for the death of family members. The law also designated the 
Commission on Human Rights of The Philippines as the focal point for the protection of 
                                                
262 See: Shahshahani, Azadeh. “US Aid and Human Rights Violations in Philippines.” The Huffington 
Post.  April 4, 2014.  
263 Ibid. 
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IDPs.264 In May of 2014, however, President Benigno Aquino III vetoed the law, arguing 
that some of its provisions were unconstitutional. A revised bill has been tabled towards 
the end of the 2014 (IDMC, 2014a).  
An in depth case study of the Philippines could carefully trace the mechanisms 
that have been pushing through this law project.  It could help illuminate a number of 
important questions:  What took the Philippines so long to commit to the GP? What 
motivated the country’s policymakers to propose comprehensive IDP policies in The 
Philippines at this time?  In the absence of regional human rights institutions and activist 
human rights networks and a strong regional culture of national sovereignty and non-
interference what made the difference?  
 
Sudan  
With an estimated 12.5 million IDPs, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than 
a third of the world’s internally displaced population.  As a result of internal conflict, 
state failure and ethnic strife, internal displacement has been a permanent feature of the 
region since the end of the Cold War.  As of 2013, 21 countries suffered from internal 
displacement (and 15 of these from protracted situations of displacement). Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan had the largest populations of IDPs 
in Africa, and were closely followed by Somalia and the Central African Republic 
(CAR).265  Not surprisingly, due to the large dimensions of the problem in the region, 
displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa has attracted significant attention of international 
                                                
264 Ibid. 
265 See: IDMC.  Internal Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa.   (http://www.internal-
displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/summary/)  Last visited 12/16/14. 
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donors, norm entrepreneurs, and humanitarian workers.  Further research on patterns of 
commitment and compliance with the GP needs to take a look at Sub-Saharan Africa.   
The Sub-Saharan region is also interesting because it has developed legally 
binding treaties on internal displacement.  In 2012 Africa enacted the Kampala 
Convention – the first binding regional convention for the protection of IDPs. Formally 
known as the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa, the Kampala Convention it is the world’s first continental 
instrument that legally binds governments to protect the rights and wellbeing of IDPs.  
Among other things, the convention established a legally binding definition of IDPs and 
outlines general provisions for the prevention and mitigation of internal displacement.  It 
outlaws actions that lead to arbitrary displacement and holds all actors responsible for 
displacement, including private and multinational companies, accountable for their 
actions.  Most notably the Convention requires states to modify their national criminal 
law in order to “declare as offences punishable by law acts of arbitrary displacement that 
amount to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity” (Article 4(6)) (Kamungi, 
2010).  It reinforces states’ primary responsibility to protect IDPs and promotes the 
adoption of national legislation and policies, in line with the GP, to protect and assist 
IDPs.  It requires states to collaborate with civil society and humanitarian organizations 
to ensure IDPs’ protection and assistance if they do not have the resources to do so 
themselves also makes national authorities responsible for creating the conditions 
required to achieve durable solutions (IDMC, 2014b).  Although it is still too early to 
determine its effectiveness in alleviating the plight of IDPs it undoubtedly constitutes a 
historical milestone for the diffusion of the Guiding Principles, making the region a 
critical area of study.  
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Prior to the Kampala Convention, a number of countries in the region took an 
early lead in addressing the needs and protecting the rights of IDPs.  Burundi (2000), 
Angola (2001), Sierra Leone (2001), Liberia (2002), Uganda (2004), Sudan (2009) and 
Kenya (2012) have put in place domestic legislation on displacement during the 2000s.  
Among these, Sudan perhaps represents the most important, and certainly the most 
puzzling case of commitment with the GP. 
Displacement in Sudan has been the result of a number of protracted internal 
conflicts.  These include the two notoriously bloody civil wars with the South (1955-1972 
and 1983-2005)266 that resulted in the death and displacement of millions of people, and a 
war in Darfur (2005- ongoing), in the western part of the country, which has claimed the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians and prompted international accusations of 
genocide.   
Sudan for many years, prior to the secession of the South, had the dubious 
distinction of being the country with the most IDPs in the world.  Perhaps for this reason 
a former Sudanese diplomat, Francis Deng, was chosen in the 1990s to become the first 
UN special representative on displacement.  Sudan also constitutes one of the world’s 
clearest cases of regime-induced displacement (Orchard, 2010a).  The government in 
Khartoum, historically controlled by the Islamic Arab majority, has orchestrated directly 
and indirectly a number of ethnic cleansing campaigns against minority groups in order 
to maintain control over the country’s vast oil reserves.  For several decades, Sudan has 
continuously denied allegations of genocide, defied the international community’s call 
for an end to hostilities, and blocked humanitarian aid.  In many ways this has made 
Sudan a pariah state.267  In 2008 the International Criminal Court indicted Sudan’s 
                                                
266 Sudan’s Second Civil War resulted in the breakup of the country and the creation of South Sudan… 
267 See: “Sudan’s War on Itself; From Rogue State to Pariah State.” New York Times. May 16, 2004. 
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longtime ruler Omar Al Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in 
Darfur.  Despite constituting by several measures a “least likely” case of compliance with 
the international IDP regime, in 2009 Sudan instituted very comprehensive domestic 
legislation on internal displacement. 
Sudan’s signal of commitment with the IDP regime presents a serious puzzle. 
Why would one of the world’s biggest violators of IDP rights choose to commit to the 
IDP regime in 2009?  To what extent was commitment driven by international pressure?  
To what extent was it a purely domestic matter?  To what extent is Sudan instituting and 
complying with these laws?  
One possible interpretation of Sudan’s development of domestic legislation on 
displacement is that it represents a cynical move to appease international pressure and 
was not really intended to alleviate the plight of the millions’ of Sudanese IDPs.  Another 
possible explanation is that it was an attempt to address the Khartoum grievances of the 
Southern Sudanese and stall the region’s move towards secession.  If these laws were in 
fact an exercise in “window dressing,” it would be interesting to ascertain the extent to 
which commitment to the IDP regime paid off and lessened the country’s international 
isolation.  It would also be important to investigate whether Sudan’s commitment to the 
regime has produced any sort of regional effect, perhaps prompting other norm violators 
to take the regime more seriously.  Has it, instead, devalued the seriousness of these 
norms?   
There are a number of additional countries whose responses to the international 
IDP regime could shed additional light on the research question.  I believe that the cases 
listed above (Turkey, The Philippines, and Sudan), however, could offer the most 
interesting comparison to Colombia and offer important contributions to our 
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understanding of the importance of regional dynamics as they relate to compliance with 
IDP norms. 
As with the Colombian case study, a comparative structured study of Turkey, the 
Philippines and Sudan should employ a qualitative process tracing methods.  More 
specifically, these studies should carefully trace the chain of events that lead to countries 
to put in place, or fail to put in place, domestic policies for the protection and assistance 
of IDPs in compliance with the international IDP regime. 
Although some published information (particularly reports by organizations such 
as UNHCR, IDMC, and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement) may assist 
researchers in telling the story of IDP politics in these countries, any in-depth case study 
would most likely have to rely primarily on data derived from extensive elite key 
informant interviews.  The targets of these interviews should, at a minimum, include: 
domestic and foreign force migration and human rights activists, international observers, 
country experts, domestic policymakers, and representatives of UN agencies and other 
humanitarian organizations involved with IDPs. 
It may admittedly be less feasible replicate the research performed in Colombia in 
Turkey, the Philippines and Sudan because these three countries are, at the very least, 
home to more restrictive societies.  For this reason information derived from key 
informant interviews is particularly critical.  Nevertheless, the perspective of strategically 
placed individuals in these countries may help researchers to reconstruct the story of 
efforts to promote the IDP protections in these countries and test the validity of the 
hypotheses and nascent results that came out of the Colombian case study. 
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CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the last two decades of the 20th century, internal displacement arose as an 
urgent humanitarian problem.  To this day the problem has only continued to grow 
showing no signs that it will disappear anytime in the near future.  However, thanks to the 
efforts of a tireless and ingenious group of norm entrepreneurs the world today has in 
place an international regime to protect these vulnerable masses.  The evidence suggests 
that a regime based on “soft law” has increasingly made a difference on national policies 
and practices.  Over the years, a growing number of countries have committed to and 
have begun to comply with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.  The norms 
have become effectively disseminated within humanitarian circles and, for the most part, 
are taken for granted by the international community.  They are also slowly hardening 
through the creation of customary international law and the elaboration of binding 
regional treaties. 
This is in many ways a success story for international human rights activism.  The 
emergence of the international IDP regime demonstrates how principled advocates 
operating largely outside of traditional international rule-making frameworks can make a 
real difference in the lives of millions of people.  In Colombia alone, people escaping the 
conflict today enjoy a level of recognition and a set of guarantees and protections that 
would have been unimaginable a generation ago. 
However, this study also demonstrates that commitment and compliance with IDP 
norms is not taking place uniformly around the globe and that there are glaring 
differences across regions in terms of commitment and compliance.  This difference can 
be attributed to a number of complex regional factors (such as culture, regional 
integration, the role of regional hegemonic powers, and the density of regional human 
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rights networks) for which there is no easy policy solution.  There are, nevertheless, a 
number of steps that the international community can take, and continue to take to 
address the regional gap in commitment and compliance. 
First, and perhaps the principal lesson of this systematic and global study of 
commitment and compliance with the IDP regime is that efforts to promote the rights of 
IDPs need to move from the global to the regional arena.  It is evident that norm 
entrepreneurs intuitively understand this.  Efforts to develop binding regional treaties and 
conventions on displacement are a step in the right direction.  The Kampala Convention, 
which came into force in 2012, was arguably a monumental achievement.268  Norm 
entrepreneurs should make efforts to replicate such an agreement in other regions – most 
notably East Asia/Pacific and the Middle East. 
Second, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, such as 
the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, IDMC, UNHCR, the EU, the OAS and 
AU should continue to facilitate opportunities for the exchange of ideas and expertise on 
displacement and foster the regional dissemination of the GP. Some clear examples 
include regional conferences where advocates, academics, humanitarian workers and 
government entities learn from each other’s experiences.  A number of displacement 
experts I interviewed believe that countries’ failures to institute policy measures to 
address displacement often times have more to do with their capacity and expertise than a 
lack of political will.  This study should encourage the creation of the type of regional 
organizations like the Permanent Consultancy for Displacement in the Americas 
(CPDIA), which played a key role in assisting Colombia to draft its IDP laws.  Along 
these lines, norm promoters should continue to cultivate transnational advocacy links to 
                                                
268  IDMC.  Briefing Paper: The Kampala Convention two years on: time to turn theory into practice.  
December 8, 2014.   
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draw domestic IDP and human rights groups out of the isolation in which they often find 
themselves.   They should continue to support domestic advocates and sympathetic 
government entities with financing, training and technical capacity building.  
The case of Colombia illustrates how international donors like the European 
Union and the United States can play a central role in the implementation of IDP norms.  
The Guiding Principles, after all, are complex and expensive propositions to put into 
force.  Donors can contribute to the implementation of IDP laws by providing fragile 
countries with urgently needed financing to organize the relevant state bureaucracies and 
fortify national human rights institutions (such as the office of the ombudsman).  Donors 
can also contribute to efforts of national consolidation, to expands the presence of the 
state authorities in historically marginalized or conflict zones and to facilitate their access 
to IDPs.  In particular, they should concentrate on promoting the development of 
effective and independent courts.  As illustrated in Colombia, in the absence of 
international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, implementation may depend on a 
strong domestic judiciary to keep governments accountable. 
The international community should continue to support the role of UNHCR as 
the international institution for internal displacement.  This study’s findings suggest that 
the organization, which reluctantly broadened its mandate to include internal 
displacement, is indeed making a difference both in promoting host countries’ 
commitment and in attenuating their displacement crises. 
Finally, the international community should continue to maintain the issue of 
displacement high on the international agenda.  Several humanitarian experts interviewed 
expressed their frustration that as internal displacement has become increasingly 
mainstreamed, IDP activism has lost much of its momentum.  International attention has 
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moved on to other humanitarian concerns.269  International advocacy groups and the RSG 
himself have become less outspoken on the issue over the years.  Nevertheless, as the 
recent developments in Syria demonstrate, internal displacement continues to be an 
urgent humanitarian challenge of enormous proportions.  Despite considerable advances 
made in the past twenty years significant work lies ahead.  The international community 
needs to move beyond rhetoric and into action.  Millions of lives around the globe depend 
on it. 
  
  
                                                
269 Interview with Andrea Lari (Programs Director, Refugees International). March 29, 2013.  Washington, 
DC.   Telephone interview with Simon Bagshaw (OCHA, Protectioon and Diaplacement Officer, Policy 
Development Branch).  May 9, 2012.  Telephone interview with Joel Charny (InterAction, Vice President 
for Humanitarian Policy and Practice). April 4, 2012. 
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Appendix A: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
SECTION I - GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
Principle 1  
1. Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and 
freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their 
country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights 
and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced.  
2. These Principles are without prejudice to individual criminal responsibility under 
international law, in particular relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  
Principle 2  
1. These Principles shall be observed by all authorities, groups and persons 
irrespective of their legal status and applied without any adverse distinction. The 
observance of these Principles shall not affect the legal status of any authorities, 
groups or persons involved.  
2. These Principles shall not be interpreted as restricting, modifying or impairing the 
provisions of any international human rights or international humanitarian law 
instrument or rights granted to persons under domestic law. In particular, these 
Principles are without prejudice to the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other 
countries.  
Principle 3  
1. National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection 
and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their 
jurisdiction.  
2. Internally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection and 
humanitarian assistance from these authorities. They shall not be persecuted or 
punished for making such a request.  
Principle 4  
1. These Principles shall be applied without discrimination of any kind, such as race, 
color, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic 
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or social origin, legal or social status, age, disability, property, birth, or on any 
other similar criteria.  
2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied 
minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of 
household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to 
protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes 
into account their special needs.  
SECTION II - PRINCIPLES RELATING TO PROTECTION FROM 
DISPLACEMENT  
Principle 5  
All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their 
obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all 
circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of 
persons.  
Principle 6  
1. Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily 
displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence.  
2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:  
a) When it is based on policies of apartheid, Aethnic cleansing or similar 
practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial 
composition of the affected population;  
b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved 
or imperative military reasons so demand;  
c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by 
compelling and overriding public interests;  
d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires 
their evacuation; and  
e) When it is used as a collective punishment.  
3. Displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances.  
Principle 7  
1. Prior to any decision requiring the displacement of persons, the authorities 
concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid 
displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken 
to minimise displacement and its adverse effects.  
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2. The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure, to the greatest 
practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the displaced 
persons, that such displacements are effected in satisfactory conditions of safety, 
nutrition, health and hygiene, and that members of the same family are not 
separated.  
3. If displacement occurs in situations other than during the emergency stages of 
armed conflicts and disasters, the following guarantees shall be complied with:  
a) A specific decision shall be taken by a State authority empowered by law 
to order such measures;  
b) Adequate measures shall be taken to guarantee to those to be displaced full 
information on the reasons and procedures for their displacement and, 
where applicable, on compensation and relocation;  
c) The free and informed consent of those to be displaced shall be sought;  
d) The authorities concerned shall endeavor to involve those affected, 
particularly women, in the planning and management of their relocation;  
e) Law enforcement measures, where required, shall be carried out by 
competent legal authorities; and  
f) The right to an effective remedy, including the review of such decisions 
by appropriate judicial authorities, shall be respected.  
Principle 8  
Displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, 
liberty and security of those affected.  
Principle 9  
States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous 
peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on 
and attachment to their lands.  
SECTION III - PRINCIPLES RELATING TO PROTECTION DURING 
DISPLACEMENT  
Principle 10  
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life which shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. Internally displaced persons 
shall be protected in particular against:  
a) Genocide;  
b) Murder;  
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c) Summary or arbitrary executions; and  
d) Enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, 
threatening or resulting in death.  
Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited.  
2. Attacks or other acts of violence against internally displaced persons who do not 
or no longer participate in hostilities are prohibited in all circumstances. Internally 
displaced persons shall be protected, in particular, against:  
a) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence, including the 
creation of areas wherein attacks on civilians are permitted;  
b) Starvation as a method of combat;  
c) Their use to shield military objectives from attack or to shield, favor or 
impede military operations;  
d) Attacks against their camps or settlements; and  
e) The use of anti-personnel landmines.  
Principle 11  
1. Every human being has the right to dignity and physical, mental and moral 
integrity. 
2. Internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall 
be protected in particular against:  
a) Rape, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender-
specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;  
b) Slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, 
sexual exploitation, or forced labor of children; and  
c) Acts of violence intended to spread terror among internally displaced persons.  
Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited.  
Principle 12  
1.  Every human being has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.  
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, they shall not be 
interned in or confined to a camp. If in exceptional circumstances such internment 
or confinement is absolutely necessary, it shall not last longer than required by the 
circumstances.  
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3. Internally displaced persons shall be protected from discriminatory arrest and 
detention as a result of their displacement.  
4. In no case shall internally displaced persons be taken hostage.  
Principle 13  
1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or 
permitted to take part in hostilities.  
2. Internally displaced persons shall be protected against discriminatory practices of 
recruitment into any armed forces or groups as a result of their displacement. In 
particular any cruel, inhuman or degrading practices that compel compliance or 
punish non-compliance with recruitment are prohibited in all circumstances.  
Principle 14  
1. Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his or her residence.  
2. In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out 
of camps or other settlements.  
Principle 15  
Internally displaced persons have:  
a) The right to seek safety in another part of the country;  
b) The right to leave their country;  
c) The right to seek asylum in another country; and  
d) The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place 
where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.  
Principle 16  
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to know the fate and whereabouts 
of missing relatives.  
2. The authorities concerned shall endeavor to establish the fate and whereabouts of 
internally displaced persons reported missing, and cooperate with relevant 
international organizations engaged in this task. They shall inform the next of kin 
on the progress of the investigation and notify them of any result.  
3. The authorities concerned shall endeavor to collect and identify the mortal 
remains of those deceased, prevent their despoliation or mutilation, and facilitate 
the return of those remains to the next of kin or dispose of them respectfully.  
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4. Grave sites of internally displaced persons should be protected and respected in 
all circumstances. Internally displaced persons should have the right of access to 
the gravesites of their deceased relatives.  
Principle 17  
1. Every human being has the right to respect of his or her family life.  
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, family members who 
wish to remain together shall be allowed to do so.  
3. Families which are separated by displacement should be reunited as quickly as 
possible. All appropriate steps shall be taken to expedite the reunion of such 
families, particularly when children are involved. The responsible authorities shall 
facilitate inquiries made by family members and encourage and cooperate with 
the work of humanitarian organizations engaged in the task of family 
reunification.  
4. Members of internally displaced families whose personal liberty has been 
restricted by internment or confinement in camps shall have the right to remain 
together.  
Principle 18  
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.  
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, 
competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure 
safe access to:  
a) Essential food and potable water;  
b) Basic shelter and housing;  
c) Appropriate clothing; and  
d) Essential medical services and sanitation.  
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of women in the 
planning and distribution of these basic supplies.  
Principle 19  
1. All wounded and sick internally displaced persons as well as those with 
disabilities shall receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible 
delay, the medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any 
grounds other than medical ones. When necessary, internally displaced persons 
shall have access to psychological and social services.  
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2. Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women, including access to 
female health care providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as 
well as appropriate counseling for victims of sexual and other abuses.  
3. Special attention should also be given to the prevention of contagious and 
infectious diseases, including AIDS, among internally displaced persons.  
Principle 20  
1. Every human being has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law.  
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities 
concerned shall issue to them all documents necessary for the enjoyment and 
exercise of their legal rights, such as passports, personal identification documents, 
birth certificates and marriage certificates. In particular, the authorities shall 
facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in 
the course of displacement, without imposing unreasonable conditions, such as 
requiring the return to one’s area of habitual residence in order to obtain these or 
other required documents.  
3. Women and men shall have equal rights to obtain such necessary documents and 
shall have the right to have such documentation issued in their own names.  
Principle 21  
1. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions.  
2. The property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all 
circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts:  
a) Pillage;  
b) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence;  
c) Being used to shield military operations or objectives;  
d) Being made the object of reprisal; and  
e) Being destroyed or appropriated as a form of collective punishment.  
3. Property and possessions left behind by internally displaced persons should be 
protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or 
use.  
Principle 22  
1. Internally displaced persons, whether or not they are living in camps, shall not be 
discriminated against as a result of their displacement in the enjoyment of the 
following rights:  
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a) The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, opinion and 
expression;  
b) The right to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in 
economic activities;  
c) The right to associate freely and participate equally in community affairs;  
d) The right to vote and to participate in governmental and public affairs, 
including the right to have access to the means necessary to exercise this right; 
and  
e) The right to communicate in a language they understand.  
Principle 23  
1. Every human being has the right to education.  
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities 
concerned shall ensure that such persons, in particular displaced children, receive 
education which shall be free and compulsory at the primary level. Education 
should respect their cultural identity, language and religion.  
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full and equal participation of 
women and girls in educational programmes. 
4. Education and training facilities shall be made available to internally displaced 
persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as 
soon as conditions permit.  
 
SECTION IV - PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
Principle 24  
1. All humanitarian assistance shall be carried out in accordance with the principles 
of humanity and impartiality and without discrimination.  
2. Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons shall not be diverted, in 
particular for political or military reasons.  
Principle 25  
1. The primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.  
2. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the 
right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer 
shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State’s internal 
affairs and shall be considered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be 
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arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or 
unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance.  
3. All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of 
humanitarian assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such 
assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced.  
Principle 26  
Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transports and supplies shall be 
respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or other acts of violence.  
Principle 27  
1. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors when 
providing assistance should give due regard to the protection needs and human 
rights of internally displaced persons and take appropriate measures in this regard. 
In so doing, these organizations and actors should respect relevant international 
standards and codes of conduct.  
2. The preceding paragraph is without prejudice to the protection responsibilities of 
international organizations mandated for this purpose, whose services may be 
offered or requested by States.  
SECTION V - PRINCIPLES RELATING TO RETURN, RESETTLEMENT AND 
REINTEGRATION  
Principle 28  
1. Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish 
conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons 
to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of 
habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such 
authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled 
internally displaced persons.  
2. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of internally 
displaced persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement 
and reintegration.  
Principle 29  
1. Internally displaced persons who have returned to their homes or places 
of habitual residence or who have resettled in another part of the country shall not 
be discriminated against as a result of their having been displaced. They shall 
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have the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and 
have equal access to public services.  
2. Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or 
resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their 
property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon 
their displacement. When recovery of such property and possessions is not 
possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining 
appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.  
Principle 30  
All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate for international humanitarian 
organizations and other appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, 
rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in their return or 
resettlement and reintegration.  
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Appendix B: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Diagnostics 
An important assumption of the Cox model is that of the proportionality of hazard 
rates.  The global test of the assumption failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
assumption is valid, 𝜒2 = 5.09,𝑑𝑓 = 7,𝑝 =    .6491.270 Thus, the semi-parametric 
model appears to be appropriate for the data. 
Additional diagnostics were carried out using Schoenfeld residuals to identify 
outliers that may have been having undue influence on the results.  Although none of the 
observations appeared to be imposing any disproportionate influence on the estimates, the 
observations with the highest dfbeta values (that had the largest impact on the size of 
each variable’s hazard ratio) were investigated to confirm that the data were correct.   
An additional analysis relied on Martingale residuals to evaluate the possibility 
that any of the interval and ratio-level variables should have been specified using an 
alternative functional form (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2008). The plots did not reveal 
any systematic evidence that any logarithmic or other transformation would be necessary. 
A final consideration concerning function form was that the effects of some 
variables might depend on the levels of another variable.  For example, the effect of 
norms may be greater when the size of the crisis is larger, or the effect of physical 
integrity may be larger in one region than another.   
Table 12 reports the results of testing these interactions.  Each model contains 
only the main effects and interactions without any controls in order to minimize 
                                                
270 This test was carried out using Stata’s estat phtest command. Because this option is not available 
following Stata’s command for Cox regression on multiply imputed datasets, it was necessary to run the 
model on the non-imputed data and use the residuals from the missing data model for the test.  The model 
coefficients were compared between the missing data and complete data analyses and found to be very 
similar.  The alternative, given that no procedures exists in Stata for multiply imputed data sets, would have 
been to carry out no test. 
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multicolinearity effects.  There are four different models testing for an interaction 
between normative variables and crisis size, since there were multiple variables 
measuring each concept.  In addition, physical integrity is interacted with each region 
dummy.  None of the interactions turns out to be significant, meaning that the functional 
forms assumed in Tables 3 through 6 are not inferior to a more flexible model that would 
allow for the effects of some variables to depend on the values of others. 
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Table 12: Check for Interaction Effects 
  HR SE t p  95%CI 
RSG Visit (Lag) 2.643 1.422 1.81 0.071 0.921 7.585 
Relative Size IDP Crisis 63.158 178.331 1.47 0.142 0.249 >1,000 
Interaction 12.347 46.601 0.67 0.505 0.008 >1,000 
       RSG Visit (Lag) 1.243 5.330 0.05 0.959 0.000 >1,000 
IDP Estimates (Log) 1.568 0.401 1.76 0.079 0.950 2.589 
Interaction 1.057 0.343 0.17 0.865 0.559 1.997 
       IDPs Protected by 
UNHCR 4.212 2.337 2.59 0.010 1.420 12.497 
Relative Size of IDP 
Crisis 0.080 0.668 -0.30 0.763 0.000 >1,000 
Interaction 802.857 6,997.051 0.77 0.443 0.000 >1,000 
       IDPs Protected by 
UNHCR 21.614 99.819 0.67 0.506 0.003 >1,000 
IDP Estimates (Log) 1.683 0.435 2.01 0.044 1.014 2.793 
 
0.887 0.309 -0.34 0.731 0.448 1.757 
       Regional Density (Lag) 5.204 5.828 1.47 0.141 0.580 46.728 
Relative Size of IDP 
Crisis 190.778 439.174 2.28 0.023 2.094 >1,000 
Interaction 0.055 0.449 -0.35 0.723 0.000 >1,000 
       Regional Density (Lag) 102.396 963.622 0.49 0.623 0.000 >1,000 
IDP Estimates (Log) 2.016 0.513 2.76 0.006 1.225 3.320 
Interaction 0.858 0.626 -0.21 0.833 0.205 3.587 
       Europe-Central Asia 4.139 3.083 1.91 0.057 0.961 17.823 
Physical Integrity 0.665 0.120 -2.26 0.024 0.467 0.948 
Interaction 1.189 0.287 0.72 0.474 0.741 1.907 
       Latin America-
Caribbean 4.103 4.044 1.43 0.152 0.594 28.321 
Physical Integrity 0.826 0.109 -1.45 0.147 0.638 1.070 
Interaction 0.674 0.279 -0.95 0.340 0.300 1.516 
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